

# Moral Relations, Political Economy and Class Struggle

Philip Corrigan & Derek Sayer

In a critical comment on the Comtists (in a draft for his *The Civil War in France*) Marx declares:

*Poor men! They do not know that every social form of property has 'morals' of its own...*<sup>2</sup>

The strategy of analysis involved in this sharp comment opens up the manner in which many analysts have constituted their notions of 'morality' or 'moral ideology'. We wish to suggest that the terms 'moral relations' and 'moral economy' better express the social reality that is being depicted. To do this is not merely to play with words; as Ollman has rightly argued,<sup>3</sup> a relational grasp of the world can only be understood in terms of a multidimensionality which results from class-specific practices.

The relations at issue, briefly, are formed in the production and reproduction of material values, of the necessities of life, including human beings. The grounds for this assertion do not lie in any putative 'priority' of 'the economy' or 'technology' over 'ideology' or 'morality'. It is a question, rather, of a mode of production involving specific moral relations. As *The German Ideology* emphasises, *The production of life ... now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship. By social we understand the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, or social stage, and that this mode of cooperation is itself a 'productive force'.*<sup>4</sup>

That is to say, firstly, that production is always simultaneously material and social: it is impossible to separate out the 'forces of production' in such a way as to conceive the 'base' of any mode of production apart from the relations between people that are the way it is accomplished. Such relations have their moral dimension. But, secondly, there is always a struggle to accomplish production, as Marx establishes in his *Grundrisse*

*It must be kept in mind that the new forces of production do not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from the womb of the self-positing Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the existing development of production and the inherited, traditional relations of property.*<sup>5</sup>

That is,

*Forces of production and social relations - two different sides of the development of the social individual - appear to capital as mere means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high ... Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc.*

*These are products of human industry ...*<sup>6</sup>

Production is always an accomplishment: and what is produced are not merely goods, but the appropriately moral relations which make the production of material values possible. These relations too, in short, are the achievements of struggle; specifically, of class struggle, the struggle not for production in the abstract, but for particular ways of producing.

Our point is simply this. When Marx says that

'capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things',<sup>7</sup> he is making a *methodological* statement which speaks of 'ideas' in speaking of 'things', which talks of 'moral relations' in talking of 'political economy'. The social relations of capitalist production are profoundly moral in their establishment, through certain conditioned arrangements between people, of the grounds - the factual reality - of the world of the Obvious.

A certain reading of marxism-leninism conspires to work with the grain of bourgeois vocational (disciplinary) education to render it Obvious that one should talk of 'morality' and 'moral ideology' as distinct from class relations. This is evident in both Althusser's paper on Ideological State Apparatuses<sup>8</sup> and the praise of, and reliance upon it found in recent Radical Philosophy discussions.

The particular misreading most damaging to analyses of moral relations is one which makes a methodology out of the metaphor of bases and super-structures. The error here is analogous to the futility of attempting to say here is the language-game and there is what it means, what it accomplishes, what it enables us to see, do or understand. Such discourse speaks of here 'the family' and there 'the ideological consequences of the family'.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, and thoroughly congruent with this retreat into metaphysics, it is 'forgotten' that what is being analysed are the social relations of a class-structured social formation dominated by a particular social division of labour. Claims as to the 'socially repressive function'<sup>10</sup> of 'any moral ideology' are like the claims of 'radical sociologists' to show the 'social control functions' exercised by family, school, or university. What such discoveries overlook is class repression and class control, and the conditions supporting these phenomena.<sup>11</sup>

Rather, the workplace, the university or the family entail determinate clusters of social relations which embody definite moral perspectives. Here the work of Geras and Mepham is salient.<sup>12</sup>

In the words of the latter,

*The conditions for the production of ideology are the conditions for the production of a language, and can only be understood by reference to the structure of forms and social practices which systematically enter into the production of particular concepts and propositions in that language. Ideology is not a collection of discrete falsehoods but a matrix of thought firmly grounded in the forms of our social life and organised within a set of interdependent categories. We are not aware of these systematically generative interconnections because our awareness is organised through them.*<sup>13</sup>

We would pause only to note, in passing, that Marx declared language to be 'practical consciousness'; and that we do not all speak the 'same' language, because the content of consciousness is experience: and experience cannot be the same for all classes.<sup>14</sup> But we wish to stress here Mepham's central thesis:

*Bourgeois ideology dominates because, within serious limits, it works, both cognitively and in practice.*<sup>15</sup>

We would add nothing other than a reminder of the permeability, the constructed nature, of this Obvious world. Skillen's self-criticism of his earlier remarks makes the point admirably:

*I think it is now easier to see their one-sidedness. For in stressing the official morality and its hidden meaning we did not bring out the kind of forces it is opposing. Even in the best regulated notions the dominant order is threatened; and official morality is one mark of that threat.*<sup>16</sup>

Modes of production have their appropriate politics and moral relations which make the world Obvious for all those who dwell, work, profit and die there. These politics and morals of production are historically specific, and the accomplishments of different classes. While Capital rules, for example, the political and moral economy of Capital will be dominant; but that dominance is always an achieved phenomenon, established through a constant day-long, year in and year out class struggle against the political economy of labour and the moral relations appropriate to its emancipation. This is why the notion of contradiction is so vital to any discussion of morals. The working class, for instance, embodies the contradictions of its apparent powerlessness and subordination in the present, real and Obvious world, and its potential power to transform circumstances and people in overcoming the domination of Capital by a direct attack on the politics and the morals of the social division of labour.

## Fetishism & Moral Relations

Just as one consistent reading of marxism-leninism relates the 'base' and the 'superstructure' of any mode of production externally and semi-causally, so another attempts to reduce that 'base' to the facts of property ownership alone. This results in understanding revolution as an act of mere 'taking', not of 'transforming': a point we return to below.

But 'social forms of property' is a very complex concept. In *The German Ideology*, discussing the 'latent slavery of the family', Marx and Engels note how this 'first property'

*corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing over the labour-power of others.*

They continue by stressing that *Division of labour and private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of that activity.*<sup>17</sup>

This says that property is given a social form by reference to the necessary 'activity' - i.e. the social relations - upon which it depends, and through which it is produced. This is how, and why, every social form of property has 'morals' of its

especially when read with K. Speccht, 'The constitution of objects in language' (ch.6 of his *The Foundations of Wittgenstein's late philosophy*, Manchester UP, 1963) and A. Schmidt, 'On the relation between history and nature in dialectical materialism' (Appendix to his *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, NLB, 1971)

4 *German Ideology* (full edition, Lawrence & Wishart, 1965:41; Arthur ed. p50). See also Marx's *Wage, Labour and Capital*.

5 M. Nicolaus (ed.) (Penguin, 1973: 278). Cf. Mao's *Four Essays in philosophy* (Peking, FLP, 1966, esp. p134); 'Our study and the current situation', *Selected Works*, vol.3, 1965, p164; and 'Talk on questions of philosophy', *Mao Tse-Tung unrehearsed* (Penguin, 1974).

6 *Grundrisse*, p706; Cf. the works mentioned in note 1.

7 *Capital*, I (Lawrence & Wishart, 1967: 766); see also *Capital*, III (Lawrence & W, 1972: 814f)

8 L. Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in *Lenin and Philosophy, and other essays* (NLB, 1971). Apart from Rancière, RP7; Cf. A. Lipietz, 'D'Althusser a Mao?' *Les temps modernes*, 29, 1973; N. Geras, RP6, 1973 and 'Althusser's Marxism' in *NLR* 71, 1972; J. Mepham, RP6, 1973; P. Binns in RP7, 1974; I. Craib, RP10, 1975.

9 Cf. note 3 above.

10 Collier, RP9, p5. Our whole effort is written against such formulae as his 'Moral ideology cannot be presented as economic ideology can, should be, and has been - as an objective appearance, contrasted with the essence of the reality of which it is an appearance, but deriving from that reality within the object [it is at this precise point that he cites the works in our note 12 below.] Moral ideology is produced in the first place in the minds of individuals.' (Collier, p6). The separations involved in this kind of philosophy - and in concepts like 'economic ideology' - are the source of grave practical errors.

11 In the foregoing we have in mind the following discussions, not all of which are subject to the same degree of criticism: R. Norman, 'Moral philosophy without morality?' RP6, 1973; J. Rancière, 'On the theory of ideology', RP7, 1974; T. Skillen, 'Marxism and morality', RP8, 1974; A. Collier, 'On the production of moral ideology', RP9, 1974; P. Binns, 'Anti-moralism', RP10, 1975; B. Eccleshall, 'Technology and liberation', RP11, 1975. Cf. P. Binns in RP4 and A. Collier in RP5, 1973, on truth.

12 J. Mepham, 'The theory of ideology in Capital', RP2, 1972; N. Geras, 'Essence and appearance: aspects of Fetishism in Marx's Capital', *NLR* 65, 1971 (reprinted as 'Marx and the critique of political economy' in R. Blackburn (ed.) *Ideology in social science* (Fontana, 1972)). Mepham's work is reprinted in *Working Papers in Cultural Studies*, 6, 1975, along with a response by S. Butters. See also G.A. Cohen, 'Karl Marx and the withering away of social science', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (1), 1972.

13 Mepham, RP2, 17

14 We return to these points all too briefly below.

15 Mepham, RP2, 19. Representations have to be passable, they cannot be purely impositional; this is what Gramsci meant by his claim that 'every State is ethical' (*Prison Notebooks*, eds. Hoare & Nowell-Smith, p258)

16 Skillen, RP8, 15

17 *German Ideology* (full edition, 44; Arthur ed. 52); see *Poverty of Philosophy* (NY, International, 1963: 154), *Capital* III (ed. cit., pp879-880)

- 1 University of Durham, England. These remarks result from collective work, in particular our essays with Harvie Ramsay collected in our book *Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory* (which has not yet found a publisher). Chapter One of the book is available as D. Sayer, *Method and dogma in historical materialism* (Durham, Working papers in sociology, no.8, 1974; and *Sociological Review* (forthcoming). Cf. papers by P. Corrigan in *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 4(3)1974; *Journal of Peasant Studies* 2(3)1975.
- 2 Peking, FLP edition, p191; NY, Monthly Review Press edition, p169.
- 3 B. Ollman, *Alienation ...* (Cambridge UP, 1971). This ought to revolutionize Wittgenstein studies,

own. Beyond the phenomena which make capitalism so obvious lie the conditions of possibility which Marx's relational analysis, his critique, exposes as an invitation for empirical and historical enquiry.<sup>18</sup>

In a mode of production dominated by commodity production and surplus-value making, fetishism is one of the *modes* of moral relations. Fetishism is never merely an error, a mistake, a misconception, a false content to consciousness. On the contrary. When Marx speaks of the 'violence of things', he is referring to the experience of the making of things in such a way that it is obvious, indeed 'natural', for some people to use other people as objects. That it is customary to view them as such, in economic theory, in accounting practices, in forms of linguistic discourse, merely recognises that it is customary to 'use' people as objects in production itself.

To sum up: production involves people making things. Making things involves people working together in a certain way against natural and social obstacles using specific technological means. It is not possible to fracture the experience of production into a material 'base' and a social and ideological 'superstructure', in which 'moral ideology' is to be located. The five o'clock shift - like membership of Lloyds - has a profoundly political and moral dimension.

Often, it is clear, analysts have rushed towards the location of moral relations as ideational in order to escape the charge of economism. But in so doing, they present a mirror-image of what Marx described as

*The crude materialism of the economists who regard as the natural properties of things what are social relations of production among people ... is at the same time just as crude an idealism, even fetishism since it imputes social relations to things as inherent characteristics and thus mystifies them.*<sup>19</sup>

In our own words,

*The crude idealism of the philosophers who regard as the ideal qualities of morals what are social relations of production among people ... is at the same time just as crude a materialism, even reification, since it imputes social relations to ideas as inherent characteristics, and thus mystifies them.*<sup>20</sup>

The symmetry of the fetishism of the economists and the reification of the philosophers indicates their common failure to grasp the nature of social production.

## The 'Viewpoint of Society'

Marx makes several of the points we have tried to establish so far in his discussions of 'justice' and 'morality'. This, in *Capital III* he argues, *The justice of transactions between agents of production rest on the fact that these arise as natural consequences out of the production relationships. The juristic forms in which these economic transactions appear as wilful acts of the parties concerned, as expressions of their common will and as contracts that may be enforced by law against some individual party, cannot, being mere forms, determine this content. They merely express it. This content is just whenever it corresponds, is appropriate to the mode of production. It is unjust whenever it contradicts that mode. Slavery on the basis of capitalist production is unjust; likewise fraud in the quality of commodities.*<sup>21</sup>

Unfortunately it is precisely these kind of formulations which have been abstracted out to become, for example, part of the functionalist meta-


physics found in Althusser by Rancière. What is then established are invariants of human sociation which continue the division of labour appropriate for and specific to capitalism. Thus Althusser's moral relations boom out when he informs us that 'the Marxist concepts of the technical division and the social division of labour'

*are a fortiori valid for a particular social reality like the university, which, for various essential reasons, belongs to every modern society, whether capitalist, socialist or communist.*<sup>22</sup>

No doubt it is the same 'various essential reasons' that drive Paul Q. Hirst to affirm that

*All societies outlaw certain categories of acts and punish them... The police force in our own society is not merely an instrument of oppression, or of the maintenance of the capitalist economic system, but also a condition of a civilised existence under the present political-economic relations. One cannot imagine the absence of control of traffic or the absence of the suppression of theft and murder ...*<sup>23</sup>

As Marx indicated in his critique of Proudhon, there can be no such talk 'from the viewpoint of society'.<sup>24</sup> Part of the 'violence of things' is perpetuated when analysts suggest that we can understand state- or market-forms, ideologies or morals, as reified properties of whole societies. They are differentially constituted and experienced.



Paul Klee: "Oppressed Little Gentleman"

The State,<sup>25</sup> for example, may be considered as a usable 'tool' to effect policing, education, invasion or genocide by one class or as a 'burden' which has to be paid for by a dominated class. Marx makes this clear when he describes how a ruling class rules through the idealisation of the secular facts of its material power, rather than solely through the materialisation of its own self-consciousness and 'eternal laws':

*The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships,*

the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance.<sup>26</sup>

Here are the moral relations of fetishism: the material constraints represent an apparatus of moral economy, embodied in the *homo oeconomicus* of the Obvious. Alternatives become difficult to conceive, in all senses.

Here it is worth returning briefly to Mepham's thesis that the conditions of possibility for language construction are those also of ideological production. In this sense the production relations of capitalism entail a repertoire of experiences. Languages do not merely name but constitute the world within which people work, also offering 'explanations' of any abrasion between expectation and experience. There is no single language which constitutes the world and moralises it, there are several. It is normal to abstract out 'official ideology' in terms of a 'Public Language' of a moral economy that appropriates the labour of the working class and 'rewards' them merely as consumers. But there are many others! the technical/doctrinal, for instance, or that internal to ruling class cohesion as found in the brutalities and barbarism of the moral 'technology' associated with Public Schools. Here, as we noted generally above, what is normally erased are the oppositional linguistic repertoires through which alternative moral worlds are constituted, in however fragmentary or piecemeal a manner.

In short, socio-linguistics has much to say to marxists in general, and analysts of moral discourses in particular. A ruling class will always try to ensure that everybody says and knows what, in practice, the majority do not and cannot experience. But that dominated class - and this is the dimension which is overlooked - will experience what it appears cannot be said (at least in public discourse). This makes that experience private; but also immoral, infidel and heathen.<sup>27</sup>

A certain kind of historiography has worked with the kinds of deformations of marxism-leninism we have mentioned. This not only ignores the issues of historical linguistics involved, for example, in 'moral relations',<sup>28</sup> but attempts to operate with assumptions concerning base/superstructure and forms of property that eventuate in a 'positional' rather than a 'relational' conception of class formation,<sup>29</sup> identity and coherence. What becomes invisible is that manner of the making of moral regulation indicated by Sir L. Woodward as 'the organisation of leisure with indirect educational results...'<sup>30</sup> This, in turn, means that we too have all too often accepted bourgeois explanations of concepts and practices, considering 'apathy', 'deference', 'literacy' and 'drunkenness' as unproblematical moral states of being.<sup>31</sup>

But the main burden of our criticism falls not on the past but the future, on the implications for understandings of socialism entailed in some of the methodology upon which we have commented. The above practices tend, cumulatively, to make socialist construction mystical by obscuring the origins of the simultaneous transformation of people and circumstances in preceding modes of production. Marx never did this. He saw within the collective experience of the working class, and the knowledge they donated to him, a vision of an alternative kind of social formation.<sup>32</sup> Socialism does not claim to speak the truths of an abstract society; it portrays the relational understanding of social

18 *German Ideology* (full edition, p31); *Grundrisse* (ed. cit., 461f); *Theories of Surplus Value III* (p500f) and *Capital III* (p790f).

- 19 *Grundrisse* (ed. cit., p687). See Marx's account of 'spiritual production' in *Theories of Surplus Value I* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1969, 284f)
- 20 Cf. Wittgenstein's remarks on the 'craving for generality' in his *Blue and Brown Books* (Blackwell, 1969, 16f)
- 21 *Capital III* (p339f); on 'authority', Cf. pp881f); *German Ideology* (full edition, p265f) is important here.
- 22 *Nouvelle Critique*, January 1964; quoted in Rancière, RP7, 4; see how E. Balibar seems to suggest - no doubt for 'reasons' - that all societies have to be class societies because all modes of production have to have non-workers appropriating surplus labour. L. Althusser, E. Balibar, *Reading Capital* (NLB, 1970, 212f).
- 23 P.Q. Hirst, 'Reply to Taylor and Walton', *Economy and Society* 1(3) 1972, 353, his emphasis. We especially like 'one cannot imagine' for his moral prescriptiveness, its conflation of ought and is.
- 24 Cf. Marx's *Poverty of Philosophy* and his *Grundrisse* where he frequently criticises petty bourgeois theorists like Proudhon. For an extension of the charge to sociological rationality Cf. P. Corrigan, 'Dichotomy is contradiction', *Sociological Review* 23(2) May 1975
- 25 On the State - apart from Gramsci, note 15 above, see A. Wood, 'The Marxian critique of justice', *Philosophy and public affairs* 1(3) Spring 1972; T. Skillen, RP2, 1972
- 26 *German Ideology* (full ed. p61; Arthur ed. p64)
- 27 Cf. C. Mueller's work cited in the extended review of his book *The Politics of Communication* (NY, Oxford, 1973) by P. Corrigan, *Sociological Review* 23(2) 1975. Cf. B. Borsley, 'Radical linguistics', RP11, 1975; issues of *Language in Society*
- 28 In the early 19th century some Public Schools taught 'a curiously named subject, Moral Relations, which seems to have been a form of elementary economics ...' L. Cooper, *Radical Jack* (Cresset Press, 1959, 24-5). Cf. A. Briggs, 'The Language of class...', ch.1 in A. Briggs & J. Saville (eds), *Essays in Labour History I* (Macmillan, 1960) and P. Hollis, 'Ideology - the new analysis', ch.7 of her *The Pauper Press* (Oxford UP, 1970).
- 29 See the explicit critique of marxist dogma in the work of E.P. Thompson and E.D. Genovese.
- 30 Sir L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform*, 2nd ed. (Oxford UP, 1962, 495). Cf. R. Johnson, 'Educational policy...', *Past and Present*, 49, 1970.
- 31 Cf. S. Yeo, 'On the uses of "apathy"', *Archives européennes de sociologie*, 15, 1974; H. Newby, 'The deferential dialectic', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, 1975; P. Corrigan and V. Gillespie, 'Class struggle, social literacy and idle time', *Victorian Studies* (forthcoming); Brian Harrison, *Drink and the Victorians* (Faber, 1971); E.P. Thompson, 'Moral economy of the English crowd...', *Past and Present*, 50, 1971; and the very important comment by E.G. Genovese, *Ibid* (68), 1973, 161-168 entirely congruent with our own analysis; E.P. Thompson, 'Patrician society, plebeian culture', *Journal of Social History*, 7, 1974, and his forthcoming book on the Waltham Black, 1723 Act, which contains a specific critique of Althusser's paper cited in our note 8 above; D.C. Moore, 'Political morality in mid-nineteenth century England', *Victorian Studies*, 13, 1969-70; B. Harrison, 'State intervention and moral reform' in P. Hollis (ed.), *Pressure from Without* (Edward Arnold, 1974)

formations from a particular, materialist and thoroughly experimental basis. The material base of socialism is simultaneously its moral base: how direct producers are, and the thousands of struggles involved in understanding what it is to be a direct producer under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Above all, socialist revolution is not equivalent to a regime change or new management; it is not a matter of 'taking', but of transformation. From this false conception follows a notion of a 'new morality' which assumes that The Party will 'see to it' that people are *donated* happier, better and fuller lives. This is the morality of the division of labour making efficient use of otherwise unchanged resources (materials, machines, people), of arguing dogmatically that the only way to reach socialism is through the full ripening of capitalism.

Instead we should eschew blind faith and dogmatism, avoid a *priori* hypotheses, and concentrate on revealing the conditions of possibility (and thus the limits of veracity and validity) of moral statements which are broadcast as inherent characteristics of human nature; homogeneously available to all classes; and abstractable from the circumstances of their production.

There are severe restrictions, which we hope our remarks have indicated, on our own activities. Throwing in one's lot with the proletariat is a methodological and theoretical shift which has profound consequences. Trying to understand social reality from that body of experience is to make all sorts of things, relations, people, visible; and, having seen them, there are many other things which it is no longer possible to say, do, or see.

## Seeds of Freedom Feyerabend's Fairytales

Nicki Jackowska

I came to Sussex as an undergraduate to achieve certain objectives to expand the experiences and thought-processes which had been developing over a long period of time; to articulate that which existed in me as intuitive perception; to extend my existing thinking into new and more dynamic areas, to experience different ways of thinking, and thereby to experience a certain liberation of my own thinking from its established and habitual patterns. Soon after arrival, I discovered that any such processes, if they were to happen at all, would do so with a few isolated individuals, and otherwise only at my own initiation. It appeared that the general aim of university teaching was to reinforce established ways of thinking, to pass on the completed process from tutor to student. In the majority of encounters with members of faculty, I was required to reinforce, not challenge, the ways of working as well as the subject-matter, until I began to see that much of my personality and thinking up to that point would have to be suppressed, remain unrealised. This, of course, means that the hoped-for expansion and liberation did not happen. Instead there was mechanisation and alienation.

It wasn't long after arrival also, that Paul Feyerabend gave a course of lectures. The cramping sense of the necessity of adapting my own imaginative and intellectual processes to those laid down in the university's invisible rule-book (which adaptation might itself mean three years' hard work), mercifully disappeared. Here was a person who moved easily from analysis to paradox, from

Intellectual workers embody that specific morality founded upon the major of the Three Great Differences, that between mental and manual labour. They thus run the constant risk of theorising, or philosophising, which amounts to the shuffling of reified concepts and fetishised categories, whose invention is a product of the relations which they purport to analyse. Being thus, quite literally, part of the problem, they cannot assist in a solution.

To conclude, then: moral relations, like State relations, involve class struggles. It is time that contradictions and class struggles were seen to permeate social formations entirely and not be restricted to convenient 'industrial' or 'political' contexts. Moral relations, like 'voting', or 'going to school',<sup>33</sup> are as weak and as strong as the Americans once were in Vietnam. To defeat bourgeois moral relations is a historical and not a mental act, involving the use of the only certain resources for success: the historical experience of the war against Capitalism.

32 Cf. Marx's 'Letter to the Labour Parliament' (1854) and his 'Inaugural Address' (1864) in *Marx/Engels Articles on Britain* (Moscow, Progress 1971) plus the writings on the Commune cited in our note 2 above. A convenient anthology is *Marx, Engels and Lenin on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Peking, FLP, 1975).

33 On 'voting', Cf. S. Lukes 'Political ritual...' *Sociology*, 9, 1975; on 'going to school', Cf. P. Corrigan, *Smash Street Kids* (Paladin, forthcoming)

science to art. Or rather, who did not cross boundaries, but *eliminated* them, and who did not create limits to the kind of questions that could be asked.

The effect of these talks was to create a sense of physical and intellectual excitement, both in relation to the original, flexible, expansive thinking of Paul Feyerabend, and also in relation to a reversal of the stultifying effects of the prospect of formal, exclusively analytical study, and the regeneration of the idea of knowledge as a means to freedom, vision, understanding and the expansion of consciousness (which processes are normally thought of as taking place in the realms of religion and magic).

I bought *Against Method* to get more of this energy, which poured itself out as an *educational experience*, rather than as a philosophical treatise.

*Against Method* is a book that speaks directly to me, and I am not a philosopher of science. In asking myself why, in spite of this, I found myself deeply concerned with the arguments contained in it, the discovery was made firstly that this is not a book concerned *primarily* with the Philosophy of Science, or even formal philosophy, and secondly that this is a book which questions the most fundamental structures of thinking and believing, and so the tools of all learning and discovery. Paul Feyerabend is talking about the way we think, our prejudices, and the way theories take hold and are sustained. The issue is *not* the truth or otherwise of any theory connected with the Copernican Revolution, although the discussion revolves mainly around this, but is rather concerned, given the events of the Copernican Revolution as a model, with the way structures of thinking are built up in any situation. In other words, he is talking about the growth of knowledge, and the necessity of constant examination of all structures, or world-views - also the necessity of inconsistency, irrationality,