A Critical Note on Bhaskar and Systems Theory*

G. Carchedi

Von Bertalanffy's article 'The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biology', published in 1950 [1], is widely regarded as having started the systems-thinking movement. In the words of F.E. Emery, scientific interest was mobilized by von Bertalanffy's 'rigorous distinction between open and closed systems' [2]. Whether this distinction can be accepted or not, the fact remains that systems theory has since then gained widespread popularity - not only in terms of its practical applications to the governmental and administrative spheres but also in terms of its penetration in the realm of theory. New disciplines, like cybernetics, information theory, operations research, and systems analysis have come into being, and old disciplines have developed branches based upon systems thinking. This holds for many of the natural and social sciences as well as for philosophy [3]. Common to all these applications is the fundamental distinction between open and closed systems where, as von Bertalanffy puts it, 'a system is closed if no material enters or leaves it; it is open if there is import and export and, therefore, change of the components' [4]. No wonder, then, that in the wake of systems theory's apparent success, many authors, impressed by system theory's apparent scientific rigour, fall into the temptation of borrowing (either consciously or not) essential elements of this approach, first and foremost the closed system/open-system distinction.

By way of illustration, let us consider R. Bhaskar's recent work in the philosophy of science, since the above-mentioned distinction is one of the pillars upon which his theory is built. The thesis I want to argue is not that Bhaskar is a systems theorist; rather, my thesis is that Bhaskar's adoption of the closed/open-system dichotomy as a central feature of his theoretical construction cannot but lead him to conservative stands and conclusions. This conservative character stems from the uncritical incorporation in his approach of that dichotomy, which is an essential element of an inherently conservative approach, systems theory. What follows, therefore, is not intended to be a review of all aspects of Bhaskar's work [5], some of which are, without any doubt, important elements for the construction of a radical ontology and epistemology. (I am thinking, for example, of his distinction between the transitive and the intransitive objects of knowledge [6], and of his cogent critique of a number of philosophers and philosophical currents [7] based upon that distinction.) Rather, the aim of these notes is to focus the discussion on Bhaskar's treatment of laws, both natural and social, and to provide some indications of the inadequacies implicit in Bhaskar's view and of how they can be overcome. The aim of what follows, therefore, is to provide a constructive rather than a malicious critique.

As I have already suggested, Bhaskar's argument hinges upon the basic difference between open and closed systems: the latter disrupt the course of nature and produce through man's action a sequence of events, constant conjunctions, which otherwise would not have taken place. If this conjunction allows us to identify a law, then that law, to be generally valid, must be valid also in the absence of experimental conditions in an open system, and thus it does not necessarily imply a constant conjunction of events. This shows that real structures, generating mechanisms, do exist even though only their effects are visible [8]. On the face of it, this is a very attractive strategy which at one stroke dismisses empiricism and establishes, by the pure strength of logic, the tendential nature of natural and social laws. If we want to make intelligible experimental activity and thus justify the existence of science, then the world must be made up of generating mechanisms and their effects (the two often being 'out of phase') and science must be the study of those mechanisms. On Bhaskar's view, the universality of a law is that it must continue to act in spite of other systems' influences, i.e. in an open system, and thus without a constant conjunction of events. The absence of such a conjunction is explained in terms of disturbances, fetters to the working of the law. These fetters become then the countertendencies which obstruct, from outside the system, what would be the functioning of the system (mechanism) in a closure.

Now, it can be objected that the assumption that a law valid under certain conditions (closed systems) must continue to be valid also under different conditions (open systems) can hold only if there is no radical modification of the system when the closure is opened. To take only one example in the social

* In its original form this article included an account of an alternative 'dialectical' conception of social laws and tendencies which is advanced by Carchedi. The Editorial Collective agreed that this alternative account, being necessarily very condensed indeed, did not add to the force of the critique of Bhaskar. We decided, in view of this, to publish, with the author's agreement, only the first part of the article, and to refer readers to Carchedi's book *Problems in Class Analysis* (RKP, 1982). The section from the original article omitted in this version is based upon Chapter 2.

world: if a pre-capitalist system is opened to capital infiltration, the outcome can be a radical change in the former's generating mechanism and laws rather than the effect anticipated by Bhaskar. The problem with this approach is the assumption, unwarranted in my opinion, of a world of events basically generated by systems which are not only closed but also essentially independent, i.e. the basically adialectical distinction between closed and open systems. Even though, on Bhaskar's approach, in the non-experimental world events are generated in open systems, from a logical as against a chronological point of view (i.e. as far as the logic of the generating mechanism is concerned) events are *first* generated by and in closed and independent systems and *then* subjected to 'offsetting factors' when the system is ideally open.

On this basis, it is difficult to imagine how a satisfactory way (or any way at all) can be found to inquire into what governs the functioning of the mechanisms in an open world. This seems to me to be too high a price to pay in order to be able to show - in a purely logical way, and thus apart from the inconvenient need to prove a theory in practice - the existence of non-empirical structures. The difference between Bhaskar's approach and a dialectical one is that in the former the external factors can only slow down, so to speak, the generative activity of a certain system [9]; whereas in the latter, the determinant instance (or generative mechanism in Bhaskar's terminology) has already in itself a multiplicity of possible conditions of existence or supersession, out of which only some find concrete realization. In their turn, these latter (the determined instances) react upon (overdetermine) the determinant instance. It is this complex relationship of determination, rather than the simple addition of effects, which explains the possibility of the non-realization of the consequent as well as (and this is perhaps even more important) the non-constancy of the forms taken by it. In a dialectical view, contradictory phenomena do not come from outside the system [10]; both the determinant instance and the determined ones are essential parts of the same system. Moreover, for Bhaskar open-system events are generated by two or more mechanisms (the economic, the physical, the natural, etc.)[11] 'so that because we do not know ex-ante which mechanisms will actually be at work (and perhaps have no knowledge of their mode of articulation) events are not deductively predictable' [12]. In a dialectical view, the generative mechanism, due to its inner contradictoriness, generates a play of tendencies and countertendencies which make perfectly accurate predictions (at least in the social sciences [13]) impossible. Dialectics presupposes a view of the world in terms of tendencies (normic statements, in Bhaskar's terminology) but such a view of the world is not necessarily dialectical, as I have shown in Bhaskar's case.

The basic weakness in Bhaskar's approach thus consists in his concept of, and distinction between, closed and open systems.

> 'If a system is closed then a tendency once set in motion must be fulfilled. If a system is open this might not happen due to the presence of "off-setting factors" or "countervailing causes"... Once a tendency is set in motion it is fulfilled unless it is prevented.' [14]

The closed system is not a dialectical one, not even a tendential one (since it does produce constant conjunctions of events); it is a machine-like generator of events. In systems theory the machine and the organism are the two major metaphors. No matter how important the differences between these two metaphors (and the approaches inspired by them) are, their common element is their inability to accommodate a dialectical view of reality, that is a view that explains movement and change in terms of internal contradictions and which accounts for the structure which generates those contradictions.

Rather than going back to Durkheim's concept of organism, Bhaskar's concept of laws is heavily influenced by the Weberian metaphor of mechanism and by that author's conception of concrete phenomena as deviations from ideal types [15]. It is not by chance that for Bhaskar 'it is a mistake of the greatest magnitude to suppose that [theory] ... will tell us what to do' [16], and that he must therefore conclude that 'Marxist science is subversive in virtue of its cognitive power alone' [17]. On these fundamental issues Bhaskar shakes hands with Weber rather than with Marx. A theory which denies predictability and stresses only explanatory power is useless for a class engaged in a radical transformation of social reality. Bhaskar's laws are tendential but no predictions can be made from them. But it is precisely the analysis and prediction of tendencies (laws) and thus of the possible developments of the phenomena regulated by these laws which lends meaningfulness to social science. This all shows very clearly not only the conservative consequences of the acceptance of a fundamentally adialectical element of knowledge (i.e. the open system/closed system scheme), but also the social (i.e. class) determination of that element of knowledge. And this is so not only in terms of the functionality of this element of knowledge for class domination at the theoretical/ideological level, but also in terms of the origin of this element of knowledge. In fact [18], the concept of closed system and thus of closure and of constant conjunctions of events applies to physics and chemistry [19], the two sciences whose development is fundamental for the development of capitalism after the Second World War (late capitalism), but it is not applicable to other natural sciences (e.g. cosmology) and certainly not to the social sciences. Bhaskar extends this scheme to *all* sciences on the strength of the argument that if *science* is possible then this scheme must apply [20]. What he achieves is thus not the proof of a certain ontological nature of the real concrete, but only a further example of the non-neutrality of knowledge, in this particular case of the impossibility of building Marxist ontology from a class-neutral point of view, in terms of 'pure' logic.

Given the adialectical separation between closed and open systems, it is not surprising that Bhaskar's theory founders when confronted with the basic question as to how events are generated in open systems, i.e. the question of the relationship between systems in the open world - or, if you prefer, of the nature of this system of systems. 'To completely account for an event,' says Bhaskar, 'would be to describe all the different principles involved in its generation' [21]. But what about the articulation of all these different principles? Surely, a description of each one of them is quite a different thing from an analysis of their reciprocal interaction, and of the nature of the interrelations which must be postulated if we postulate the multiple, rather than the individual generation of events. Yet this question is simply not tackled by Bhaskar [22]. Consequently, the failure to account for how a complex system tends, because of its inner nature. to generate an event produces the double and related failure to account for (i) how there can be a multiple generation of conjunctures; and (ii) the articulation of this multiplicity of generating mechanisms. Given this lack of a theory of a system of systems, Bhaskar's transcendental realism cannot account for why there is this plurality, i.e. it cannot account for it in sociological terms (which, correctly, are the only ones

acceptable to him). Thus, Bhaskar must resort to: (1) the individual scientist as the generator of new theories, and (2) the 'creative employment of his [i.e. the scientist's] imagination' [23] as the motor of the production of knowledge. True, Bhaskar emphasizes, correctly, that 'man never creates, but only changes his knowledge' [24] and that knowledge 'can never be seen as a function of individual sense-experience' [25], so that the sociological dimension of knowledge is given by its being a non-individualistic acquisition. Knowledge, 'though it exists only in virtue of human activity ... is irreducible to the acts of men' [25] and men are active agents rather than passive sensors (which is the view of the empirical realist). However, it is the individual rather than the *class* which is still the unit of scientific production. Bhaskar's theory might not be individualistic *à la* empirical realism but it is still individualistic [27]. On his account, individuals are not atoms, they presuppose each other, they are carriers of social relations, but they are not embodiments of aspects of class relations, and, if they are, their being carriers of class relations is not given any privileged (determinant) status [28]. On this fundamental point, again, Bhaskar is much closer to Weber than to Marx. He is perfectly entitled to be so, but then again he should not give the opposite impression.

More recent writings have shown concern for some of the issues mentioned above. Even though my critique hinges upon Bhaskar's incorporation of the closed/open system dichotomy in his thinking, I shall comment briefly also on how Bhaskar elaborates on, and amplifies, the fact/value distinction and the possibility of making predictions. My general point will be that while (further) concern for these issues marks a welcome development in Bhaskar's approach and might add much to his already stimulating work, I am not convinced either that the direction in which Bhaskar goes will lead to the development of a Marxist dialectical view or that these new developments in his theory are consistent with the bulk of his previous writing.

In respect of the closed/open system dichotomy, a distinction can be made between the *meaning* that Bhaskar thinks should be attached to this dichotomy and the *way* he deals with the problem posed by the lack of theorization of a 'system of systems'. As regards the first, the closed/open-system dichotomy plays a double role. On the one hand, this dichotomy is used to generate an immanent critique of empiricist ontology. But if one uses a certain concept to criticize a certain view, then, having shown this concept's validity as a critical tool, one will use the same concept as a building block of his own view. And this is exactly what Bhaskar does. My contention is that, given this connection and the conservative nature of the closed/open-system dichotomy, this concept should be discarded as a tool of theoretical criticism, and empiricism should be criticized on different grounds. On the other hand, Bhaskar's strategy is to use this concept to highlight the epistemological difference between the social sciences and the 'classical' natural sciences of physics and chemistry. Again, while it is correct to point out that such a difference exists, it is incorrect - if one aims at a dialectical view - to draw that distinction on the basis of an inherently adialectical concept. Therefore, the boundary should be drawn but along different lines. To sum up, the notion of closed and open systems does play a very important role in Bhaskar's theory, perhaps even more important than that author is willing to concede.

Even more important is the way Bhaskar tackles the question of the interrelations between generative systems. In a forthcoming article [29] Bhaskar considers, without further elaborating on it, the case (case II) of the 'determination of events within a "system" in an open system', where event E_0 is determined by three interrelated mechanisms (M_1, M_2 and M_3) and by a fourth mechanism (M_4) completely separated from the first three. This, however, does not overcome my objections, for the following three reasons. First, this case (case II) is a 'modification' of case I which is the 'determination of events in an open system', where there is no relation at all among M_1, M_2 and M_3. The relations between systems seems to be taken as logically prior. Secondly, there is here no solution, only a shift of the problem. For how can an event be the outcome of two categories of systems (one category being constituted by interrelated mechanisms and the other by discrete mechanisms) if no relation is established between these two types of mechanisms? And, thirdly, the concept that at least some systems generating an event might be interrelated is neither given a theoretical elaboration (we only find a statement to the effect that those systems or mechanisms which are interrelated are tied by a relation of 'causal interdependence', itself a Weberian rather than a Marxist concept) nor organically integrated in the body of Bhaskar's theory. Something which, in my opinion, should be at the center of his theorization is only mentioned in passing.

Similar remarks apply to the question of predictability. Bhaskar distinguishes between conditional predictions (which can and must be made) and unconditional or categorical predictions. If conditional predictions are predictions about tendencies and their possible developments (the only concept of prediction consistent with a dialectical view), then again how can this be organically integrated within (reconciled with) the essential elements of Bhaskar's theory? Take the above-mentioned statement (based, as I have attempted to show, on the closed/open-system dichotomy) to the effect that Marxism is revolutionary in virtue of its cognitive power 'alone'. How can conditional predictions (which are possible only on a clear and well developed view of the relation between the several generating mechanisms and thus on a different concept of tendency than Bhaskar's) be fitted within this approach?

Lastly, a few comments on the fact/value distinction. If I understand him correctly, Bhaskar's latest position on this point is that 'if we have a consistent set of theories T which (i) shows some belief P to be false, and (ii) explains why that belief is believed; then the inferences to (iii) a negative evaluation of the object S (e.g. system of social relations) accounting for the falsity of the belief (i.e. mismatch in reality between the belief P and what it is about O) and (iv) a positive evaluation of action rationally directed at removing (disconnecting or transforming) that object, i.e. the source(s) of false consciousness, appear mandatory CP' [30]. The crux of the matter is of course verification: how do we know (actually, who - e.g. individuals, classes etc. - knows and by means of which method?) that a belief is false, i.e. that there is a mismatch (lack of correspondence) between that belief and its object? Since discussion of this aspect of Bhaskar's theory would require a paper of its own, the most sensible thing to do, within the limits of these notes, is not to go into it at all. My only comment, therefore, will be similar to the previous ones. A positive evaluation of the action rationally aimed at removing the causes of false beliefs (consciousness) is not enough for me, if I want a theory which not only reassures me that I am morally justified in my action but also which tells me 'what to do'. Bhaskar's view in earlier writings that to expect this from a theory

is a 'mistake of the greatest magnitude' is echoed again in his more recent article, so that no change can be discerned on this point: 'Diagnosis is not therapy. We may know that something is causing a problem without knowing how to get rid or change it ... an explanatory critique of this type ... does not tell us what to do' [31]. It has been my thesis that Bhaskar's acceptance of this (false) belief, the difficulty he has in theorizing an epistemology in which the principal role of knowledge is precisely to tell us what to do, is a result of the central role accorded to the open/closed-systems distinction and of the consequent impossibility of reconciling this element with a dialectical view.

Footnotes

1 *Science*, Vol.III (1950), pp.23-29, reprinted in F.E. Emery (ed.), *Systems Thinking*, Penguin, 1981, Vol.1, pp.82-89.
2 *Systems Thinking*, *op.cit.*, p.69.
3 For a critical discussion of the adoption of systems thinking by other disciplines, see R. Lilienfeld, *The Rise of Systems Theory*, John Wiley and Sons, 1978.
4 *op.cit.*, p.83.
5 For two such attempts, see the reviews by P. Halfpenny, and book review of R. Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism*, in *Sociology*, Vol.14, No.4, November 1980; and H. Radder, 'Realisme in natuur-en menswetenschappen', *Krisis*, No.2, October 1980.
6 Similar, in fact, to Marx's concrete-in-thought and real concrete. See, e.g., *Grundrisse*, Penguin, 1973.
7 See, e.g., R. Bhaskar, 'Feyereband and Bachelard: two philosophies of science, *New Left Review*, Nov-Dec. 1975.
8 *A Realist Theory of Science*, Harvester, 1978, Chapter 1; 'Realisme in de natuurwetenschappen', *Krisis*, No.1, 1980.
9 '... law-like statements ... make a claim about the activity of a tendency, i.e. about the operation of the generative mechanism that would, if undisturbed, result in the tendency's manifestation. *A Realist Theory of Science*, p.98.
10 Contrary to Bhaskar's opinion. See *op.cit.*, p.231.
11 The arbitrariness of the distinction between different systems is clear. On the other hand, on a dialectical view rooted in the concept of social class, the different areas of social phenomena (and thus the different social sciences, or sub-systems, if you prefer) can be discerned *because they are different types of class domination.*
12 *op.cit.*, p.119.
13 Moreover, as T. Benton correctly stresses, it is doubtful 'whether decisive tests of theory are possible in the natural sciences either'. 'Realism and Social Science', *Radical Philosophy*, Spring 1981, No.27, p.18.
14 *op.cit.*, p.98.
15 However, Bhaskar's closed systems are not ideal constructs but are real concretes.
16 *The Possibility of Naturalism*, Harvester, 1979, p.82.
17 *op.cit.*, p.90.
18 As Bhaskar himself mentions, without however drawing the same conclusions. See *A Realist Theory of Science*, pp.104-05.
19 It is not by chance that 'Physics' and 'Biology' appear in the title of Von Bertalanffy's article.
20 Let me stress that Bhaskar does *not* conflate the social and the natural sciences. He uses the open/closed-system device to argue for the existence of generating mechanisms in both the natural and the social world (and it is in *this* sense that he extends a scheme derived from the natural sciences, from a certain type of natural sciences, to all science) as well as for an inquiry into the differences between these two basic types of science. In fact, Bhaskar recognizes that social phenomena cannot be studied under conditions of closed systems, and actually this is for him one of the essential differences between social and natural sciences. However, from this he derives the non-predictability of the former sciences (as opposed to the possibility of complete predictions in the latter sciences). See above and also: 'On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism', in J. Mepham and D.-H. Ruben (eds.), *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, Vol.II, Harvester, 1979, p.127 and ff. My conclusion, on the other hand, is that, if you extend a scheme developed (for specific, historically determined and, to begin with, economic reasons) in certain branches of the natural sciences to the social sciences, then you not only implicitly assign a secondary status to the latter (where by definition closures are not possible) but in fact subordinate your conception (definition) of social science to a conception of natural science that hinges upon an inherently adialectical and implicitly conservative conception. These features will then re-emerge in your theorization of the social sciences.
21 *A Realist Theory of Science*, p.111
22 It might be worth mentioning that in systems theory the often hidden connection between the different systems is of a hierarchical nature. See R. Lilienfeld, *op.cit.*, p.164. It is at such theoretical junctures that the conservative nature of systems theory comes to the fore.
23 *Op.cit.*, p.166. Therefore, the application of one theory rather than another to explain the latent structure of nature becomes a matter of *individual preference*, See 'On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism', *op.cit.*, pp.128-29.
24 *A Realist Theory of Science*, *op.cit*, p.148.
25 *op.cit.*, p.187.
26 *ibid.*
27 A conclusion strongly denied by **Bhaskar** but reached also by T. Benton (*op. cit.*, p.17), though via a different line of critique.
28 'Sociology is ... concerned ... with the persistent *relations* between individuals (and groups) and with the relations between these relations. Relations such as between capitalist and worker, MP and constituent, student and teacher, husband and wife.' 'On the Possibility etc.', *op.cit.*, p.113. If we cannot abstract things from the relations in which they stand with each other (metaphysics), we cannot abstract relations from the things they relate, either. If sociology studies, to begin with, the relations between individuals, it is these latter (and not classes as groups of individuals essentially different from the individuals themselves) who are the basic unit of social life and thus of social analysis.
29 'Emergence, Explanation and Emancipation', forthcoming in P. Secord (ed.), *Consciousness, Behaviour and Social Structure*, Sage Publications, 1982.
30 'Scientific Explanation and Human Emancipation', *Radical Philosophy*, Autumn 1980, No.26, p.23.
31 *ibid.*, p.24.

ERRATA

(1) Joe McCarney's article on Rortes in *RP*31 contained a printing error which significantly altered the sense. The phrase about the 'opposition to historicism and conservatism' should have referred to the 'opposition *of* historicism and conservatism'.

(2) Mark Tebbit's article 'Lukacs, Heidegger and Fascism' unfortunately appeared in *RP*31 with some of the footnotes missing. We reproduce here all the notes:

1 Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.
2 See Poster, *Existentialism in Post-War France*, for a critical survey of these attempted syntheses.
3 See J.P. Stern, *Nietzsche*, as a recent example of such prevarication.
4 See especially Lukacs, *The Destruction of Reason*.
5 Weber's influence on Lukacs has been greatly exaggerated. Lukacs draws extensively on the insights of Weber, Simmel, Toennies and others, but is unambiguous in regarding them as essentially bourgeois.
6 This is not to suggest that there was no confusion in the way in which Lukacs presented his argument at this stage, nor that it was entirely free of contradiction. As I hope will become clear from this article, some confusion was inevitable in the circumstances, and the contradictions are either apparent or peripheral.
7 Although this was largely on political grounds, Lukacs's position was profoundly misunderstood - as it also has been in many Western Marxist circles - as philosophical *relativism*.
8 It should go without saying that this intellectual process is regarded as an essential component of the practical revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. Lukacs is not shifting the emphasis from 'action' to ~~'consciousness~~ 'consciousness', but on the contrary is stating the conditions in which they can be brought together.
9 Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat'.
10 See especially HCC, pp.83-110.
11 HCC, especially pp.161-72.
12 He is also emphasising the inevitability of this failure, unless the standpoint of formal rationalism is transcended.
13 HCC, p.92.
14 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.487. Lukacs does in fact answer these questions with considerably more historical precision than Heidegger, who is more concerned with proving that reification is the permanent structure of the human mind. That not only this question but the whole book was largely conceived as a response to Lukacs has been convincingly demonstrated by Goldmann, in *Lukacs and Heidegger*. But as Lukacs has himself pointed out, Heidegger's philosophy as a whole is an implicit critique of Marxist philosophy as such.
15 *Radical Philosophy* 25-27.
16 It would, nowever, be as logical to argue, for example, that Popper's preoccupation with Marxism shows that he was a communist.
17 I am not for a moment suggesting that this was what Waterhouse intended; but I am sure he would agree that this attitude towards existentialism in particular is not an uncommon one.
18 See, for example, BT, p.320.
19 BT, pp.63-64.
20 BT, p.164.
21 By this I mean 'liberalism' in the broadest sense: the general idea of toleration.
22 This was primarily of course an artistic rebellion: 'the modernist revolution'. It need hardly be said that this was not a peripheral aesthetic phenomenon, but a symptomatic indication of the conflict of contemporary social forces.
23 BT, p.165.
24 See Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp.252-302, for the most famous illustration of this state of mind.
25 BT, pp.45-46.
26 HCC, pp.83-110.
27 HCC, p.101.
28 HCC, p.109.
29 HCC, pp.110-49.
30 What Lukacs is calling *formal* rationalism is usually understood as rationalism as such: the belief that there is no breach in the natural order of things, the order having been already imposed on the things. Hence when the order is shaken by crisis, 'things' reappear because they have not been fully comprehended.
31 See Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p.xxvii especially, but also the whole introduction.
32 The chapter in *Capital* Vol.I on commodity fetishism is, philosophically speaking, almost entirely addressed to this problem.
33 HCC, p.119.
34 HCC, p.119.
35 HCC, pp.149-207.
36 HCC, p.xxiii.
37 DR, pp.489-522.
38 BT, pp.30-31.
39 BT, p.57.
40 See Thomas Mann, *The Magic Mountain*, pp.392-405. The argument between Naphta and Settembrini is a remarkable illustration of this conflict.
41 HCC, p.194.
42 DR, pp.97-98.
43 Lukacs's critics in the Expressionist Debate failed to understand this, and focused the debate on the secondary question of personal integrity.
44 For a notable exception, see Jameson, *Wyndham Lewis*, which is based on Lukacs's overall perspective.