What Makes Critical Theory 'Critical'?

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The topic of this paper is the project of a critical theory of society. It considers that project in the form it takes in the work of its best known exponents, the theorists of the so-called 'Frankfurt School'. The main question to be answered is the question of how the critical character of this body of work is to be understood. What constitutes it as a critical and not simply an explanatory theory? This is a question which gets little systematic attention in the writings of the critical theorists themselves, nor, surprisingly, has it occasioned much reflection by commentators. The tendency of the literature has been for the critical claims of the theory to be made and accepted, while the problem of how they should be conceptualised is ignored or negotiated with vague generalities <1>. Yet it is perhaps the chief question of philosophical interest that arises in this area.

An issue that must loom large in trying to answer it is that of the relationship between the Frankfurt School and the tradition of social theory that derives from Marx. Many streams have fed the work of the School, and it might legitimately be studied in terms of any of them. But when one's interests are, in a broad sense, methodological, the connection with Marx rather than, say, Freud or Weber, is bound to be especially significant. For the founding members of the School held that the methodological character of their work, its critical status, derives from the model of the critique of political economy. It is true that the leading figure of the second generation, Jürgen Habermas, looks outside the Marxist tradition for the foundations of the critical project. He is, however, dealt with here only to the extent needed to point the contrast with the theorists who are our chief concern. These are Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, the most important members of the original Frankfurt School.

A text often given canonical status, both inside and outside the School, so far as the statement of a programme is concerned, is Horkheimer's 1937 essay 'Traditional and Critical Theory' <2>. It is, in spite of this status, or in partial explanation of it, remarkably elusive even on quite basic points. Nevertheless, the historical loyalties of the method it advocates are clearly, even if half-heartedly, declared. The term 'critical', we are told in a footnote, 'is used here less in the sense it has in the idealist critique of pure reason than in the sense it has in the dialectical critique of political economy' <3>. It will be convenient to borrow for these contrasting elements in the idea of critique the labels 'reconstruction' on the one hand and 'criticism' on the other <4> The idealist programme of reconstructive critique is one of specifying the conditions of the possibility of the exercise of reason, either in general or in some specific practice. The critique of political economy has, however, to be understood as criticism; that is, as systematically grounded and elaborated negative evaluation. It seems from Horkheimer's declaration that it is with this second version of critique that we have essentially to deal.

The question posed at the start of the paper may now be reformulated. What has to be conceptualised is a system of negative evaluation. Such a system, it may be assumed, will necessarily involve some standards of evaluation. There must be criteria of judgement mediating the transition from the starting points of the enterprise to its practical conclusions. The question is what is the nature of the standards in the case of the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School.

It may be well to start by noting the most general ways in which the critical theorists themselves characterise their practice. The most general epithet of all has already been encountered in the quotation from Horkheimer and is invoked on innumerable occasions elsewhere: the critique is, first and foremost, 'dialectical'. This is standardly interpreted to signify that it works in the mode of 'immanence'. Adorno speaks for all when he insists: 'Dialectic's very procedure is immanent critique' <5>. He is fully representative also when he goes on to claim the authority of Hegel for the view. The reference cited is from a section of the Science of Logic which offers one of Hegel's most explicit presentations of dialectic as immanent criticism. Its immediate concern is the question of the correct approach to philosophical systems:

> ... the refutation must not come from outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse to recognize those assumptions; the defect is a defect only for him who starts from the requirements and demands based on those assumptions.
> <6>

Hegel goes on to make the comment quoted by Adorno: 'Genuine refutation must penetrate the power of the opponent and meet him on the ground of his strength; the case is not won by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not' <7>.

The standards of dialectical criticism must not, it appears, be externally imposed on the object, but must in some sense arise within it. This is still not a perspicuous requirement, and perhaps the best way to bring it into sharper focus is to see how it is interpreted in practice. What is needed are some models of immanent method at work. No attempt can be made here to follow up all the many and varied hints dropped by the critical theorists as to how social criticism might proceed. The discussion will have to be confined to conceptions which have some substantial presence in their writings. It should also be said that, although there is an element of chronological order in what follows, it is not an historical study and the basic divisions of the subject-matter are framed on conceptual grounds alone.

Ideological critique

The obvious place to start is with a procedure that seems to apply the lessons of the Science of Logic as directly as possible. It is advocated in Horkheimer's 'Notes on Institute

Activities' of 1941, his most self-conscious attempt as Director, to 'summarize the research project' of the Institute of Social Research. The question of standards is dealt with in the following way:

> The critical nature of societal concepts may best be elucidated through the problem of value judgments that animates current discussion among social scientists.... Social theory may be able to circumvent a sceptical spurning of value judgments without succumbing to normative dogmatism. This may be accomplished by relating social institutions and activities to the values they themselves set forth as their standards and ideals.... If subjected to such an analysis, the social agencies most representative of the present pattern of society will disclose a pervasive discrepancy between what they actually are and the values they accept.... The ambivalent relation between prevailing values and the social content forces the categories of social theory to become critical and thus to reflect the actual rift between the social reality and the values it posits. <8>

On this model, immanent criticism lives off the gap between what society professes and what it performs. Much of its appeal, as Horkheimer's account suggests, derives from the way it appears to resolve the problem of standards without the need for elaborate and difficult theorizing. They are constituted by values posited by the social reality itself. Thus, they are, as it were, taken ready-formed from the object of criticism: it is made to condemn itself out of its own mouth.

There is a strong case for holding that such a conception was indeed central to the Institute's work at this period. It is often explicitly invoked by the leading theorists, and many of their illustrations of critical method are intelligible only in terms of it. Characteristically, it is what Adorno was later to call 'liberal society's pretensions to freedom and equality' that are the chief target <9>. The model is somewhat less prominent in Marcuse's writings, but he too declares:

> The critical rationality derives from the principles of autonomy which individualistic society itself had declared to be its self-evident truths. Measuring these principles against the form in which individualistic society has actualized them, critical rationality accuses social injustice in the name of individualistic society's own ideology. <10>

A version of the same idea supplies, on the author's own account, the methodology of Soviet Marxism <11>.

The practice of criticism conceived along these lines has figured large in commentaries on the Frankfurt School. In these works it is frequently subsumed under, and provides the chief substance of, the category 'critique of ideology' (Ideologiekritik). It will help in exploring the subject to reflect on the misleading nature of this heading. As Marcuse's statement suggests, what we have here is not, in its standard employment by the critical theorists, a conception in which ideology forms the object of criticism. Instead, ideology, in the shape of the values of society, is held constant as the yardstick against which social reality is measured. It is, in Horkheimer's words, a method for criticising 'social institutions and activities' in the light of 'the values they themselves set forth'. Adorno is just as explicit: the 'spokesmen' of dialectical materialism 'questioned not the ideas of humanity, freedom and justice but rather the claims of bourgeois society to have realised those ideas' <12>. Thus, the project is not one of a critique of ideology, but of what might be called an ideological critique of society.

This issue opens the way to something more fundamental. It brings home the need to make explicit a condition which must obtain if one is to speak of critique here at all. On the face of things, it may be said, all that the procedure achieves is, in Horkheimer's terminology, to 'disclose a discrepancy' or 'reflect a rift' between ideology and reality. Such a gap is, in itself, however, no more a deficiency for a liberal society than it would be for any other. It would be odd to assume that one must be criticising a community that claims to follow the precept 'thou shalt not suffer a witch to live' if one shows that it does not in fact manage to kill all the individuals meeting its requirements for being witches. The difficulty here was anticipated by Hegel: it concerns the ease with which the force of the criticism may be evaded by stepping outside the assumptions that define the field of immanence. The method has critical significance only in so far as one accepts, however provisionally, the ideology used as a yardstick. It will have greatest impact on those who subscribe to it with fewest reservations, and are most likely to be outraged by seeing it flouted. Hence, the method, as standardly employed by the Frankfurt School, is in its deepest meaning a method of bourgeois self-criticism.

These points emerge clearly enough in Adorno's discussion of the method in connection with 'radical bourgeois thought' of the nineteenth century. At that time: 'Critics confronted bourgeois society not only economically but morally with its own forms' <13>. The representative figure is the Ibsen of Hedda Gabler. Adorno's discussion shows from another aspect the basic limitation of the ideological method, its inability to enforce conclusions hostile to the existing state of things. At best, its disclosure of the contradiction of ideology and reality may be said to confront its audience with a need to choose. In the case in question, some of them at least were inclined to jump in the opposite direction to the critics. Thus, the criticism 'left the ruling stratum ... with no other defence than to reject the very principle by which society was judged, its own morality' <14>. Later in the same work Adorno sheds fresh light on the bourgeois character of the model by developing a refinement of it in terms of the notion of 'irony'. The mode of irony is not content with flatly confronting social reality with its own ideology, but, more subtly, 'convicts its object by presenting it as what it purports to be'. It is a quintessentially insider style of criticism whose 'formal a priori' is agreement on 'binding norms' <15>. Here the representative example is the work of Karl Kraus.

Adorno is plainly sensitive to the suspicion that the procedure achieves its immanence, its insider status, only at the expense of its radicalism, only by accepting the confines of the bourgeois horizon. Thus, he insists that 'the motives of intransigent bourgeois self-criticism coincide in fact with those of materialism through which the former attain self-awareness' <16>. This claim seems in a general way unconvincing. The motives of materialism include the abolishing of bourgeois society, and bourgeois self-criticism, however intransigent, could hardly stretch so far without losing its bourgeois identity: its self-awareness at that point would be suicidal. In relation to our overall concerns, however, the issue may best be pursued by direct reference to the work of Marx. No extensive citation is needed to show that he did not take bourgeois ideology as a guiding light, but instead subjected it throughout his career to radical criticism. There is, for example, the treatment of the doctrine of the 'rights of man' in the early essay 'On the Jewish Question'. The objection is not that these rights fail to be realised in bourgeois society: it is directed against the entire tradition of thought in itself <17>. On this issue at least there is no failure of continuity between the young and the mature Marx. This is sufficiently shown by the mockery directed in the first volume of Capital at the sphere of commodity exchange as 'a very Eden of the innate rights of man ... the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham' <18>. No doubt the significance of Marx's career is open to many interpretations. But any tendency to assimilate him to the role of bourgeois ironist must surely be misconceived.

It may not be necessary to labour the difficulties faced by ideological critique. For the model did not remain for long at the centre of the Frankfurt School's conception of its project. It began to founder for reasons which were eloquently depicted in Adorno's account of the fate of bourgeois irony:

> Irony's medium, the difference between ideology and

reality has disappeared. The former resigns itself to confirmation of reality by its mere duplication. Irony used to say: such it claims to be, but such it is; today, however, the world even in its most radical lie, falls back on the argument that things are like this, a simple finding which coincides for it, with the good. There is not a crevice in the cliff of the established order into which the ironist might hook a fingernail. <19>

With variations of idiom, this diagnosis is repeated by all our subjects. In the era of liberal capitalism it was possible, the argument runs, to confront reality with its own aspirations. But in the total, one-dimensional world of administered capitalism no such possibility appears. Ideological critique presupposes a gap between what thought projects and what it actually performs. But thought has now become a reflex of the established order and projects nothing beyond it; ideology in the original sense has evaporated. Thus, the programme of ideological critique could not be carried through because it proved incompatible with the School's central vision of the nature of contemporary society. It had to be given up and replaced by something else. Resources of this were, of course, available. The failure of ideological critique is, nevertheless, ominous in its signalling of the problem of reconciling the explanatory thrust of the School's social theory with the ambition to be critical.

Moral critique: contents and foundations

It was noted above that critique as criticism requires an element that sets standards of judgement. This cannot now be constituted by ideals avowed by the object itself. It seems natural, however, to suppose that whatever fills the role will have to have a similar conceptual shape. This suggests that it should consist in a set of values which, as before, function as principles of social organisation and, taken together, specify a state of human existence held to be superior to that obtaining in the present. It is not even necessary in virtue of the collapse of ideological critique to renounce the particular values by which it had operated, though it will, of course, be necessary to conceptualise their claim to be immanent in a different way. It remains to be seen whether this can be achieved. The first step towards an alternative model is, at any rate, easy enough to take. For the vision of a preferred state of society, of 'the good life' for human beings, is a pervasive presence in the writings of the critical theorists. It will accord with a familiar usage, and is encouraged by that of our subjects themselves, if what is warranted by this vision is identified as a specifically 'moral' version of critique <20>.

The main questions that arise at this point may be distinguished as follows. The first is simply that of specifying the Frankfurt School's ideal of human existence as precisely as the evidence allows. The second concerns its foundational aspect, the justification of the values it embodies. The third, closely related to the other two, is the question of how criticism in terms of such values can be immanent so far as existing society is concerned. What hangs on this is, as we have seen, the claim of criticism to be part of, or organically linked to, the tradition of dialectical thought. It is in the end the crucial issue for the present inquiry, but something must be said on the others in order to clear the ground for dealing with it.

The search for answers to the first question quickly runs up against the notorious reluctance of the members of the School to spell out in any detail the features of the future society. This reluctance reflects a tendency in Marxist thought stemming from Marx himself, though with Adorno, in particular, it takes a peculiarly emphatic form, amounting almost to a taboo. Nevertheless, the literature of critical theory contains enough in the way of characterisation for our immediate purposes. The society towards which the theory is oriented, the first 'truly human' society, will be structured in accordance with principles of freedom and justice. Beyond that, at the individual existential level, Marcuse supplies a reasonably rich specification in terms of the achievement of happiness. For Horkheimer too, at least in some phases of his thought, critical theory has 'the happiness of all individuals as its goal' <21>. Adorno's characteristic stance is perhaps best shown in his reaction to the fact that 'He who asks what is the goal of an emancipated society is given answers such as the fulfilment of human possibilities or the richness of life' <22>. What this elicits is an immediate condemnation both of the 'illegitimate' character of the question and the 'repellent assurance' of the answer. Yet even in this very section of text Adorno is willing to provide some content for conceptions of everyday life in the emancipated society. Admittedly, the note that is struck in one not often heard in the precincts of Marxism:

> Rien faire comme un bete, lying on water and looking peacefully at the sky, 'being, nothing else, without any further definition and fulfilment', might take the place of process, act, satisfaction and so truly keep the promise of dialectical logic that it would culminate in its origin. None of the abstract concepts come closer to fulfilled utopia than that of eternal peace. <23>

There is also a contrast to be drawn between Adorno on the one hand and Horkheimer and Marcuse on the other as regards the question of foundations. The section of Minima Moralia which has just been cited offers a starting point for considering Adorno' distinctive views in this area. Having rejected both question and answer concerning the goal of an emancipated society, he adds at once: 'There is tenderness



only in the coarsest demand: that no-one shall go hungry any more.' This 'coarseness' is, it may be said, the hallmark of Adorno's version of moral critique. In Negative Dialectics he envisages a society 'so organised as the productive forces would directly permit it here and now, and as the conditions of production on either side relentlessly prevent it', and comments: 'The telos of such an organisation of society would be to negate the physical suffering of even the least of its members, and to negate the internal reflexive forms of that suffering' <24>. Elsewhere in the work the drive towards the great moral simplicities takes even starker form: 'It is not in their nauseating parody, sexual repression, that moral questions are succinctly posed; it is in lines such as: No man should be tortured; there should be no concentration camps....' What is striking here from a foundational viewpoint is the unwillingness to allow these 'lines' to be a subject for theorizing:

> The lines are true as an impulse, as a reaction to the news that torture is going on somewhere. They must not be rationalized... <25>

Later on, the stakes are raised yet higher, and theory seems still more out of place:

> A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen. When we want to find reasons for it, this imperative is as refractory as the given one of Kant was once upon a time. Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the new imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral

addendum - bodily, because it is now the practical abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed even with individuality about to vanish as a form of mental reflection.
<26>

This refusal to be discursive is the most remarkable feature of Adorno's position. His wish is, it appears, to assimilate the relationship with the moral fundamentals to a purely natural reaction, an 'impulse', a 'bodily sensation'. Many philosophers have, of course, granted the primitive status of suffering and have placed it at the centre of their moral universe. But they have generally been willing to represent this view as, in some measure, the product of, and a fit subject for, ratiocination, if only in order to register it as an ultimate commitment or basic postulate. Such a recognition seems to involve a degree of theoretical placing, of conceptual mediation, that would be unacceptable to Adorno. His stance appears by contrast as frankly irrationalist. Having regard to the factors that shaped it, the stance is in human terms deserving only of deep respect. If, however, it is considered as an element in a foundational exercise, it can hardly be accepted as satisfactory. The difficulty is that, as with other forms of irrationalism, it is open to an immediate counter-thrust that has as much or as little authority as it does itself. Unfortunately, we know enough of human psychopathology, and Adorno has contributed to these insights, to realise that sympathy and indigation cannot be counted on as automatic responses to agony. The supply of torturers would not be what it is if there were not also at work spontaneous stirrings of a different kind. To acknowledge this is not, of course, to suggest that Adorno's humane and generous anger belongs on one footing with the evil cravings of the sadist. But the differences do not emerge if they are considered merely in their character as natural impulses: to bring them out the willingness to find reasons, to deal discursively, is indispensable.

This willingness is much more marked in the writings of Horkheimer and Marcuse. Indeed, the position that emerges from them has a decidedly rationalist character, for in it 'reason' itself turns out to be the key foundational category. The basic claim is simply that the organisation of society which realised justice, freedom and happiness would also be its rational organisation. Beyond that, the tendency is to assume, in keeping with the philosophical tradition, that nothing need, or can, be said in its favour. For Horkheimer's views it may be most rewarding to turn to the earlier period before the development of the philosophy 'shared' with Adorno <27>. In 'Traditional and Critical Theory' the critical project is consistently placed under the authority of reason. Critical theory of society is described as 'a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life'. The goal at which critical thought aims is 'the rational state of society'. More specifically, 'the critical theory in its concept formation and in all phases of its development very consciously makes its own that concern for the rational organisation of human activity which it is its task to illumine and legitimate'. At the same time, the project is also tied to various substantive social considerations and primarily to ones of justice: 'the critical theory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for the abolition of social injustice'. Horkheimer taps in the final nail in the argument by adding: 'This negative formulation ... is the materialist content of the idealist concept of reason' <28>.

In a companion piece to Horkheimer's essay, Marcuse lays most stress on the connection between reason and freedom:

> ... the concept of reason contains the concept of freedom as well.... Hegel was only drawing a conclusion from the entire philosophical tradition when he identified reason and freedom.

Elsewhere in the essay the goal of the 'rational organisation of society' is explicitly linked with 'concern for human happiness', and 'man' is understood as 'a rational being' that 'requires freedom' and has happiness as 'his highest good' <29>. Another essay of the period strongly emphasises the 'inner connection' of happiness and freedom:

> Happiness, as the fulfilment of all potentialities of the individual, presupposes freedom: at root, it is freedom. Conceptual analysis reveals them to be ultimately identical.
> <30>

In plotting the internal ties that bind the concepts of reason, freedom and justice, Horkheimer and Marcuse were, as they well knew, drawing on powerful themes in the Western philosophical tradition. Freedom and justice have standardly been regarded there as the primary mediations through which reason makes its presence felt in the world: freedom is the indispensable medium of all attempts to implement its demands, and justice is the guarantee that their implementation bears no trace of arbitrariness; that is, of the irrational. The connections are less transparent in the case of happiness and Marcuse has to engage in more elaborate discussion to establish them. Nevertheless, the overall strategy is clear. What is offered is, in the end, a foundational theory in which the social ideal is specified in terms of principles that are themselves to be seen as articulations of reason. This is an entrenched and, within its limits, persuasive pattern of argument, and it will not be challenged here. Having fixed it as background, attention may now be shifted to an issue which is raised in an acute form by Horkheimer's and Adorno's rationalism. Their foundational strategy had relied on abstract, conceptual considerations not specially linked to any particular set of historical circumstances. The difficulty is to see how criticism in the light of standards established in that way can possibly qualify as immanent. But this issue is bound to become more pressing in the course of the move from ideological to any form of moral critique.

Moral critique: Adorno

A response may be formulated in terms of a category which has a central place in dialectical tradition and recurs constantly throughout the writings of the critical theorists. It offers the most suitable heading under which to draw together the diversity of their views. The key category is potentiality. Criticism may intelligibly be said to be immanent provided that its object is, as it were, pregnant with its goal. But potentiality is notoriously a slippery notion, and the risks were obvious to our subjects. Thus, it is an organising principle of Marcuse's essay on 'Philosophy and Critical Theory', and yet he is careful to warn '... in phantasy one can imagine anything. But critical theory does not envision an endless horizon of possibilities' <31>. In an essay written slightly later, Adorno, having insisted that dialectics 'would renounce itself in renouncing the idea of potentiality', goes on to ask: 'But how is potentiality to be conceived if it is not to be abstract and arbitrary, like the utopias dialectical philosophers proscribed' <32>. The danger in the idea is that it may give way under pressure and fail to place any significant controls on one's imaginings. It is then easy to drift into the possible worlds of the logicians, the accommodating domain of the not-logically-impossible. The potentialities that ground the immanence of dialectical critique, however, must be in some stronger sense real, objective possibilities of the material. The task for theory is to discipline the idea so as to achieve this. There are, it may be suggested, three main guidelines or forms of constraint at work in the writings of the Frankfurt School.

The first is a direct legacy of historical materialism. Genuine possibilities are warranted by the level of development of the productive forces. Significantly, this is the immediate recourse of both Marcuse and Adorno in the essays that have been cited. The second constraint derives from philosophical ontology. The limits of what is truly possible are set by the nature of whatever it is whose development is in question. In critical theory, the typical focus of such concern is, variously, the individual human subject, society or humanity as a whole. The third requirement may be seen as a distillation of the first two, their political expression, so to speak. It holds that there must be actual forces or

tendencies at work in existing society which may be taken as the bearers of the possibility of its transformation. These guidelines are, of course, not mutually incompatible, but are readily found in association with one another. There are, however, significant variations of emphasis in the way they are treated in the different reaches of critical theory.

The variations emerge primarily in the treatment of the ontological guidelines. The historical materialist requirement tends to be assumed by all the critical theorists, but not in a way that differentiates them substantially. In relation to the modern period, it is usually taken as carrying the promise of the conquest of scarcity, which is itself the precondition of all the other achievements of the emancipated society. Accepting this requirement can, however, only be the starting point for an understanding of potentiality. Theorists who claim any kinship with Marx will, after all, be unlikely to see much point in speculating about social possibilities which lack any roots in human productive powers. To delimit them significantly, one has to consider the nature of the subjects of historical change.

Adorno's work in this area involves a theme that seems to offer a powerful response to the crisis of ideological critique. At least, it promises the smallest break with the origins of dialectical method. The attempt to base critique on values professed by the object itself turned out to be a failure. But it was in any case a procedure of limited scope which captured only a part of the Hegelian enterprise. To capture it fully one has to do justice to the diversity of working models of dialectic it contains. In particular, one has to move beyond the limitations of the model which was the basis for ideological critique, that of the immanent approach to philosophical systems. It is by no means the case that Hegel's dialectic is tied to objects with a level of consciousness capable of yielding standards for criticism ready-formed. The means through which its range is extended beyond such instances are mainly ontological. Thus, the historical dialectic has as its 'presupposition' the idea that 'reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process'. As such, it is 'the rational and necessary evolution of the world spirit' <33>. The significance of this ontological commitment for immanent method is that it introduces a fresh element to serve as a pole of the oppositions on which the method depends. This element is the rational which stands opposed to the real and which yet, since the two are articulated together through the life of spirit, is inherent within it as potentiality. Method is not now limited to finding a gap between the object's self-image and its present existence. It may focus instead on that between one or both of those moments and the object as it is, in its concept and in truth; that is, in the fulfilment of its role in the development of rational spirit. The difficulties in this conception have sponsored a vast literature, but they need not concern us in detail here <34>. What has to be noted is the new world it promises to open up for criticism. This is no longer confined to objects that may be said to possess their own ideology. Even what is most inarticulately locked 'in itself' may be posited in opposition to the rational form of its own existence. Thus, one arrives at the conception of a method of complete generality, a generality echoed in many of Adorno's formulations of his immanent dialectic;

the 'confrontation of concept and reality', the 'cogitative confrontation of concept and thing' <35>.

It is scarcely surprising that Adorno feels able to retain such formulations, for he is far from any outright rejection of Hegelian ontology and, in particular, its problematic of the subject. An indication of how he wishes to rework that problematic is given in his contribution to the Positivismusstreit. The hallmark of positivist sociology is taken to be its treatment of 'the subject of all knowledge - society, the bearer of logical generality' as if it were simply an object:

> Here lies the innermost difference between a critical theory of society and what is commonly known as sociology ... critical theory is oriented towards the idea of society as subject, whilst sociology accepts reification...
> <36>

The most explicit development of this idea is to be found in Negative Dialectics. What is proposed there is a materialist unmasking of Hegelian Geist, an unmasking from which it emerges as identical with society:

> Alfred Sohn-Rethel was the first to point out that hidden in ... the general and necessary activity of the mind (der allgemeinen und notwendigen Tätigkeit des Geistes) lies work of an inalienably social nature.... Beyond the philosophy of identity's magic circle the transcendental subject can be deciphered as society, unconscious of its own self (als die ihrer selbst unbewusste Gesellschaft).
> <37>

The theme recurs later in the work:

> In the name of 'world spirit' the spirit is affirmed and hypostatized only as that which it always was in itself ... what society worships in the world spirit is itself, the omnipotence of its own coercion.
> <38>

This ontological thesis has, as might be expected, its implications for method. It is in the light of it that one should read the statement that negative dialectics assumes, 'tel quel, the abrupt immediacy, the formations which society and its evolution present to our thought; and it does this so that analysis may bare its mediations, according to the standard (nach dem Mass) of the immanent difference between phenomena and that which they claim to be in themselves (was sie von sich aus zu sein beanspruchen) <39>. Here, as in Hegel, the evolution of the subject is made to yield the standard for universal critique. It gives a purchase to the crucial idea of the tension between what things immediately are and what they implicitly (von sich aus) claim to be. In Adorno's version, however, difficulties begin to thicken when one considers how the process of history, through which alone such claims may be realised, is conceived.

The issue may be introduced by returning to the historical materialist constraint on potentiality. For Adorno, as for the other critical theorists, the key factor in the productive forces is technology. The development of this factor is subject to a historical dialectic, the 'dialectic of enlightenment': technology is the 'essence' of the knowledge that constitutes enlightenment <40>. The programme of enlightenment is 'the disenchantment of the world' through the exercise of reason <41>. What is involved is, however, a limited, 'formalised' conception of reason whose most significant feature for present purposes is its instrumentality <42>. It would be difficult to exaggerate the scope of the claims Adorno makes for the movement of disenchantment: 'As far back as we can trace it, the history of thought has been a dialectic of enlightenment' <43>. Given that enlightenment is, in essence, technical knowledge, history now appears as a unitary process, the 'history of the progressing mastery of nature' <44>. Seen in this way, it invites a complex response:

> Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for that reason,

however, is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history - the unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over men, and finally to that over men's inner nature. No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.
<45>

Thus, the progressing mastery of nature brings in its wake domination over human beings and over nature in human beings. Adorno goes on to display the reflection of this view of history back on the ontology that underlies it:

History is the unity of continuity and discontinuity. Society stays alive, not despite its antagonism, but by means of it.... What historically made this possibility may as well destroy it. The world spirit, a worthy object of definition, would have to be defined as permanent catastrophe.
<46>

If one now permits this image of the historical subject to be reflected back still further, onto the project of critique, the entire structure of thought is revealed to be fundamentally unstable.

This is so because its elements will not fit coherently together. The crux of the matter is that, assuming the ontology and the philosophy of history, critique may be either immanent or emancipatory, but not both. Yet both are necessary if it is to keep within the orbit of dialectical social thought. It seems a minimal requirement of coherence to retain the bond between the ontological and the historical visions. This is to allow that what the phenomena claim to be has some efficacy in the world and that history is in some measure the record of its progressive satisfaction. But then, given the character of that record as depicted by Adorno, what the phenomena claim must merit condemnation as a harbinger of tyranny, not freedom. Critique focused on the gap between aspiration and achievement would be anti-critique, which might well function immanently but only in the service of immanent catastrophe. If, however, one insists on the emancipatory role, critique will have to give up its immanence. Cut off from the malignant purposes of things and the course of events which embodies them, it must confront those realities as the most abstract Sollen, not simply as extrinsic, but as wholly antithetical. A critique that sets itself in that way in opposition to the movement of spirit is dialectically an absurdity. Within the framework of dialectical thought, the critical project cannot, it seems, be reconciled with the vision of history as universal domination. The dialectic of enlightenment annuls dialectical critique. Thus, it might be concluded that Adorno's version of moral critique comes to grief in much the same way as did ideological critique: it proves to be incompatible with the critic's deepest sense of what is actually going on in society. Once again, the critical and the explanatory dimensions of critical theory fall apart. This time, however, the obstacle to immanent criticism is not the character of a particular period, of administered as opposed to liberal capitalism. It is rather the logic of human enlightenment itself, a logic of domination that has been operative since the dawn of history. Immanent moral critique turns out in the end to be a delusion for the reason declared in Dialectic of Enlightenment:

The conclusion that terror and civilisation are inseparable ... is well-founded.... It is impossible to abolish the terror and retain civilisation.
<47>.

From one standpoint, Marcuse's intellectual career appears as a sustained resistance to this conclusion, a systematic attempt to reclaim civilisation for 'pacified existence'.

Before considering this attempt, reference should be made to Adorno's treatment of the third constraint on potentiality, the need for its political expression. The position already outlined may be said to involve a response to this need. It is one that envisages the embodiment of the possibility of change as nothing other than the historical subject, society itself. Admittedly, it could be conceived of as a response only of a rather abstract and schematic kind. Instead of addressing the suggestion at length in its own terms, however, it may be more useful, in the light of our overall concerns, to refer it directly to the views of Marx. What is encountered there is a consistent and forceful rejection of the 'society as subject' idea. In The German Ideology it is condemned as a 'speculative-idealistic, i.e., fantastic conception', and Max Stirner's partiality to it forms an important part of the case against him <48>. The Grundrisse warns: 'To regard society as one single subject is ... to look at it wrongly; speculatively' <49>. The specific terms and context of this rejection give an extra resonance to Adorno's admission that in the critical theory of society 'one is forced back almost inevitably to the standpoint of Left Hegelianism, so scornfully criticized by Marx and Engels' <50>. It is reasonable to suppose that an aspect of what is, for Marx, unacceptably Left Hegelian about the society-subject idea is its tendency to undermine any prospect of organically linking theory with radical practice. To be told that society as a whole is the subject of change is little help to groups that have to struggle within society as it is: theory confronts practice here with a blank wall. Adorno was, of course, notoriously indifferent to the question of the objectification of his ideas in action. Hence, it might be claimed that the problem being discussed is at least not the source of serious internal tension in his work. In this respect too, Marcuse presents a significant contrast.

Moral critique: Marcuse

It has been shown that Adorno's ontology will not ground a form of potentiality suited to the needs of emancipatory critique. What is grounded there is rather a potentiality for domination and disaster. With Marcuse matters proceed more straightforwardly in this respect. The main features of his position are familiar enough from his own accounts and the many excellent commentaries that a brief recapitulation should suffice. The prime object of his ontological concern is, as he usually puts it, 'man': he is from first to last an unrepentant philosophical anthropologist. An enduring emphasis is captured early on in the review of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts when 'the definition of man' is said to be 'the basis of the critique of political economy' <51>. From the Manuscripts Marcuse retained the themes of freedom as man's essential nature and of labour as the process through which freedom is realised. To this anthropology he was later to add elements drawn from Freud's theory of instincts. The strategic purpose of the additions was to show that 'Freud's own theory provides reasons for rejecting his identification of civilisation with repression' <52>. This may be taken, for present purposes, as a rejection of the same identification in Horkheimer and Adorno. Hence, one should not expect to find that their transhistorical pessimism is shared by Marcuse. He is not concerned to show that the logic of repression is inseparable from civilisation as such and must disfigure the civilisation of the future. It may be anticipated that the difficulties confronting dialectical critique in his system will not stem primarily from its basic philosophical disposition, its ontology and theory of history. As a first approximation, it may be said that they cluster instead around the political component of potentiality, the need for it to be demonstrable in real forces and tendencies.

There seems no room for doubt as to the seriousness with which Marcuse views this requirement, a seriousness that sets him apart within critical theory. A central claim of the essay on 'Philosophy and Critical Theory' is that 'unlike philosophy critical theory always derives its goals from the present tendencies of the social process' <53>. Many years later, this characteristic was to be spelled out still more forcibly in terms of the 'governing principle of dialectical thought' that negation should be determinate:

The negation is determinate if it refers the established state of affairs to the basic factors and forces which make for its destructiveness, as well as for the possible alternatives beyond the status quo. In the

human reality, they are historical factors and forces, and the determinate negation is ultimately a political negation.
<54>

Thus, it appears that the dialectical approach to the established state of affairs is posited on the political negation of that state of affairs. Later still, however, the programme implicit in this view was to come under severe strain, as Marcuse developed a systematic understanding of the society established around him.

The issue may be introduced by noting a persistent ambivalence, indeed equivocation, which characterises the writings from One-Dimensional Man onwards. It has two aspects. The first is whether contemporary society actually contains elements that carry the possibility of its transformation. The second concerns the implications for the status of theory if the first question is answered in the negative. Equivocation on these matters runs so deep that the body of work as a whole displays signs of structural tension, even of an intellectual equivalent of trauma.

The key text here is One-Dimensional Man itself. Its exemplary value derives in part from the fact that both forms of equivocation are acknowledged in it. The first is depicted bluntly: 'One-Dimensional Man will vacillate throughout between two contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (2) that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society' <55>. The second gets a more muted recognition, though one that links it explicitly to the first. Marcuse writes of an 'ambiguous situation' in connection with an 'attempt to recapture the critical intent' of social categories. It 'appears from the outset to be regression from a theory joined with historical practice to abstract speculative thought'. Yet, at the same time:

> ... the position of theory cannot be one of mere speculation. It must be a historical position in the sense that it must be grounded on the capabilities of the given society.
> <56>

The ambiguity, as the discussion tacitly admits, is nowhere resolved in the text. Since the questions it raises are our chief concern at present, it may be well to look more closely at the background to Marcuse's statement of it.

At the start of One-Dimensional Man critical theory is presented in terms, characteristic of its moral employment, of potentiality for a better human existence. It is 'a theory which analyzes society in the light of its used and unused or abused capabilities for improving the human condition' <57>. The notion of capabilities is then given the 'political' gloss familiar from early Marcuse:

> The 'possibilities' must be within the reach of the respective society; they must be definable goals of practice. By the same token, the abstraction from the established institutions must be expressive of an actual tendency - that is, their transformation must be the real need of the underlying population. Social theory is concerned with the historical alternatives which haunt the established society as subversive tendencies and forces.
> <58>

This specification at once encounters, however, the fundamental truth of established society as it is experienced in One-Dimensional Man:

> But here, advanced industrial society confronts the critique with a situation which seems to deprive it of its very basis. Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and coordination, creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat or refute all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination.... This containment of social change is perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced industrial society.
> <59>

This may well strike one as a sufficiently clear stand on the first set of issues that were said above to be subject to equivocation. It also hints at implications for the second set which are then drawn out with what seems equal plainness:

> Confronted with the total character of the achievement of advanced industrial society, critical theory is left without the rationale for transcending this society. The vacuum empties the theoretical structure itself....
> <60>

It might now appear that the critical project is left wholly pointless or refuted. But this is a conclusion on which Marcuse is never willing finally to settle.

The 'Introduction' to One-Dimensional Man offers another, less drastic, way of reading the lessons of the integrated society. It is admitted that: 'In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change, the critique is ... thrown back to a high level of abstraction'. Nevertheless, 'this absence', it is implied, does not suffice to 'refute' the theory <61>. In the 'Conclusion' of the work, Marcuse returns to the topic, and comes down more firmly in favour of optimism. 'Dialectical theory,' he asserts, 'is not refuted but it cannot offer the remedy' <62>. He refers again to the contrast between the present situation of the theory and that which confronted its founders, when there were 'real forces (objective and subjective) in the established society which moved (or could be guided to move) towards more rational and freer institutions':

> Without the demonstration of such forces, the critique of society would still be valid and rational but it would be incapable of translating its rationality into terms of historical practice. The conclusion? 'Liberation of Inherent possibilities' no longer adequately expresses the historical alternative.
> <63>

It is difficult not to feel that Marcuse is here shrinking from the logic of his own analysis, from a conclusion whose grounds he had himself decisively established. If a theory professing a dialectical character is thrown back to a high level of abstraction, cannot be translated into historical practice and ceases to be focused on inherent possibilities it is surely not just suffering from a regrettable weakness, but is damaged in the very core of its being. It is a theory whose claim to be dialectical is bogus. Such a verdict is supported by Marcuse's reading of dialectical tradition.

Reference has already been made to his account of the 'governing principle' of determinate negation as requiring political negation through destructive factors and forces in established society. It is difficult to see how a theory that refuses to base itself on what is inherently possible could claim descent from such origins. It is equally difficult to see how an admission of untranslatability into practice could be accommodated to them. In Marcuse's understanding of Marx, practice is standardly taken to have a vital, indeed constitutive, significance for theory, to be a condition of its very

possibility. Thus, Marx's bringing together of the master-servant dialectic and the critique of political economy 'proves itself to be a practical theory, a theory whose immanent meaning ... is particular praxis' <64>. A theory cut off from praxis and thrown back to abstractions could hardly claim affinity with this model. It may be, however, that the most effective way to crystallize doubts about Marcuse's fidelity to his own dialectical insights is in terms of the treatment of the subject in his exegetical work. The theme is given strong, perhaps excessive, emphasis in his interpretation of Hegel <65>. Moreover, none of Marx's commentators have more firmly insisted that his revolutionary theory presupposes a revolutionary subject, the class that is the 'absolute negation', the 'living contradiction' of capitalist society <66>. The continuing validity of this line of thought seems to be affirmed in One-Dimensional Man: 'Society would be rational and free to the extent to which it is organised, sustained and reproduced by an essentially new historical Subject.' Significantly, however, the theme has here moved into the subjunctive, and is, in any case, immediately overtaken by the usual gloomy acknowledgement of reality. The existing system 'denies this exigency', and its dominant characteristics 'militate against the emergence of a new Subject' <67>. Marcuse's grasp of dialectical tradition should, strictly speaking, have ruled out the optimism over the viability of dialectical theory that he permits himself in this situation. It is one in which a basic assumption of the tradition, that theory moves in harmony with the movement of reality, is no longer tenable.

This discussion needs to be related to developments after One-Dimensional Man. The question of society's revolutionary potential as it figures in the later writings may be considered first. Marcuse's ambivalence in this area is not of great interest in itself, but only as background to his thinking about the role of theory. To avoid the danger that one is simply charting legitimate shifts of opinion over a period, it may be well to conduct the discussion within the framework of individual texts. The case of Counterrevolution and Revolt is particularly interesting. It is marked by a dualism in which optimistic and pessimistic formulations are laid down close together in an inert opposition without either mutual reflection or movement of synthesis. Thus, capitalism is said to create transcending needs which it cannot meet, yet existing needs are, it seems, transformed only in the socialist revolution. Freedom is rooted in the human sensibility, so that the senses are the basis for the transformation of reality. Yet existing society is reproduced not only in the mind, the consciousness, of men but also in their senses. On the one hand, the fetishism of the commodity world is wearing thin, people see behind it; Communist parties and unions are mass organisations with a potentially revolutionary force; the existential protest threatens the coherence of the social system. On the other hand, socialist Marxist theory and practice have no soil, no 'sufficient reason', among the large majority of the working population; the cultural revolution appears as the abstract negation rather than the historical heir of bourgeois culture; in any case, the potential mass basis for social change may become a mass basis for Fascism <68>.

What is evident here is not so much readiness to embrace full-blown contradictions, as a diversity of interpretation that suggests simply an inability to make up one's mind. So powerful an impression as the text conveys of facing in different directions at once could scarcely have been lost on Marcuse himself. Indeed, the nature of the issues is such as might be thought to bring them within the scope of the confession of vacillation in One-Dimensional Man. Some admirers have wished to interpret the tendency as a testimony to the dialectical character of his thought <69>. But he makes no attempt himself to represent it in such a light. In terms of his wholly orthodox understanding of dialectic as a dynamic process of resolving contradictions, it would be hard to imagine anything less dialectical than continuous vacillation between their opposing poles, the intellectual equivalent of running on the spot. Elsewhere in Marcuse's

writings the unhappy, self-critical tone with which this area of tension is explored is strongly marked. In An Essay on Liberation, he refers to the 'vicious circle' consisting in the fact that 'the rupture with the self-propelling conservative continuum of needs must precede the revolution which is to usher in a free society, but such rupture itself can be envisaged only in a revolution' <70>. Similarly, he speaks in Five Lectures of 'what is unfortunately the greatest difficulty' in theorising social transformation:

> ... for new, revolutionary needs to develop, the mechanisms that reproduce the old needs must be abolished. In order for the mechanisms to be abolished there must first be a need to abolish them.

He concludes sadly: 'That is the circle in which we are placed, and I do not know how to get out of it' <71>.

The circle may be said to have a vicious aspect in the everyday as well as the technical sense. There can be no doubt of Marcuse's life-long hostility to capitalism and of his commitment to its transformation into socialism. Moreover, he constantly sought to locate and identify with whatever elements of opposition offered prospects of advancing that end. In this way he remained always a political being to an extent unparalleled among the critical theorists. Thus, in human terms, his inability to see a way out of the circle may be thought to have a cruel, even tragic, significance. Such a judgement is acceptable up to a point, but it cannot, without sentimentality, be allowed to stand as a final verdict. The need for qualification arises when one begins to consider the consequences of the situation for the status of theory: that is, when one turns from questions concerning the assessment of revolutionary potential to questions concerning the viability of critique. It has then to be admitted that the tragic tension had been well dissipated by the time the vicious circle was acknowledged. The tension is partially maintained in One-Dimensional Man owing to the continued reliance on formulations that reflect the earlier conception of potentiality as determinate, that is, political, negation. But already these formulations cannot be said to represent the dominant strain. That is represented by the tendency to combine optimistic conclusions about the possibility of theory with pessimistic ones about the possibility of practice. Such a tendency itself presupposes a conception of theory and of its relation to practice which is not that of classical dialectics. Thus, the slackening of tension occurs because the traditional requirements for dialectical theory became eroded. This development gathers pace in Marcuse's later period.

Its most striking expression is the advice that critical theory should not, in contemporary circumstances, be afraid to be 'utopian', in deliberate contrast to its own past and to traditional Marxism. In a 'Foreword', written shortly after One-Dimensional Man, to a collection of Marcuse's essays from the thirties, he compared the earlier situation with that obtaining at the time of writing:

> Today critical theory is essentially more abstract than it was at that time.... In view of the capacity and productivity of organised capitalism, should not the 'first phase' of socialism be more and qualitatively other than it was projected to be in Marxian theory?
> <72>

The lesson to be drawn is:

> ... thought in contradiction must become more negative and more utopian in opposition to the status quo. This seems to me to be the imperative of the current situation in relation to my theoretical essays of the thirties...
> <73>

The meaning of this proposal may be made more precise with the help of our preceding discussion. What it amounts to is the dropping of political conditions for potentiality in favour of relying on the contribution of the productive forces. The background of Freudian-Marxist anthropology continues to be assumed, but its effective significance is the negative one of serving to guarantee that domination is not destiny and that a non-repressive civilisation is theoretically conceivable. The character of the position that results is revealed in the opening passage of An Essay on Liberation:

> Up to now, it has been one of the principal tenets of the critical theory of society (and particularly Marxian theory) to refrain from what might be reasonably called utopian speculation.... I believe that this restrictive conception must be revised, and that the revision is suggested, and even necessitated, by the actual evolution of contemporary societies. The dynamic of their productivity deprives 'utopia' of its traditional unreal content: what is denounced as 'utopian' is no longer that which has 'no place', but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the established societies. Utopian possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of advanced capitalism and socialism...
> <74>

Once adopted, the utopian strain was to haunt Marcuse's thought to the end <75>. In one of his last pieces of writing, an essay on Rudolf Bahro, he insists that 'socialism shows itself to be a real possibility, and the basis of utopia is revealed in what already exists, only when the most extreme, integral, "utopian" conception of socialism informs the analysis' <76>.

The utopian turn has important implications for the nature of critical theory. Even when the claim to be dealing in inherent possibilities is retained, what they turn out to be inherent in is simply the 'technical and technological forces', regardless of how they are blocked by the realities of power. Potentiality has itself become almost entirely technical here, and not to any significant degree political. What results is a species of moral critique without political mediations. In it judgement is formed in the light of a state of society representing the fulfilment of human nature whose material requirements can in principle be met with existing technology. As Marcuse is, at least sometimes, willing to admit, this conception involves a definite break with Marxist theory. The conclusion seems inescapable that it is precisely what the presentation suggests, a version of the utopian socialism that was so roundly condemned by Marx and Engels. Indeed, it involves a break with any form of dialectic that can claim descent from Hegel. Its merely utopian possibilities will not meet the required conditions of immanence. They must confront the present as an ideal and a rebuke, not as the revelation of its natural bent and the conclusion of its inner logic.

Some additional light may be shed by considering how the theme of the subject develops in Marcuse's later work. At the level of official doctrine, as it were, attachment to it never wavers. Its meaning within the overall structure of thought was, however, to shift considerably. There is continuing qualitative change, along the lines foreshadowed in One-Dimensional Man, in the significance of the theme for theory. In the original conception of Hegel and Marx, as Marcuse had shown, the consciousness and agency of the subject had been the indispensable medium of existence of dialectic. They have nothing resembling that status in the position Marcuse was to evolve under the pressure of the total society. Thus, An Essay on Liberation continues to use the language of the subject to pose the problem of social transformation, but it is now, it appears, impossible to specify who the agents of such transformation might be, and futile to try <77>. Inability to identify the subject has become a difficulty, even 'the greatest difficulty', for theory, but still by no means what the naive student of dialectical tradition might expect, its death sentence. Clearly, the tradition has become seriously diluted at this point.

Another form of dilution appears in the way the concept of the subject begins to lose its original boundaries of reference. The result is that the concept becomes increasingly insubstantial and indeterminate. Already in An Essay on Liberation, there is a crucial shift of emphasis from the subject, in the old sense, to subjectivity <78>. Thus, the 'emergence of the new subject' is spoken of as if it were simply identical with 'radical change in consciousness' <79>. Moreover, the main event celebrated in the work is that the 'new sensibility has become a political factor', demanding to be taken account of by critical theory <80>. This new sensibility, even if it cannot be located in any specific agents of change, is itself praxis <81>. Against this background, it is not surprising that Marcuse should have seized so enthusiastically on Bahro's notion of 'surplus consciousness'. This is 'that free human (psychische) capacity which is no longer absorbed by the struggle for existence' <82>. It is not 'the consciousness of a particular class', but 'the consciousness of individuals from all strata' comprising a 'diffuse, almost organizationless opposition' with 'no mass base'. Marcuse presents this thesis in the familiar idiom: the individuals from all strata are 'the potential subject of an oppositional praxis' <83>. But the concept of the subject has surely here reached its limiting case. For what we are dealing with is so amorphous as to be scarcely intelligible as an individual centre, even a 'potential' centre, of thought and action.

Some help with the problem is provided elsewhere in the Bahro essay. Marcuse cites, and accepts, the claim by Bahro that surplus consciousness as 'transforming power' is 'embodied' in the 'intellectual layers of the collective worker', and only beyond this does it exist 'in all strata of the independent population, in an obstructed and inactive form' <84>. He goes on to spell out and defend the thesis of the 'leading role' of the intelligentsia, even in the provocative form of socialism's alleged need for an 'elite of intelligence' <85>. These references to the intelligentsia are the nearest he comes to the identification of a determinate group sustaining the new consciousness. Belief in the leading role of intellectuals as a group in promoting social change has had considerable appeal for intellectuals in modern times. In spite of its durability, it is a belief which has difficulty mustering significant theoretical, not to speak of empirical, support. Marxism seems almost the last source where such support might be expected. Indeed, when Marcuse achieves his belief in a new consciousness embodied in the intelligentsia it is hard to avoid the sense of a great circle closing in the history of ideas. The echoes of the revolution of consciousness which was proclaimed by the Left Hegelians, with themselves as its representatives, and was excoriated by Marx and Engels, seem unmistakable. To note this is to invoke another image of a pattern of thought closing in on itself, this time within critical theory. Given Adorno's identification with Left Hegelianism noted earlier, the development we have been tracing in Marcuse's work seems a reflection of the ultimate coming together of the views of the two most prominent critical theorists. In this as in other aspects what results is a moment not of true Aufhebung but rather of assimilation and loss of identity on Marcuse's part <86>.

The difficulties encountered by Marcuse's version of moral critique have a familiar ring. Critical immanence has once more proved unable to find a fingerhold in reality. As in the case of ideological critique, the impregnable reality is that of contemporary, administered society. Just as it destroys ideology in the sense required to yield standards of criticism, so it eliminates the possibility of its own political negation. In these circumstances, critique is indeed thrown back to abstractions, to an appeal to the needs of human

nature and the technical feasibility of their fulfilment. This in turn leads to changes in metatheory, to Marcuse's abandonment of the criteria of immanence he knew to be crucial for classical dialectics, and to his attempt to equip critique for survival as a utopian enterprise. His concern with oppositional elements remains, but only as a biographical particularity, a survival of political instincts, no longer as the expression of a theory necessarily linked to practice. Here the entire project of renewing the Hegelian Marxist tradition by means of a critical theory of society may be seen as running honourably into the sand.

The conclusion of this discussion is that the Frankfurt School's programme of critique cannot be carried through in any of its main variants, whether 'ideological' or 'moral'. In all of them the immanent emancipatory evaluation of reality proves to be incompatible with, and is systematically subverted by, its understanding. Against this background it appears natural that someone who retained critical ambitions for social theory should seek to realise them under different theoretical auspices, to move the methodology out of the shadow of Hegel. This may, at any rate, serve as a rough characterisation of Habermas's early work in critical theory. The divergence from the first generation is expressed primarily in his foundational strategy. It is one in which critique as reconstruction is, so to speak, revived in order to bear the weight of critique as criticism. The standards of criticism are reconstructed by means of a transcendental argument as presuppositions of discourse <87>. Clearly, the intellectual ancestor of this strategy is Kant, rather than Hegel. Hence, one may speak of a shift in basic orientation



whose consequences extend to all the concerns of this discussion. It is, of course, only superficially a paradox to suggest that transcendental arguments may yield immanent conclusions. For they establish what is required in virtue of the nature of the object if it is to be intelligible. Thus, the standards transcendentally established for critical theory may be said to be always immanent to the object of criticism. But this result, as so often with Kantian method, must appear from a Hegelian standpoint as too easily won, by a process that omits the painful, detailed labour of the negative. What the standards are held to be intrinsic to is the nature of language, and hence of social action, as such. They are not intrinsic to any one society or period in a way that distinguishes the relationship conceptually from that obtaining for any other. All human practices operate, as it were, at the same logical distance from the standards, even if, as a matter of fact, they differ in the extent to which they manage to realise them in practice. Immanence in Hegel and Marx is more determinate than this, shaped to the specificity of the object and not simply attributable to it in common with everything else. Their theory is a thoroughgoing historicism in which standards of reason have life and meaning only in the movement of societies, and are not independently accessible to timeless, transcendental reflection. It seems a pity of a body of thought with such a distinguished past were now to be given up without a struggle. Hence, it is tempting to explore the possibility of taking the opposite path to that of Habermas. If Hegelian Marxism proves unsuitable as a framework for critical theory of society, one might propose to retain the framework while dropping the assumption that within it social theory must be conceived as criticism.

Marx and critique

The proposal may be focused in the following way. An obvious diagnosis of Marcuse's plight lies to hand. It sees him as committed to revolutionary theory on Marxist lines, yet unable either to accept the crucial identification of the revolutionary subject as the proletariat of advanced capitalism or to find a credible alternative, and, hence, as unable to avoid the antinomies witnessed above. This view of the situation now needs to be given a further twist. For one must ask whether if Marcuse had located his subject, it could have rescued the integrity of his thought. Doubts on this score have implications for the Frankfurt School as a whole. So far the discussion has seemed to point towards the familiar, and facile, verdict that the theory of the School is 'Marxism without the proletariat' <88>. Such a verdict is possible, however, only on the most superficial reading of intellectual history. It appears to assume that Marxism may be viewed as a simple aggregate of elements of which the proletariat is one. But the proletariat is not so loosely inserted in the original structure of thought as to make this assumption tenable.

What is ultimately in question here is whether the relationship of revolutionary subject to revolutionary theory can ever be adequately conceived on the model of that of critique to its audience. The suggestion to be pursued is that the attempt so to conceive it encounters systematic incongruity. Such a large-scale conceptual mismatch may be expected to show itself in numerous individual anomalies. There is space at present to consider only one of the more significant of these <89>. It arises from what might be called the universalist rationalism of the critique idea. The critique of society is most naturally understood as dealing in considerations which are binding on all in so far as they are rational. Thus, the goal of freedom, justice and happiness is to be thought of as having an authority that provides every individual agent equally with a reason for seeking it. Marx's theory is not, however, to be taken as addressed to the universe of rational beings as such. In its self-conception, it is formulated from, is expressive of, and, in turn, reflexively transforms the standpoint of the proletariat. What the critique thesis cannot allow for is this possibility of categorial distinctions of status between different groups in relation to its procedures and findings. Its abstract rationalism must dissolve the specificity of the link between a class and its theory. It may, of course, acknowledge that members of the proletariat are more likely in fact to feel the force of Marxist reasoning. But this is a contingent matter. The concession does nothing to redeem the internal character of the connection between theory and subject. The problem is that a critique of society must always be too indiscriminate, too mediated, to achieve the necessary intimacy. This is to suggest that it can never be immanent enough to comprise a genuine dialectic.

A claim such as this needs immediate support from the sources of modern dialectical thought. Thus, something should be said on the question of Marx's dealings with the concept of critique as criticism. The story is complicated in its details, but the main lines are distinct enough. It cannot be denied that the early writings show a commitment to the critique of various aspects of social reality, and that providing it is taken to be the responsibility of radical theorists <90>. It is also evident that critique in that sense contributes nothing of significance to the later work. The commitment to critique is retained, and indeed highlighted, but the characteristic form it takes is the critique not of society but of political economy. This project became central to

Marx's self-conception, as the titles or subtitles of so many major writings testify. From the earliest references to political economy, it is plain that what he has effectively in view is 'the science of political economy', or, as he terms it with a different emphasis, 'the ideology of the political economists' <91>. Political economy is, for Marx, the most intellectually formidable version of bourgeois ideology, authoritatively embodying that ideology's grasp of capitalist society. Thus, he may be said to have seen his life-work as bound up with the critique of bourgeois ideology, the enterprise often associated with, but never seriously attempted by, the Frankfurt School. More specifically, his aim was to destroy the cognitive core of that ideology, as it found expression in political economy. To achieve this, it was necessary, as with all critical critique, to employ standards of evaluation. The standards Marx required for his purposes consisted of cognitive values, the values constitutive of inquiry in science and logic. These are, indeed, the only values that play an integral role in his mature work. Recent discussion in this area has tended to be bedevilled by the largely semantic question of his relationship to 'morality' <92>. There are many places in the writings, early and late, where expressions of what it seems pointless to deny is 'moral' outrage are wrung from him by what he witnessed all around. It is also the case, however, that he consciously and consistently refused to rely on appeals to a conception of an alternative human existence to supply the practical significance of socialist theory <93>. Yet, as the case of the Frankfurt School shows, some such conception would have been needed to be the ultimate ground of the theory, if its status were that of social critique. So far as existing society was concerned, what Marx postulated of the revolutionary subject was cognitive, rather than moral, achievement: its essential weapon was understanding, not criticism. The question to be asked is how he could have supposed that this was an adequate recipe for revolutionary theory.

The revolutionary character of the theory is closely associated by Marx with its being dialectical. More precisely, it is held to be revolutionary in virtue of employing a dialectical method <94>. Hegel is always acknowledged as the founder of that method. Hence, at this point it is natural to turn to the second source of the modern debate over dialectics. Above all, it is natural to turn to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the work that is for Marx 'the true point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy' <95>. The basic dialectic in the Phenomenology is the dialectic of consciousness which is, Hegel insists, always consciousness of something. Thus, the general form of the contradictions is that of a conflict between the idea of the object by which the subject consciousness is initially possessed and the object as it is actually encountered in experience <96>. The concept of critique is not required to theorise this process. In Hegelian phenomenology transitions are not effected through negative evaluations of the successive moments. Such evaluations could only represent a superfluous layer of mediation here. The source of movement is the discovery, not that the moments are as such undesirable or inadequate, but that they involve contradictions <97>. This discovery is assumed to be of directly practical significance for a subject consciousness meeting minimal conditions of rationality. Such a consciousness cannot rest in the awareness of its own contradictions but is necessarily driven beyond, towards their resolution.

In Marx's appropriation of the scheme, the phenomenological subject becomes the social class and the dialectic of consciousness becomes a dialectic of class consciousness. For a subject class, at least in the earlier stages of the dialectic, the basic content of its view of the social world is drawn from 'the ruling ideas', which Marx tells us are the ideas of the ruling class. The subject class, that is to say, is subjected to the ruling ideology. It is the claim of the ideology to provide a correct picture of social reality that must, on the phenomenological model, come in conflict with, and be refuted by, comprehended experience. The strategic importance of the critique of political economy has to be seen against this background. In exposing the cognitive failure of bourgeois ideology, the contradiction between its projections and the reality, it serves as the trigger of the dialectic of class consciousness. Thus, theory is practical in virtue of being formative of the consciousness, and thereby the agency, of the subjects who make history. In being so, it is itself a form of historical change, not a device for securing a base for ratiocination about its desirability. This peculiar immediacy and immanence is assumed throughout Marx's scattered moments of methodological self-consciousness. It is captured in such formulations as that which holds that the 'theoretical conclusions of the Communists ... merely express in general terms actual relations springing from an existing class struggle' <98>. Formulations of this kind were to be eagerly taken up by the major figures of the revival of Hegelian Marxism in the early twentieth century. They are echoed in Karl Korsch's assertion that 'the Marxist system is the theoretical expression of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat <99>. They are echoed also by Lukacs: 'the theory is essentially the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself' <100>. History and Class Consciousness elaborates this thesis with a consistency and complexity not achieved by Korsch. Indeed, the original conception seems at times almost submerged there by the weight of theory. This impression reflects the remarkable system of conflations that crowns the theoretical achievement of the work. Historical materialism, as the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process, is, in the end, identical with the true 'imputed' class consciousness of the proletariat. This is in turn identical with the ideological maturity of the class and, to complete the circle, the struggle for that maturity simply is the revolutionary process itself <101>. These fusions are surely reminiscent not so much of the spirit of Hegel's system as of the Schellingian night in which all cows are black. Lukacs himself came, of course, to be critical of the entire scheme, and, most of all, of the ontology of identity that underpins it, the view of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history. A non-mythological, truly materialist and dialectical theory would, as he realised, have to rest on a different social ontology. What was required was a properly articulated account of the nature of the revolutionary subject which would render intelligible its role as the agent of a materialist dialectic of history. This was the chief problem bequeathed by History and Class Consciousness to Marxist theory.

The challenge was not to be seriously taken up in the West. In this vital respect the work was an end not a beginning. Hence, the view of 'Western Marxism' as a Lukacs-inspired engagement with the central philosophical tasks of the Marxist tradition is an amiable fantasy <102>. The members of the Frankfurt School were perhaps the natural inheritors of the Lukacsian problematic. Its adoption by them was, however, ruled out by a feature associated with 'Western Marxism' which they genuinely do exhibit, its remoteness from political practice and, specifically, the practice of the working class movement. Unable, for complex reasons, to identify with, and give theoretical expression to, the standpoint of the proletariat, they functioned as socialist intellectuals whose link with socialism had to be mediated through reasons for acting of universal validity. Ethics had, in the manner outlined in this paper, to substitute for Marxist ontology. Their situation bears out, what is in any case evident on grounds of Marxist theory itself, the strangeness of speaking of a Marxism which is characterised by a divorce from practice. It suggests also the theoretical nullity of a category of historical understanding that has that divorce as a constituting principle. For the divorce from practice must surely infect the essence of the theory, placing it outside the limits of what can significantly be designated as Marxism. A tendency to overlook this among students of post-classical Marxism seems to indicate that the shape of the tradition that is their professed concern has become obscure and its requirements have become dead letters. Such a failure of historical sense should by no means be attributed to the critical theorists. On the contrary, they were

well aware of where they had come from and of the direction in which they were heading.

In this context 'Traditional and Critical Theory' is once again a seminal document. For one thing, it contains several impeccably Lukacsian formulations. It advocates a conception in which 'the theoretician and his specific object are seen as forming a dynamic unity with the oppressed class', and so 'his profession is the struggle of which his own thinking is a part and not something self-sufficient and separable from the struggle'. What is opposed to traditional ideas of theory is the 'idea of a theory which becomes a genuine force, consisting in the self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution'. At the same time, however, some positions occupied in History and Class Consciousness have begun to be abandoned. This is most evident in the persistent concern to detach the fate of critical theory from that of the proletariat: 'even the situation of the proletariat is, in this society, no guarantee of correct knowledge'. There is no 'social class by whose acceptance of the theory one could be guided'. The conclusion is that, in words already quoted above, 'the critical theory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for the abolition of social injustice' <103>. The key to the enigmatic quality of the essay surely lies here: it subscribes to a conception of theory as the self-awareness of revolutionary subjects; yet on the identification of these subjects it has suffered a complete failure of nerve. The essay is a transitional work, marking the high point of Lukacs's influence on the Frankfurt School and pointing towards its inexorable decline, as pessimism over the proletariat deepened. Some members of the School were able to cope with this situation with more equanimity than others. The special poignancy of Marcuse's response was noted above. Yet he too had a keen sense of what was being left behind, as is witnessed by his enduring belief that Korsch and Lukacs represented the 'most authentic' current of Marxism <104>. Adorno was perhaps least affected, as the one least impressed by this current and its vision of the proletariat. In some respects, however, he shows the deepest awareness of the overall contours of the movement of ideas in which critical theory was lodged. It is typically expressed not in extended historical exposition but in aphorisms and asides. It is in this light that one should view his taking to task the attitude to criticism that Marx had developed by the time of the 'Theses on Feuerbach':

> In his youth he had demanded the 'ruthless criticism of everything that exists'. Now he mocked criticism. But his famous joke about the Young Hegelians, his coinage 'critical criticism' was a dud and went up in smoke as nothing but a tautology.
> <105>

If it is assumed that Adorno understood Marxist theory as a critical theory of society, he is presumably to be regarded here as rebuking Marx for not being in his mature work Marxist enough. But this would be a fatuous opinion to attribute to Adorno. It is surely better to take the passage as another sign of his awareness that the theory is not essentially social critique and that the project of such a critique is a reversion to Young Hegelian positions that Marx had left behind in youth, to a pre-Marxist conception of how thought is to be radical in relation to society.

NOTES

1 The chief exception, and most philosophically penetrating general work on the Frankfurt School is D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas, London, 1980.
2 M. Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. M. J. O'Connell and others, New York, 1972 (subsequently CT), pp. 188-252.
3 CT, p. 206.
4 The immediate source of this borrowing is P. Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School, Cambridge, 1980, p. 25.
5 T. W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, trans W. Domingo, Oxford, 1982 (subsequently AE), p. 5.
6 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller, London, 1969, p. 581.
7 AE, p. 5.
8 M. Horkheimer, 'Notes on Institute Activities', Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 122.
9 T. W. Adorno and others, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, 1976 (subsequently PD), p. 115.
10 H. Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, New York, 1978 (subsequently EFSR), p. 147.
11 'This study attempts to evaluate some main trends of Soviet Marxism in terms of an "immanent critique", that is to say it starts from the theoretical premises of Soviet Marxism, develops their ideological and sociological consequences and reexamines the premises in the light of these consequences'. Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis, London, 1958, p. 1.
12 T. W. Adorno, Prisms, trans S. and S. Weber, Cambridge, Mass., 1981 (subsequently P), p. 65.
13 T. W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott, London, 1978 (subsequently MM), p. 93.
14 MM, p. 93.
15 MM, pp. 210-11.
16 MM, p. 95.
17 K. Marx, Early Writings, trans. R. Livingstone and G. Benton, Harmondsworth, 1975 (subsequently EW), pp. 212-41.
18 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans B. Fowkes, Harmondsworth, 1976, p. 280 (subsequently C),
19 MM, p. 221.
20 For a sample of Adorno's dealing with 'morality', see discussion below. For Marcuse, see, e.g., An Essay on Liberation, Harmondsworth, 1969 (subsequently EL), pp. 18-19; Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis Politics and Utopia, London, 1970 (subsequently FL), p. 96. Horkheimer's status as the Institute's 'moralist' was well recognised. See letter from Adorno quoted in S. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute, Brighton, 1977, p. 236. See also associated discussion by Buck-Morss.
21 CT, p. 248.
22 MM, pp. 155-56.
23 MM, p. 157.
24 T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, London, 1973 (subsequently ND), pp. 203-04.
25 ND, p. 285.
26 ND, p. 365.
27 MM, p. 18. See also M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, New York, 1947, p. vii.
28 CT, pp. 199, 245, 242.
29 H. Marcuse, 'Philosophy and Critical Theory', Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Harmondsworth, 1968 (subsequently N), pp. 136-37, 135, 152.
30 'On Hedonism', N, p. 180.
31 N, p. 154.
32 P, pp. 92-93.
33 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 27, 29.
34 A central difficulty may, however, be posed in terms, relevant to the present discussion, of the traditional distinction between immanence and transcendence. It seems essential to Hegel's conception that the dialectical subject be, in some sense, immanent, that it should not confront the historical movement in blank externality and that its purposes be realised only in and through that movement. Yet its purposes are not simply exhausted in, or identical with, the historical details, and it must have enough transcendence to be intelligible as the source of the teleological energy on which the movement as a whole depends. It is not easy to see how, or whether, these requirements can be reconciled.
35 PD, p. 23; N, p. 144.
36 PD, pp. 33, 34.
37 First sentence in the passage is rendered in accordance with ND, p. 177. Translation of the second is from M. Rosen, 'Critical Theory: Between Ideology and Philosophy', The Need for Interpretation, ed. S. Mitchell and M. Rosen, London, 1983, p. 100. German text is Negative Dialektic, Frankfurt am Main, 1966, pp. 176-77. My discussion of the theme in connection with Negative Dialectics is influenced by Rosen's treatment.
38 ND, p. 316.
39 ND, p. 38; translation amended, see Negative Dialektik, p. 46.
40 T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming, London, 1979 (subsequently DE), p. 4.
41 DE, p. 3.
42 DE, pp. 3-4, 104. In general, the hallmark of formalised reason is the adjustment of details within a framework taken for granted. Thus, as well as instrumentality it is also subsumption under principles; DE, p. 82. Clearly the whole field owes more to Weber than to Marx.
43 ND, p. 118.
44 ND, p. 355.
45 ND, p. 320.
46 ND, p. 320.
47 DE, p. 217.
48 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, London, 1976 (subsequently CW), pp. 52, 206.
49 K. Marx, Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 94.
50 PD, p. 128.
51 H. Marcuse, 'The Foundation of Historical Materialism', From Luther to Popper, trans. J. De Bres, London, 1973 (subsequently FLTP), p. 26.
52 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, New York, 1962, p. 4.

53 N, p. 143.
54 'A Note on Dialectic', EFSR, p. 449. This essay was written in 1960 as a new Preface to Marcuse's Reason and Revolution. The claim quoted here may be seen as implied by the interpretation of Hegelian 'real possibility' in that work. See Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, London, 1967 (subsequently RR), pp. 150-52.
55 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, London, 1964 (subsequently ODM), p. xv.
56 ODM, pp. xiv-xv.
57 ODM, p. x.
58 ODM, pp. xi-xii.
59 ODM, p. xii.
60 ODM, p. xiv.
61 ODM, p. xiii.
62 ODM, p. 253.
63 ODM, pp. 254-55.
64 FLTP, p. 40.
65 RR, e.g. pp. 52, 259. For the suggestion that 'Marcuse has a quite Fichtean-Kantian reading of Hegel which stresses the absolute sovereignty of the subject', see D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, Basingstoke, 1984 (subsequently HM), p. 443, n. 10.
66 RR, p. 435; ODM, p. 31.
67 ODM, p. 252.
68 Counterrevolution and Revolt, London, 1972 (subsequently CR), see in succession, pp. 16, 71, 21, 41, 82, 31, 93, 25.
69 See, e.g., B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography, London, 1982, p. 165, n. 8.
70 EL, p. 27.
71 FL, p. 80.
72 N, p. xvi.
73 N, p. xx.
74 EL, p. 13.
75 What appear to be exceptions are so only in a verbal sense. See, e.g., FL, p. 64. The position that Marcuse there denies to be 'utopian' is elsewhere taken by him to be the essence of the utopian strain, i.e., complete reliance on purely 'technical possibility'.
76 'Protosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward A Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro's Analysis', Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses, ec. U. Wolter, New York, 1980 (subsequently RB), p. 26.
77 EL, pp. 58-59, 82.
78 See HM, pp. 317-18 and p. 467, n. 95. There is some tension between Kellner's position in the note, where he accepts that in Marcuse's late writings the revolutionary subject becomes revolutionary subjectivity and his position in the main text, where this is represented as a shift that Marcuse should have made but did not.
79 EL, p. 59.
80 EL, p. 31.
81 EL, p. 33.
82 RB, p. 27.
83 RB, p. 39.
84 RB, pp. 28-29.
85 RB, p. 32.
86 A useful index to the process is provided by the increasing influence on Marcuse of Adorno's aesthetic theory; for instance of his obsessive anti-identitarian stance and of the view of autonomous form as the sole carrier of the radical significance of art. See, e.g., CR, p. 198; The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, London, 1978, pp. xi, 8, 13.
87 J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. J. Shapiro, London, 1972, esp. pp. 301-17. For a discussion of the transcendental method, see B. Stroud, 'Transcendental Arguments', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. lxv, No. 9, 1968, pp. 241-56; C. Taylor, 'The Validity of Transcendental Arguments', Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1979, pp. 151-65.
88 L. Kolakowski puts it more precisely: '... the main principles of "critical theory" are those of Lukacs's Marxism, but without the proletariat'; Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 3, Oxford, 1978, p. 355. It is, however, not clear what this formula could mean for Kolakowski. As he demonstrates, Lukacs's Marxism is tied definitionally to the proletariat; see, e.g., p. 269.
89 Another is discussed in the final section of J. McCarney, 'Recent Interpretations of Ideology', Economy and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1985, see pp. 90-92.
90 'The criticism of religion is ... in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo', EW, p. 244; 'All communist and socialist writers ... subjected the real foundations of contemporary society to incisive criticism.' K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism, Moscow, 1975, p. 99.
91 'English Political Economy, i.e. the scientific reflection of the state of the economy in England', EW, p. 406 'his (the political economist's) ideology', C, p. 931.
92 For an introduction to the debate, see K. Nielsen and S. C. Patten (eds.), Marx and Morality, Guelph, 1981.
93 To cite some well known examples: 'Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.' CW, p. 49; '... the working class have no ideals to realise, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant', The Civil War in France, Moscow, 1972, p. 58.
94 C, pp. 102-03.
95 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow, 1974, p. 127.
96 For an illuminating discussion see G. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, London, 1981 (subsequently HCS), pp. 45-47, 83-91, 107, 122.
97 'Hegel does not condemn this. To do so would be to stop outside the phenomenology and to impose another abstract definition of what the experience should be on the will. The discrepancy between the natural will's definition and its experience, the social reality presupposed by the definition, itself transforms the inequity.' HCS, p. 85.
98 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', The Revolution of 1848, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 80.
99 K. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, trans. F. Halliday, London, 1970, p. 42.
100 G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. R. Livingstone, London, 1971 (subsequently HCC).
101 See discussion in J. McCarney, The Real World of Ideology, Brighton, 1980, Ch. 3, esp. pp. 125-26.
102 For 'Western Marxism' see, e.g., P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, London, 1976; A. Arato and P. Breines, The Young Lukacs and the Origins of Western Marxism, London, 1979; R. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism, Cambridge, 1981.
103 CT, successively pp. 215, 216, 231, 213, 242, 212.
104 Reported in HM, p. 69.
105 T. W. Adorno, 'Resignation', Telos, Spring 1978, p. 166.