



REVIEWS

Freud or Fraud?

Jeffrey Moussaieff Mason (ed.), The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1985, 512pp, £19.95 hb

Jeffrey Moussaieff Mason, The Assault on Truth: Freud's suppression of the seduction theory (with a new preface and afterword), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985, 320pp, £3.95 pb

Stephen Marcus, Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, 268pp, £18 hb

Despite the evident absurdity of his scientific doctrines, Wilhelm Fliess was Sigmund Freud's soul mate during a critical period of the latter's personal and intellectual development. Freud needed someone to whom he could confide his fears and ambitions, as well as his latest evidences and developing theories. The period of their mutual correspondence covers the 'origins of psychoanalysis' (the title of the previous edited collection) and, as is often argued, the birth of psychoanalysis as a new and independent science is inseparable from the process of self-analysis to which Freud subjected himself. It is thus to Fliess that Freud writes, 'I have found love of the mother and jealousy of the father in my own case too, and now believe it to be a general phenomenon of early childhood' (15.10.1897). But, with The Interpretation of Dreams (1900-01) completed and psychoanalysis a newborn science, Freud had no further need of a man whose views he could now see to be wrong and, moreover, fundamentally incompatible with his own.

Such, in compressed form, is the conventional account whose telling often typifies what Gellner terms the hagiographical style appropriate to the Life and Passion of Saint Sigmund. Stephen Marcus devotes a chapter of his Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis to reviewing the previously published edition of the Freud-Fliess correspondence and his approach, typical of his book as a whole, is indeed hagiographical. We are told of a 'complex journey of creative discovery' which testifies to Freud's 'genius', 'personal and intellectual courage', his commitment and adherence to the idea of science with 'its profoundly moral component'. Fliess, we are further informed, was a 'witness' to this process, privileged to hear Freud's discoveries at first hand in virtue of his lack of embarrassment before their sexual content, and, if Freud misrecognised his friend's true scientific qualities, this 'idealising' and 'overvaluing' had 'transference-like qualities'.

For some time there has been a suspicion that the conventional account - and not just in such wildly hagiographical form as that typified by Marcus - was badly misjudged. The 1954 English edition of the correspondence admitted to omissions and deletions, but these had been executed by

convinced and loyal Freudians. Their claim only to have excluded 'everything publication of which would be inconsistent with professional and personal confidence' seemed unconvincing when set beside what informed hints implied had actually been left out. And then came the Masson affair.

Jeffrey Masson gained the confidence of Anna Freud and thereby access to her father's unpublished and, in some cases, previously unknown documents. He was entrusted with preparing an edition of the complete Freud-Fliess correspondence. The whole experience converted Masson from a sympathetic, if slightly sceptical, Freudian into a dangerous enemy within the Freudian camp. He published The Assault on Truth making extensive use of the previously unpublished material, including letters to Fliess. As a result, Masson was sacked from his post in the Freud Archives, excommunicated by the American psychoanalytical community and subjected to lengthy, if subtle, character assassination by Janet Malcolm in the pages of the New Yorker (issued in book form in 1984 under the title In the Freud Archives). This celebrated intellectual scandal is unfortunate, not least because it has prejudiced the reception and reviews of the complete correspondence. For many reviewers the correspondence has been read as confirming or failing to confirm Masson's claims in The Assault on Truth. That Masson's editorship deliberately invites such an approach is, as will be argued, a serious failing. However, it should be possible separately to discuss and evaluate the various issues. Masson's claim in The Assault on Truth is that Freud abandoned a certain theory and that he shouldn't have. The first half of the claim is accepted by all, the latter is deeply contentious. The theory in question is that neurotics are, in all cases, suffering as a result of the sexual abuse to which they were subject in childhood at the hands of adults, often their parents. Freud set aside this theory, and, in a famous letter of September 1897, gave various reasons for so doing. Chief amongst these were the improbability of such a theory (could all parents of neurotics be so perverse?) and the importance of fantasy in unconscious constructions (were patients remembering actual scenes or only fantasising them in the service of certain unconscious desires?). Further, Freud maintained subsequently - and this is echoed by all Freudians - that to have retained the seduction theory would have been an error fatal to the development of psychoanalysis. For what is associated with the rejection of that account is a recognition of the important role of fantasy and the structures of infantile sexuality, particularly in the context of the Oedipus complex.

Now, Masson has a number of reasons for believing that it is Freud's rejection of the theory which is a dreadful mistake. These reasons are not always clearly distinguished and

they are not of the same order. First, Masson believes the theory in question to be important and probably true (or at least preferable to the subsequent alternative). Second, Freud's rejection of the theory is argued to be the product of intellectual dishonesty and cowardice. Third, the long-term effects of its revocation have, Masson concludes, been deleterious to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. Much of what Masson has to say is both interesting and challenging to Freudian orthodoxy, but it is on the whole vitiated by an intemperateness of approach which stretches all available evidences to fit a single all-or-nothing theory. Thus Freud never subsequently denied that some neurotics had been the victims of incestuous attack in their infancy, only that the seduction theory could account for all cases of neurosis. And for Masson to say that psychoanalysis has neglected the importance of cases of child abuse is not tantamount to showing that it should accept a single aetiological account of neurosis.

Freud, Masson suggests, rejected the seduction theory because he feared the isolation from, and rejection by, his scientific peers its open defence entailed; further a belief in fantasised rather than real events as the causes of certain symptoms served Freud well in his attempted exculpation of his friend Fliess's surgical negligence in the celebrated case of Emma Eckstein. Now it is well known that Freud consistently complained of being a lone pioneer neglected or pilloried by his contemporaries on account of what he had to say; a more interesting criticism of Freud is that he seems on the evidence to have regularly overstated the extent of his proud isolation. The case of Emma Eckstein is more interesting. At Freud's request, Fliess had, in accordance with his nasal theories, performed an operation to whose disastrous consequences Freud was a shocked witness. Fliess had left behind a strip of surgical gauze which dramatically came free some time later. It is Masson's contention - confirmed he believes by passages in the correspondence - that Freud came to explain Eckstein's post-operation bleeding as the result of a hysterical longing rather than being the mundane effect of his friend's culpable negligence. Thus the same shift from real to fantasised in aetiology as undercut the seduction theory provided an alibi for Fliess's surgical incompetence.

It is undoubtedly true that Freud's reaction to Emma Eckstein's case reveals an alarming insensitivity if not callousness on his part towards the victim. His letter to Fliess describing the incident where the gauze was removed bemoans the fact that 'this mishap should have happened to you', and his subsequent accounts of Emma's progress strive to reassure Fliess that - contrary to all the evidence - he had done nothing to occasion her illness, indeed that the patient herself was in large part to blame for her symptoms. It is, of course, not unknown for intense personal loyalty to blind the most critical of intellects to the failings of others. It is quite another thing to argue that an entire theory arises from the need to defend a friend. Moreover, whilst it is easy and proper for Masson to maintain that in this case real physical causes were illicitly neglected at the expense of supposed hysterical fantasies, it is quite a different matter to imply that for all symptoms a 'real' cause should be so preferred. Indeed, Masson's general criticism of psychoanalysis - that it substitutes fantasised for real occurrences - is hopelessly broad, it suggests an ad hominem argument and, moreover, conceals an unwillingness on Masson's part to say precisely what role fantasies do play in symptom formation.

What gives the Emma Eckstein episode its particular interest and, together with other instances, provides Masson's narrative with the raciness of a detective story is that relevant letters and passages were not included in the 1954 edition. Why should the original editors have exercised such a blatantly biased censorship? It certainly strengthens Masson's charge that a conspiracy of Freudians has protected Freud's own prejudiced 'official' history of psychoanalysis. What the evidence won't support is Masson's further implied charge that it is the true (i.e. Masson's)

story concerning the seduction theory which is being suppressed by means of the deletions. And for a couple of simple reasons. There are unjustifiable exclusions unrelated to the seduction theory and many of those arguably related to the seduction theory may simply be explained in other ways, for instance to protect Freud's personal reputation. Freud does not emerge well out of the Eckstein letters and it is indeed a shock to read them for the first time in print. It is understandable that those loyal to Freud's memory should naively have thought to protect him from personal criticism by keeping such documents from the public eye. This is not to say that they were hiding the true reasons for Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory.

Other cuts in the 1954 edition seem very hard to justify and some are strange in the extreme. To take one small example. In the famous letter of September 1897 outlining his reasons for rejecting the seduction theory Freud writes of his 'surprise that in all cases the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of being perverse'. In the 1954 edition the phrase 'not excluding my own' was removed (oddly, James Strachey put it back in his selection of the letters for the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud). Now what might another Masson make of this? Was Freud here providing us with a clear clue as to his own status as a victim of incestuous abuse? Did Freud reject the seduction theory because he needed to believe that he had only fantasised his father's sexual attack? Did the 1954 editors know this?

When one compares the 1954 edition with the complete correspondence one can see various patterns that now emerge, all unfavourable in varying degrees to a certain orthodox view of Freud. There is, for instance, a great deal more complaining about his personal health and Freud appears far more of a hypochondriac moaner than previously.



Again all unkind references to his teacher and collaborator, Breuer, had been removed. Put back in, Freud appears a nastier and more petty man. As to his actual relations with Fliess, we now can see the friendship in its true light. The conventional view holds that Freud did not take seriously Fliess's scientific views, responding for instance to the latter's theory of biological periodicities in all humans with discreet protestations of mathematical ignorance. The complete correspondence shows Freud to have eagerly supplied Fliess with regular personal data on his, and his family's, 'periods', to have continually described his own health in terms of the appropriate period and eagerly to have anticipated the fruition of Fliess's study so that a joint work could then be undertaken. Again, it is clearly Freud who made the running in the friendship, pressing Fliess to write oftener, and, as the following previously unpublished excerpts reveal, displaying a passionate intensity in his regard for Fliess: 'Your kind should not die out, my dear friend, the rest of us need people like you too much. How much I owe you: solace, understanding, stimulation in my loneliness, meaning to my life that I gained through you ...' (1.1.1896), 'I rejoice once again that eleven years ago I already realised that it was necessary for me to love you in order to enrich my life' (26.8.1898).

What is needed, and what this now complete edition

makes possible, is a careful and balanced appreciation of the Freud-Fliess friendship and its importance for Freud's personal and intellectual development. Masson's demand that we now see conclusive evidence of Freud's 'assault on the truth' has, regrettably, skewed the terms of understanding this correspondence. And, even more regrettably, this is reflected in Masson's actual editorship. In his obsessional concern with the supposed suppression of the seduction theory, Masson has abused the functions of editing and annotation to an unacceptable degree. The letters are sectionalised according to Masson's understanding of their significance. Thus, we have a group under the heading, 'The Emma Eckstein episode', whereas the period in question, 1895, is equally significant for being that in which Freud wrote the extremely important 'Project' and about which he writes to Fliess at great length. There are several references to Masson's own book and more than a few prejudicial annotations. The following is perhaps the most glaringly bad. In an October 1898 letter Freud spoke of a 'glimmer of light on the horizon as though this year I shall be in a position to find my way back to the truth from grave errors'. In a footnote Masson points to the exclusion from the 1954 edition of the word 'back', and states the significance of this to be that Freud once possessed the truth, namely the seduction theory, and now hopes to find his way back to it. The letter is no more than a very general report on Freud's situation and there is nothing to suggest that Freud is thinking about specific hypotheses. The sentence in question may be read as a pious expression of that familiar and benign intellectual hope that sooner or later one is going to get things right. Moreover, it could equally well be understood as referring to the seduction theory as a 'grave error' now left behind, thus permitting Freud to get back to a correct understand-

ing of the neuroses. In sum, whether Masson is right or wrong in his convictions, these latter should not have been permitted to determine the editing and annotation.

Freud is not well served by hagiographical accounts of his life and intellectual progress. Equally, we are not necessarily any nearer to a judicious appreciation of Freudianism by learning that Freud was not always a nice person. The real problem is that peculiar to psychoanalysis is a distinctive appreciation of its unique founder, Freud. We would worry less about his personal failings if we were not urged to accept his own self-analyses as both paradigmatic and probative. To put it loosely, can we accept the self-proclaimed rigour with which Freud insists he investigates his attitudes to his parents if we see him to be signally blind about a close friend? Is he really being honest in his textual declarations of personal desires when private correspondence indicates he deceived himself and others about important matters? 'Revisionists' like Masson have felt obliged to muck-rake in order iconoclastically to shake up a benign image of the founding father of psychoanalysis. But a 'warts and all' account of Freud is of service only if it can inform a well developed theory of the proper relationship between the private personal and the publicly theoretical. We don't have to like Freud to believe in psychoanalysis, although obviously it helps. We certainly have to believe in certain things in order to be able to trust in psychoanalysis. It is these that we should start investigating dispassionately and objectively. At least a complete edition of the Freud-Fliess correspondence provides some useful evidence for such an investigation.

David Archard

Labouring Science

Noel W. Thompson, *The People's Science: the popular political economy of exploitation and crisis 1816-34*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, viii + 252pp, £22.50 hb

If it appeared without the benefit of its longer title, the 'people's science' of this book would no doubt conjure up images of mesmeric trances, phrenological busts, table rapping, fern collecting, geological hammers, heated aquariums or other features of some equally arcane early nineteenth-century craze. In fact, the term was first applied with far more gravity to political economy in 1831, and in the *Edinburgh Review* no less, a journal that made a speciality of its thunderous denunciations of all pseudo-sciences. It appeared in the course of a long review by William Empson of some recent popular tracts by Mrs (Jane) Marcet and (Miss) Harriet Martineau. The age of original theoretical speculation had passed, Empson declared to his Whig readership, a 'missionary era' had dawned during which the old gospel of classical political economy would be preached to the poor. Or rather, Empson wished to herald in this new-old age. Notwithstanding the number of economic evangelists already plying their trade, there were few converts. The efforts of those like Martineau and Marcet, even added to the exertions of such impressive figures as Henry Brougham, Francis Place and Charles Knight, seemed to have brought few returns. A subject 'which from its object ought to be pre-eminently the people's science, has yet made but little way to popular power and favour' (quoted, p. 1).

Even more disturbing to those whose business it was to worry about such matters was that the audience suited to

receive the message stubbornly refused to do so. In some cases, organs of the labouring classes such as the *Political Register*, *Republican*, and *Black Dwarf* threw the teaching back in a spasm of virulent anti-intellectualism. The whole of political economy was rejected: to William Cobbett, Adam Smith was 'verbose and obscure', Thomas Malthus was 'impudent and illiterate' and David Ricardo the subject of frequent anti-semitic abuse, which Thompson declines to repeat (p. 8). The organisations established to spread the economic word claimed great success for themselves but actually achieved little. Brougham's Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (established in 1827) had an enormous impact if the readership of its publications is to be taken as a measure, yet the claim made by its founder that it has been 'eminently conducive to allaying the reckless spirit which, in 1830, was leading multitudes to destroy property and break up machines', can hardly have been taken seriously <1>. Popular upheavals continued right through the 1830s and 1840s, with or without the damping effect of the Society's rhetoric. Even when the political economists chose what was apparently the most popular medium - the novel - the message did not come through: Martineau's *The Rioters* (1827), a valiant fictional attempt to curb machine-breaking riots, could not have found many working-class admirers. When the radical *Crisis* declared that Martineau was a good novelist but a poor economist, anyone who had hacked through her prose jungle would have picked up the sarcasm and irony of the comment.

The hostility to all political economy was often tempered by other sentiments. Many members and representa-

tives of the labouring masses took a very serious interest in the subject, if not in the way it was taught. Even those who accepted that Brougham and Knight's Penny Magazine preached (as Cobbett put it) 'content to the hungry and the naked', nevertheless found its combination of science, morality, religion, and political economy irresistible. As a Chartist wrote, the Penny Magazine purveyed the 'most poisonous doctrines in company with the most fascinating information' <2>.

More important than the popular interest in economic questions was the fact that such interest finally resulted in the development of a political economy that was determinedly anti-capitalist in orientation and socialist in sympathy. This forms the subject of Thompson's volume: it, rather than Empson's gospel, was a genuinely popular science, established on rigorous principles and diffused through a mass of cheap, widely-read publications. This discourse arose in reaction to the tenets of classical political economy, but it also expressed the new reality of the times. The aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars produced changes in many spheres of British life, and debate still persists on the question of living standards in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Thompson claims that this period witnessed a general urban squalor and uncertainty of employment which was of a qualitatively different order than had been previously experienced by the masses. It was this new kind of immiseration, coupled with the provocations of classical political economy, that encouraged radicals to formulate fresh theoretical explanations for the impoverished conditions of workers and their families.

What was clear as the tide of European war receded was that the existing agrarian analyses of radicals like Thomas Spence, William Ogilvie and Thomas Paine were no longer appropriate. Exploitation was not a spectacle of the landless labourer stripped of his natural rights, whose product was physically appropriated. New forms of poverty and distress signalled a different material reality, and one which could not be grasped with the analytical tools of agrarianism. Manifestly, a theory of labour exploitation had to be devised which treated the labouring class as a whole, not just that diminishing section of it tilling the land. Put another way, some common denominator had to be found in terms of which the results of a wide and diverse range of activities could be measured if labour exploitation was to figure as the explanation of impoverishment.

Another problem facing radicals was that, just as poverty and exploitation assumed qualitatively new forms in the early century, so too did the kinds of economic insecurity and uncertainty experienced by workers. The periodic incidence of economic depressions changed the fundamental character of employment. As Marx wrote in Capital, modern industry in the 1820s was 'emerging from the age of childhood ... (into) the periodic cycle of its modern life' (quoted, p. 53). The analysis of agrarian theorists was unable to account for this situation: their claim that hardship during depressions was the result of a shortage of produce was absurd. The markets were glutted with products; the problem was that these failed to secure adequate remuneration for their producers. So once again, some new analytical tools were required to understand, and think in terms of, supply and demand, market prices, wages and profit.

Both these fundamental issues - exploitation and crisis - were addressed by the writers who figure centrally in The People's Science. The 'Ricardian socialists', as they have come to be called by many social and political historians, had a decisive impact on the orientation and interests of political economy in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Their importance, indeed, can hardly be overestimated: as Marx wrote in The Poverty of Philosophy, 'almost all the socialists in (England) have, at different periods, proposed the equalitarian application of the Ricardian theory' <3>. However, the interest of the group for the historian of political economy lies as much in the coherence of its unifying doctrines as in the size of its constituency. That coherence appears particularly striking and impressive once the list of

'Ricardian socialists' Marx sets out - and which ends with a dismissive 'etc., etc., and four pages more of etc.' - is reduced to a manageable size. Thompson selects four leading spirits: Thomas Hodgskin, John Gray, William Thompson and John Bray.

As a group, these figures stand out as having grasped the essential importance of formulating a theory of value to use in their critical analysis and as having woven this into a macroeconomic explanation of capitalist depressions. But one of the most provocative claims in Thompson's study is that a close examination of the writings of this group (Bray's Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedy, does not occupy much attention since it was published in 1839, outside the chronological limits of the book) reveals them to merit the new title of 'Smithian socialists'. Why this is so is a complicated question which it takes Thompson a long but very clever chapter to answer. The argument is mainly that a confusion arises in the work of these Smithian-Ricardian socialists (or perhaps Marx's 'equalitarian socialists' might be an appropriate tag) between an exchange theory of value and a labour theory of value. This is a confusion notoriously active in Smith's own Wealth of Nations, and like Smith the group made the assumption that the value and quantity of labour are equivalent measures. The result is a focus of economic and political interest on the sphere of exchange rather than the mode of production, for the exploitative relation was thought to be revealed through the way in which the exchange value of commodities was determined.

From theory follows practice. The Smithian input into radical political economy turned purportedly revolutionary ambitions into reformist policy prescriptions. Even Hodgskin - a great hate figure for many contemporary commentators - found himself proposing such panaceas as free trade, the elimination of monopolies, and the cessation of state interference in the market-place to eliminate capital. The true Ricardian socialist, on the other hand, would have recognised that exploitation persists even if commodities exchange at their full labour value. The true Ricardian socialist would have explained exploitation as an effect of the appropriation of unpaid labour by the capitalist, rather than the result of adding profit or rent to the value of labour embodied in a commodity. The Smithian socialist found exploitation in the realm of exchange: the Ricardian socialist found it at the point of production.

If the contours of this 'Ricardian socialist' begin to emerge through such contrasts, a familiar figure will be discerned. For, according to Thompson, the major Ricardian socialist worthy of the name (and the only one he mentions) was Karl Marx. The notion will not be overly unsettling to any already familiar with Michel Foucault's claim that Marx remains within the same episteme as Ricardo because, however much he attacks Ricardo's bourgeois presuppositions, he maintains the same relation between the 'surface circulation of values' manifested by the movement of commodities and the 'profound, unrepresentable fact of the activity that produces them: labour' <4>.

In The People's Science, Marx functions in both the tone and the telos of the argument. Marxist concepts organise the study, and the historical development charted in the work spills over 1834 into 1867, the year of publication of Capital. So far as the first point is concerned, short of engaging in a purely descriptive reconstruction of popular political economy as it purportedly 'really was', there is no option open to the critical historian but to structure his or her work through explanatory categories. Aside from some minor slips into anachronism of a linguistic kind, the deployment of categories such as 'mode of production', 'social formation' and 'relations of production' is welcome, necessary and highly beneficial to the overall coherence of this study. The presence of Marx, as the light at the end of the tunnel, does however raise some more difficult problems (which, interestingly, also appear in standard accounts of the relation of Marx to pre-Marxist theories of value).

The first problem with Thompson's Marxist teleology is that it necessitates a large historical and conceptual jump

over the period of Chartism. The second, connected with this, is that such a jump tends to result in the 'politics' of political economy being severely underplayed. A good deal of Thompson's study involves following the course of 'Smithian socialist' economic notions of crisis and exploitation through the popular press. This aspect of the work is, to this reviewer at least, beyond reproach. A huge array of papers is examined for the periods 1816-1824, 1824-1827, then in the early 1830s, and the kinds of economic explanations discovered in texts of classical political economy, agrarian radical theory, and Smithian socialism, are found captivating and constraining the work of popular activists on the ground. Thompson shows, for example, that the popular politics of Smithianism had the benefit of clearly articulating a notion of the identity of the exploiting class and a theory of exploitation. In this respect it was distinct from, and superior to, the politics of Robert Owen, a man who, according to Thompson, probably never even formulated an economic theory of labour exploitation. However, though the Smithian radicals had this advantage, they could do little more than highlight the deficiencies and inequalities in the prevailing system, without really putting into question the long-term viability of that system.



This would seem to suggest that the working-class press influenced by the Smithian socialists neglected the political question of the ownership of the means of production. Such a suggestion cannot be accepted, and here the shadow of Marx begins to cast a dimming line over the historical understanding in Thompson's book. For many of those whose economic principles led them to focus attention on the market and exchange relations went on to argue for the establishment of co-operative communities and trading societies - and in some cases put these arguments into practice. From the perspective of 1867, such establishments may well seem to leave unanswered the question of bourgeois power, but during the 1820s and 1830s, such papers as the Co-operative magazine, The Co-operator, the British Co-operator and many more like them managed to combine a remarkably radical, even revolutionary, politics with a reformist economic vision. A quotation from George Mudie in his insipid Exchange Bazaars Gazette to the effect that the interests of the ruling classes would not be disturbed by his own plans for the rationalisation of exchange relations hardly offers evidence that all co-operative ventures were reformist (see p. 146).

A third problem in Thompson's study appears once again in the guise of politics, or its absence. In working towards an account of the demise and disintegration of anti-capitalist and socialist political economy after 1834, Thompson suggests a number of causal and contributory factors. In part, the inherent inadequacies of Smithian socialist political economy led to its downfall: within a developed understanding of the mode of production and with a fixation on the idea of exchange value, such a theory was unable to explain periods of relative prosperity under capitalism. This (and here one may accept Thompson's argument from/to Marx) was something present only in the Marxist critique of capitalism. But why should this absence of a theory of growth

and depression be a lack? Here, Thompson's argument becomes a little too crude for comfort. For having suggested that the rise of radical political economy was not closely tied to degenerating economic conditions in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (the issue was one of the quality of life, not the standard of living measured quantitatively), he turns to something like that argument in explaining the demise of radical political economy. This theory in the 1830s lacked an understanding of capitalist prosperity at a time of relative affluence; therefore it fell from favour. Smithian socialist economics 'embodied and purveyed a conception of the functioning of capitalism which deviated as significantly from the economic realities of the 1820s and 1830s as that of James Mill, Harriet Martineau, Mrs Marcet and the would-be political economists of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge' (p. 186).

The trouble with this argument is that Thompson wants a close, perhaps causal, fit between an economic 'reality' (whose reality?) and economic theory. And the problem is compounded once we recall that in any case the economic reality of the 1830s was not one of capitalist boom and growth. I mentioned that the absence of 'politics' from Thompson's account was a deficiency. This becomes clear when we find Thompson struggling throughout his book for what might be termed a notion of political mediation. It is in the political domain, surely, that in capitalist societies the facts and figures of the 'standard of living' become transposed into the reality of the quality of life. At the start of The People's Science, some notion of political mediation seemed to be in play: politics interceded between economic 'reality' and 'ideology' in a way which prevented causal arrows being launched from one to the other. But political considerations only make a brief entrance on stage, in act one. They do not appear when the question of the popularisation of economic doctrines in the radical press is discussed. This makes it possible for Thompson to suggest as one of the explanations of the demise of interest in political economy after 1834, that radicalism found other pressing 'political' concerns to turn to, such as universal suffrage, protest against the New Poor Law, and the campaign for the People's Charter. The implication is that organs such as Crisis, Pioneer, The Voice of West Riding, The Destructive and The Poor Man's Guardian (which came to an end by 1835) did not treat political questions such as universal male suffrage - which is untrue. The further implication is that publications such as the Northern Star and Chartist Circular which sprang up later did not consider economic issues - this, too, is untrue. The Chartists eagerly seized on the economic distress which prevailed during the 1830s and 1840s to press their case for their 6-point (political) Charter. As Rayner Stephens declared at the first great Lancashire Chartist meeting in the late 1830s, 'This question of universal suffrage is a knife-and-fork question, a bread and cheese question.... If any man ask what I mean by universal suffrage, I mean to say that every working man in the land has a right to a good coat on his back, a good hat on his head, a good roof for the shelter of his household ... and all the blessings of life that reasonable men could desire' <5>.

The lack of political analysis in Thompson's study takes a number of different forms. One may bemoan, for example,



the way in which organisations such as Political Union Trades Unions, Mechanics' Institutes and Co-operative Associations are passed over briefly or in silence. This gives the book as a whole a rather unbalanced character, and leads to some misjudged emphases and inappropriate denunciations. However, all of this cannot seriously detract from what is in other respects a remarkable and illuminating piece of work. A neglected piece of labour's heritage is brought back to life in a crisp and stylish manner. Anyone interested in social history, in politics and economics, in early nineteenth-century radicalism, or in the circulation of ideas in popular media will find this study fascinating and useful. Moreover, there are lessons here for today's political economist and political activist. Thompson describes the emphasis of the Smithian socialists on equitable exchange relations as pointing in the direction of 'an insipid, non-theoretical labourism which demanded a fair day's pay for a fair day's work' (p. 224). And he concludes his book by noting that for all its rapid and extensive growth, 'the people's science was a plant doomed to wither before it could establish lasting

popular or theoretical roots' (p. 228). More than a few vestiges of that people's science are unfortunately present in today's socialist discourses. Likewise, the days of insipid labourism did not end with the publication in 1839 of J. F. Bray's Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedy.

Mike Shortland

NOTES

Jonathan Rée and John Fauvel were kind enough to send me detailed comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this review.

- 1 Brougham quoted in Charles Knight, Passages from a Working Life (3 vols), London, 1864-65, II, p. 310.
- 2 Quoted in P. Hollis, The Pauper Press, London, 1970, pp. 143-44.
- 3 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, London, 1976, VI, p. 138.
- 4 See O. Ducrot et al, Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme?, Paris, 1968, pp. 308-09.
- 5 Quoted in Asa Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies, London, 1959, p. 34.

Biological Bearings

R. C. Lewontin, S. Rose and L. Kamin, Not in our Genes: biology, ideology and human nature, New York, Pantheon, 1984, xi + 322pp, \$8.95 hb

Biological explanations of human nature and social formations are undergoing a revival and it is not just a fringe phenomenon. Such explanations are emerging from the core areas of disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, human behavioural genetics, sociology and criminology, and to some extent in educational theory, ethics, political theory and philosophy. Not In Our Genes offers a critical appraisal of this revival.

The disputed view is labelled 'biological determinism' and it is the idea that human nature is fixed by our genes, that the inequalities of status, wealth and power are a consequence of our biologies. A brief historical survey in this volume traces the roots of biological determinism back to Descartes, in particular to his mechanistic view of the universe, and then attempts to show how the early stages were linked to the development of capitalism. Today, biological determinism is used to justify the status quo in Western societies, especially through the concept of social deviance (the dull, the mad and the criminal).

The historical account is somewhat sketchy and dogmatic but the key value of the book lies in what follows - tightly argued analyses of the problematic nature of biological determinism in the study of IQ, gender difference and certain areas of psychiatric concern: violence, 'hyperactivity' and schizophrenia.

The analysis of the IQ issue returns briefly to history to expose the nature of IQ testing and its social function. The research that is supposed to indicate genetic individual differences in intelligence between classes and races contains serious flaws ranging from the invention of data, through the arbitrary nature of certain crucial statistical decisions, confusion over the notions of heritability and race, to particular fallacies in adoption studies and twin studies. These flaws are displayed in convincing detail and the claim that there is no evidence for genetic difference in IQ score is well-supported. The authors conclude that the standards of research are far higher in pig genetics. Of course, there would be less ideological pull for one conclusion rather than another in this area.

Gender differences are an issue of relevance to biological determinism as these are often aligned with those of sex. The authors review the attempts to explain gender differences in terms of biology and expose the systematic selection, misrepresentation and improper extrapolation of the evidence. (This review includes the recent split brain research.) Once again, there is a lot at stake here. As recently as ten years ago, Goldberg wrote the book entitled The Inevitability of Patriarchy and many would still like to believe that there is a biological basis to what they perceive as women's inferiority.

For readers familiar with new French feminism, there is a very interesting, probably unintended, link to be made between ideas about the feminine in, for example, the writings of Luce Irigaray, and what these authors have to say about developing human brains.

The next area of specific analysis is social deviance, in particular, violence and what is sometimes called 'hyperactivity' in children. The authors' contention is that such phenomena constitute social problems mistakenly identified as brain abnormalities by biological determinists. Unfortunately there is little direct confrontation with the determinist view, for the argument consists mainly in exposing the relevant treatments and in questioning their effectiveness and safety. The discussion has shock value, but seems to be at odds with a claim made earlier in the book that 'the repugnant political consequences that have repeatedly flowed from determinist arguments are not criteria by which to judge their objective truth' (p. 28).

Psychiatric treatment is taken up as a general issue and this discussion is very informative and entertaining, as this composite quotation reveals: 'the very term "side effects" is redolent of reductionist disappointment.... There is a widespread medical belief that good drugs are like magic bullets that hit a single, precise target disease site.... No drugs actually work like this.... Most of the interactions of extraneous drugs with the body's chemistry are more like an explosion with shrapnel flying in many directions and a large area of fallout rather than bullets producing a neat contained hole.'

The research on schizophrenia which purportedly shows that it is a disease entity with a genetic base is critically examined in impressive detail. Three major areas are cov-

ered: family studies, twin studies and adoption studies. In the first, observations are made to see if schizophrenia runs in families. A major problem here is that, even if a positive result is found, this could be due to a shared similar environment rather than common genes. There is a somewhat similar difficulty with the twin studies. Here same-egg twins (MZs) are compared with different-egg twins (DZs) with the guiding rationale that: if the likelihood of both MZs getting schizophrenia if one gets it is greater than the likelihood of both DZs getting schizophrenia if one gets it, then that is due to genetic identity between MZs, given that DZs on average share only half their genes. The problem that the authors point to here is that there is more environmental similarity for MZs than DZs. So the rationale is questionable and the findings have not isolated a genetic cause.

In the main type of adoption study used to support the claim about a genetic base for schizophrenia, the mental health of the biological and adoptive parents of schizophrenic adoptees is assessed. If the incidence of schizophrenia in the biological parents is higher than the rate observed in some appropriate control group then this is taken as confirmation of the claim. The major problem here has been the unjustified extension of the term 'schizophrenia' to include, for example, 'uncertain borderline schizophrenia'. No significant results emerge if this extension is disallowed.

Many other problems with the twin studies and the adoption studies are discussed. One remarkable one is that diagnostic assessment is sometimes made without the person being seen: on the basis of relatives' reports, or via hospital records only, the person is 'pseudo interviewed'.

This critical analysis of the schizophrenia research undercuts the claims of current psychiatric texts that the twin studies and the adoption studies establish the biological basis of schizophrenia. This is no small achievement given that the strongest case for the biological model which is the dominant paradigm of contemporary psychiatry is supposed to be in schizophrenia research.

The authors then attack sociobiology, which is presented as a synthesis of the biological determinist views on specific issues. Firstly, they take issue with the sociobiologists' view of human nature, because it is ethnocentric. Secondly, they dispute the assertion that universal human characteristics are coded for in the human genotype, on the grounds that it is impossible to sort out the gene effect from the effect of environment. Finally, they argue that the basis for the sociobiologists' belief that the origin of human social traits is natural selection is mere political persuasion, not significantly different from the social Darwinism of the nineteenth century.

The major overall weakness of the book is the looseness in the characterisation of the view under attack and of the view which forms the standpoint of attack. Sometimes biological determinism is stated as complete determination of behaviour by biology, sometimes it is stated as only partial determination. The authors' view is alluded to here and there, but in terms that are not very clarifying: for example, they grant the need to bring in biology and the social in explaining human characteristics where neither is given primacy or ontological priority, and they speak of a dialectical understanding of the relationship between the biological and the social. The discussion of genotypes and phenotypes is helpful, but does this capture all that is meant by 'dialectical understanding'? One is left wondering. In addition, a view which the authors call 'cultural determinism' is attributed to a range of authors including socio-

logical relativists, anti-psychiatrists, deviancy theorists and behaviourists. The description given of cultural determinism - that individuals are simply mirrors of cultural forces that have acted on them from birth - is a caricature, and the attempt to align all 'anti-psychiatrists' with labelling theorists has no justifiable foundation.

The major strength of the book, which outweighs its weaknesses, is in the analysis of specific areas where versions of biological determinism are supported and where the faults in this research, its current practical consequences and its future directions are assessed. If these biological determinisms are frightening, then this should spur the development of alternative theories and practices. The book is a timely reminder not to be taken in by the apparent political neutrality of certain scientific findings.

Denise Russell

The Subject of Identity

Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, *Personal Identity*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 158pp, £15 hb, £5.50 pb.

D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm, *Consciousness and Causality*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 222pp, £17 hb, £6.50 pb

These are the first two volumes to appear in a series entitled 'Great Debates in Philosophy'. Personal identity certainly qualifies as a well-delineated and well-trodden topic that has been subject to great debate, but 'consciousness and causality' fits this bill less easily, and in fact the volume bearing that title might as well have been described as a general discussion of philosophy of mind. Indeed, the books form a pair whose value lies less in their being resumés of, or additions to, traditional problems in the history of empiricist philosophy than in their providing platforms for what is newest and most pervasive in the philosophy of mind: functionalism, and its relation to physicalism. They also provide indices of how functionalism, which is, at least in its self-presentation, very much a theory, and a systematic one at that, gains reactions from older - and therefore threatened - ways of 'doing philosophy of mind'. What is at the heart of the debate in these two books is the unstated question: should mentality be treated in terms of a systematic theory at all?

In each volume, one of the contributors - Shoemaker on personal identity, Armstrong on the causal theory of the mind - is a functionalist of some variety, and the other a representative of some earlier position or methodology. Swinburne's position is that of an absolute realist, and he deploys anti-verificationist arguments against the criteria of personal identity that functionalism requires; Malcolm loyally reiterates a certain way of understanding Wittgenstein's writings regarding what can and can not be said about the mind.

The debate on personal identity picks up, as is usual, from where Locke, Butler and Reid had left it, and Swinburne and Shoemaker refer in the first instance to the memory criterion, its difficulties and necessary emendations, following on with a discussion of the thought-experiments involving split and transferred brains that Williams and Parfit have added to the debate over the past two decades. Although the contributors' interests are not unaligned with these problems, their intentions do not ultimately consist in finding the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity, and the result is more interesting than if they had been.

Swinburne takes what he calls the 'simple' view of persons: that they are indivisible and non-material substances which may be disembodied. To adopt this Cartesian position



involves trying to show, with some difficulty, that the thought-experiments which erode the simple view and establish the Parfitian 'complex' view of persons as not necessarily wholly intact do not do the work that they are supposed to. Swinburne also has to play around with the Aristotelian conception of persons in order to accommodate the brute fact of our physical instantiation, and has to hold that persons are a different kind of substance, in logical respects, from all other kinds. The main bulk of his argument, however, is concerned with refuting what he perceives as verificationism: memory-links, bodily continuity and indeed anything that could plausibly be advanced as a candidate for the relation of personal unity, are all downgraded to being, at best, 'fallible evidence' for personal identity. Evidence is meant to be a much weaker concept than that of a criterion, and is said to vary in degrees of directness, memory being 'the most direct'. If one does not believe that realist arguments are in all cases outright winners, then at this point one will part company with Swinburne, and do so by asking what room there can possibly be for justifying any talk of degrees of directness of evidence, given an absolute separation of ontology from epistemology. Swinburne's conclusion is the bare claim that the subject must be 'continuously and directly aware of his own existence' over time. Personal identity is 'ultimate and unanalysable'.

Shoemaker's tactic is to pick the memory criterion and fuse it into a general theory of mind, in which it supplies the diachronic companion for a synchronic principle telling us what it is for several mental states to be one person's at one time; the two yield jointly 'the principle of co-personality for mental states'. His discussion of personal identity serves in effect to show how mental states are functional entities, which stand in definable and systematisable causal relations to one another, to the environment, and to behaviour. The constraint on treating mental states in this way is just that they should not lead to any results that violate what we know of how persons are unified over time. The argument, which is persuasive and lucid, should then work in two directions: it should reinforce confidence in the memory criterion, and it should validate functionalism by showing how successfully it can handle the older philosophical problem.

Shoemaker says that functionalism is neutral with regard to materialism, but it is within that context that Armstrong presents his causal theory of the mind. The relations between functionalism and materialism have given rise to much literature, and the strongest claim that Armstrong advances is that there is contingent identity between 'token' or particular mental states, and token brain-states. He also dwells at length on other salient questions for functionalism, such as its capacity to accommodate the 'qualitative' or 'subjective' character of the mental operations. This is perhaps the most interesting and subtle part of Armstrong's piece: he argues that the existence of mental qualities would damage functionalism but would leave materialism intact. He then attempts to show, deftly but with incomplete confidence, that there are no mental qualities. Just as Shoemaker's position gained force from being juxtaposed with so extreme an alternative, so Armstrong derives similar benefit from the contrast that it makes when set against Malcolm's particular outlook.


Malcolm allows himself one main distinction in tackling the question of consciousness; that between 'transitive' and 'non-transitive' senses of the term (the distinction between being asleep as opposed to being awake, and being conscious of or that something). This, along with a philosophical term of art, 'genuine duration' (which an 'unattended ache' may have), is the full extent of his explicit theorising. The rest of his essay consists in the by-now familiar tactic of applying to every piece of language that might allow for constructive philosophical activity a fine-grained description of the heterogeneity of its usage in 'ordinary' language. He therefore puts enormous weight on phrases such as 'our present concept' and 'this concept as it is', in order not to grant Armstrong the material with which to get functional-

ism going. The rest of Malcolm's tactics include interpolating his text with quotations from Wittgenstein, borrowing part of the analytic rhetoric ('since materialism is logically false ...'), and imputing 'pictures' where necessary to account for the deviation of philosophical thought ('these philosophers are deceiving themselves in thinking they understand themselves').

This will appear quite in order for a certain sort of Wittgensteinian, but to others it will seem a degradation of his thought, objectionable on account of its stultifying conservatism. There is certainly a feeling of unease in reading Malcolm when he follows a quotation from Wittgenstein about the 'blueness' of the colour blue - a passage that evinces a worry about the vexed question of the existence of a legitimate object for phenomenology - with a hammering attack on the attempts of Nagel and others to say something about this puzzle.

Readers of all persuasions will have difficulty in reconciling Malcolm's insistence on both the determinacy of 'our present concept' of a mental feature, and the 'relativity of the concept to particular situations'. One can only suspect that 'our present concern' is Malcolm's present concept, and that it is pure dogma that prevents the psychologist (and Armstrong) from having a 'particular situation' to which their usage of the disputed vocabulary is both relative and quite appropriate. Armstrong is therefore not far off the mark when he writes, in reply to Malcolm's piece, that 'it would be necessary to consider our views in a larger context ... of philosophical methodology'; but there is plenty of room for scepticism as to the fruitfulness of such a discussion, given Malcolm's intransigent linguistic legislation.

The joint effect of the two books, supported by other recent writing, is to produce the conclusion that functionalism - in the abstracted form in which it is presented by Shoemaker and Armstrong, cut loose from its origins in artificial intelligence - is a successful philosophical attempt to naturalise the mind. If there are deep problems with functionalism, they are not recognised by Malcolm, and have nothing to do with functionalism's systematisation of the mind. The second, and more important, upshot is that the personal identity debate is well overdue for retirement.



The two results are not unconnected. Functionalism shows how mental states can, so to speak, stand on their own, without the support of persons. This is indeed the picture, contested by Swinburne, that Parfit presents in Reasons and Persons. Parfit makes extensive use of thought experimentation, and this is a methodology that relies on 'our intuitions' about our identities as persons. Wollheim in The Thread of Life has carefully argued that we cannot avail ourselves of such intuitions and deploy them in the manner required. But if Parfit's method is in error, functionalism does the same job, and requires no intuiting of personal identity.

There is nevertheless a suspiciously large amount of res-

istance to abandoning 'personal' identity. Shoemaker, in a curiously digressional passage, says that 'the conceptually prior notion is that of the person', whilst admitting that the 'theory of persons' is 'incomplete'. The urgent question left unanswered by this statement is how any claim to the primacy of personhood can be complete, except by going to the extent of identifying ourselves - as Swinburne invites us to do - with entities that are tantamount to souls. Wollheim, despite having given a subtle account of Freudian theory in terms of mentality functionally characterised, also asserts that 'selves' are 'prior' to their states, and it is here again that a *lacuna* in the argument emerges.'

Reluctance to accept the consequences of naturalising the mental points to one direction in which research can be recast: clinging to fundamental personhood is not a random preference, but strongly indicates the operation of ideological pressures. To abandon the search for the 'logically necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity' should take the form of investigating what is historically and socially specific to what Malcolm would term 'our present concept' of the person - and what its value is in political terms. There is no shortage of material already available in the writings of Foucault, Althusser and Lyotard which, in bringing to attention the mutable status of the body in post-modern society, points to ways in which 'personhood' is eroded by instrumentalisation and by technology that has transcended its prosthetic function.

Psychoanalytic theory can also be brought to bear on the 'identity of persons' in a way more radical than Wollheim's: Lacan's analyses of the ego as a narcissistic structure provide such a starting-point. Personal identity should by now be seen as an incident in the history and the theory of the subject. Thinking about persons should likewise be made to take account of Lacan's own 'intuition' about his identity: 'My experience has shown me that the principal characterisation of my life ... is that life goes, as we say in French, *à la dérive*.... The idea of the unity of the human condition has always had on me the effect of a scandalous lie.'

Sebastian Gardner

The Victor Hugo of Philosophy

Frederic Jameson (ed.), *Sartre after Sartre* (Yale French Studies 68), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985, 240pp, £11.95 pb

Two previous collections on Sartre from Yale French Studies, in 1948 and 1966, now look like severely dated instances of that devotion to existentialism and Sartre that ended by reducing the philosophical language of *Being and Nothingness* to a hermetic and politically inert rhetoric suitable only for a pre-modernist glossing of literary texts. The recent YFS publication, as its title hints, attempts to contribute to a refocusing and a revival of interest in Sartre. The unanswered questions surrounding *Being and Nothingness* - its value as an oxymoronic 'phenomenological ontology', and its continuity or lack of it with the writings of the later Sartre - can in the opinions of the contributors, and quite correctly, be left for consideration at a later date.

Attention to Sartre should now be squarely accorded to his relations to Marxism and his work on Flaubert, and of these two it seems that the former should have priority. Part of the explanation for the change of perspective lies in the publication of posthumous material, the *Cahiers pour une morale* and the *War Diaries*, and the necessarily lengthy process of assimilating the turgid *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and the massive *Idiot of the Family*. But, as Jameson

suggests, a deeper reason is that only after his death has it been possible to view Sartre without the oppression of intellectual progenitorship. Jameson is one of many to have undergone saturation in the subjectivity of the early Sartre, and has been one of few to have consistently drawn attention to the unexplored riches of the *Critique* and the unjust neglect into which it so soon fell.

Successive French attempts to put Marxism at a distance, with a view to either rejecting or recasting it, have left the hot philosophical questions about Marx harshly unresolved and added to them conflicts between humanist and non-humanist, Hegelian and pragmatic interpretations of Marx. Against this background, the *Critique*, as an attempt to approach Marxism within the broadest perspectives of social ontology, must have enormous appeal. In the contemporary arena, its value consists in not just providing yet another interpretation of Marx to run alongside others, but in its offer to vindicate Marxism as the only serious arena for social and political analysis, and simultaneously to provide a perspective for ordering the various extant discourses about Marx.

Sartre's fundamental premises are bold and unconditional: social being and its history are only intelligible on the twin conditions that they are understood on the basis of individual praxis, and that understanding should proceed by way of totalisation. The eventual claim of the *Critique* is that, given our history, which is one of domination by scarcity, only dialectical materialism passes the test as a theory of history; it thereby gains a necessity that is stronger than the scientific kind that Marx accorded it. The condition of intelligibility in terms of individual praxis has usually been seen as a legacy from the days of *Being and Nothingness*, and the attempt that Sartre made in 1949 to define a revolutionary philosophy that would be free from the 'myth' of materialism (as he then saw it) has been adduced as evidence that Sartre was never able to do justice to the economic in his engagement with Marxism.

The papers in *Sartre after Sartre* dispel any illusion that the key assumption of individual praxis brings with it any axioms about the translucency and freedom of consciousness, or that Sartre's individualism is of the ordinary constrictive kind. Ronald Aronson articulates the structure of the *Critique* very usefully, and indicates how much is at stake in the work. He gives indications of, but here refrains from affirming, his previously stated view that Sartre's project eventually collapses, based on the evidence of the (unfortunately still unpublished) second volume of the *Critique*. For Aronson, when Sartre set himself the heroic task of showing how the individual Stalin could in his subjective contingency be dialectically related to the totalising movements of history, he was unable to forge the connections he needed between individual intentionality and social process. Aronson concludes that Sartre has exhibited, by a great and unavowed *reductio*, the negation of his original premise, the primacy of individual praxis. Aronson's view is straightforward and inviting, but it is against his reading that a paper by Juliette Simont is directed. Simont gives full play to the weight of arguments that lie behind Sartre's initial assumptions, and it emerges that for Aronson's conclusion to pass, more than a diagnosis of textual and biographical crisis is required. For it to be plausible to assert, as Aronson says, that the missing term of 'society' must be reintroduced, it has to be shown that such a move could succeed in making social structures more lucid than Sartre, with his concepts of series, group, group-in-fusion, practico-inert, and so on, renders them. If the social is once again to be made a primitive and unanalysed notion, it has to be demonstrated that this is not just to postpone analysis and implicitly to reinforce the processes of reification that created it - as Sartre contends. Simont also spells out convincingly how Sartre links intelligibility to totalisation, by showing the depth of the link between the organism's interiority and its situation, and the adequacy of Sartre's conception of persons as 'singular absolutes' to account for the emergence of social being and agency.

The second half of the YFS collection deals with the work on Flaubert, and contains some of Sartre's notes for the incomplete fourth volume of *The Idiot of the Family*, with a translation. Following one trajectory in Sartre's thought, the concern with Flaubert appears to be just that of the status of the imaginary object, such that *The Idiot* is merely doing with a set of literary texts what Sartre had begun by doing to mental images, but with the additional task of relating the imaginary to the social world. This certainly accords with one way in which Sartre viewed his work, and it shares the reflexive perspective of *Les mots*. However, another and considerably more important dimension, insufficiently brought out in the YFS papers, is the proximity of the task set in *The Idiot* to that of the *Critique*. Flaubert was for Sartre not just a producer of the imaginary, but also himself a 'universal singular', an instance of individuality that requires to be related to the unity of history. So the aporia that Aronson alleges - Sartre's inability to make sense of Stalin - corresponds precisely to the problem of *The Idiot*: for 'Flaubert', read 'Stalin', and the four-volume work becomes a continuation of the abandoned second volume of the *Critique*. The discussion of Sartre's Flaubert in *Sartre after Sartre* concentrates on the aesthetics involved and on the detail of historical material, and neglect the broader issue of methodology.

Given the size of the returns that the collection claims can be derived from study of the later Sartrean works, the depth into which each paper goes in its treatment of issues inevitably seems insufficient, and Jameson may well have felt that the quality of interrogation still fails to do Sartre justice. The most intriguing and best-written pieces are in fact slightly isolated from the rest of the volume: Howard Davies provides a fascinating intertextual reading of *Les mots*, relating it to Mauss's *Essay on the Gift*, and Alexandre Leupin provides an introduction to a contemporary French critic of Sartre's, Denis Hollier. However, there is enough here to establish beyond doubt the correctness of Jameson's complaint that the prevailing view of Sartre is limiting and that attempts to do with social theory what Jameson himself has done with literary theory, namely the deployment of the concepts Sartre developed in the *Critique*, cannot fail to be rewarding - whatever the ultimate verdict of Sartre's success or failure should be.

Sebastian Gardner

A New Marxist Paradigm

Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 556pp, £10.95 pb

This is a work of formidable erudition and intelligence which is likely to dominate discussions of Marx and Marxism for the next decade. It shares the rigour of G. A. Cohen's attempt in *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (Oxford, 1978) to provide analytic foundations for historical materialism, but Elster surpasses Cohen in comprehensiveness and in his sense of real complexity. This is perhaps reflected in the way that Cohen, through dialogue with Elster, has lately modified - rejected, even - his earlier reconstruction of historical materialism. Given that *Making Sense of Marx* appears in a new Cambridge series edited by Elster, Cohen, and John Roemer, it would appear to be the flagship for a new armada of Marxist analytical scholarship and reassessment.

The book opens with an account of the nature of Marx-

ist explanation. In fact, this is a rather disappointing section to read, being couched in the form of a sequence of snappy, negative pronouncements. We learn that Marxist method ought not to be dialectics, nor (contra Cohen) is it functional explanation, nor again is it methodological collectivism. Elster argues that Marxist expositions are littered with examples of these errors, and that Marx himself had difficulty separating the dubious from the insightful in his method (as examples of the insightful, Elster cites methodological individualism and the unintended consequences of human action). This fair-minded but negative feel to the book comes from the paradox that Elster has chosen a commentary on Marx as the framework for presenting some aspects of his own systematic approach to social theory. This adversely affects not so much the substance of the work as its unity as a written project.

In Part Two, Marx's philosophical anthropology (that is, his theory of human nature and progress) and his later economic theories are dissected.

The former is considered indefensibly teleological and functionalist, whilst the latter's entire bag of tools (theory of value, exploitation, capitalist crisis, falling rate of profit and the rest) is emptied out and replaced by the gleaming new chips of micro-motives and technical change. Though somewhat reluctantly, Elster finds himself agreeing with Samuelson's verdict that Marx was a minor post-Ricardian in his economic theory.

And so to Part Three, where similar deconstructions of the theory of history, class struggle, ideology and the state take place. This book-length section abounds in deft critique, counter proposals, and intellectual refinements of Marx's broad-brushed models. It should be said that Elster is sympathetic to the Marxist project; he does not, Kolakowski-like, give the sense of delighting in finding fault. Yet he cannot bring himself to rely on faith to secure belief. Again, therefore, little of the classical Marxist edifice is left standing. The speculative nature of the theory of history, its proposed sequences from the primitive communities to advanced Communism, the relations of modes of production to actual historical events: Elster is unhappy to take these - as most modern historical materialists would - even as the rough guiding threads within which further theoretical and empirical work is conducted.

As for class struggle, he recommends that classical formulations be conceived anew as various possibilities and strategies in a game-theory-based model of collective action. The influence of class upon other social phenomena remains important, provided we do not confuse variable class-relevance with eternal class-centrality. On this basis, Elster offers interesting versions of the state and ideology being relatively autonomous from economic structure and class struggle, noting that Marx had a 'pre-strategic' conception of power, and an insufficiently psychological outlook on how it is that certain ideas come to be accepted. Overall, two things come out. Without an account of the precise mechanisms, Marx's wider functional claims about history and politics cannot be sustained. And in some cases where mechanisms can be identified, the general Marxist model is not, as a matter of further analysis, well borne out.

Obviously, these departures from orthodoxy coincide with a widening current of critics of Marxism who remain committed both to socialism and to social theory. In a sense, it is the idea that a 'total' theory (Marxism) gives you a total future society (socialism) that lacks credibility today. If the theory doesn't seem any longer to hold up without recourse to over-simplification, then the very idea of classical socialism must also be questioned. Indeed, can any allegedly scientific theory of history and capitalism provide directive guidance on the difficult moral and political choices we face about the role of the state, the market, the party, morality and diversity, and so on? Elster shares these concerns, whilst trying to hold on to some key Marxist qualities: Marx's sense of the possibilities of individual self-realisation, his understanding of alienation, his critique of capitalist waste and injustice, and at least the aspiration if

not the achievement of a totalising perspective. Despite this, the book exemplifies the scepticism of the analytic pursuit, and for all its brilliance we must hope that it will be followed by a more positive counterpart.



Many of Elster's points have been aired in other ways before, but the cumulative coherence of this book make it the key text to date in the 'Crisis of Marxism'. Accordingly it should be said that the lack of a sustained discussion of epistemological foundations weakens the methodological sections. Moreover, it is never made entirely clear whether the problem with Marxism is its metaphysical and functional commitments (surely something which any attempt at 'big theory' would share), or whether it is the lack of micro-foundations at the level of the theory's justification. Lastly, Elster seems to hesitate over whether the Marxist tendencies to wish-fulfilment and misplaced attribution are part of its very structure, or whether finer discrimination in deciding what counts as a true grounding for, or instance of, the wider theory would vindicate it in the face of those temptations. For all the distinctiveness of voice and sureness in argument, Elster is furthering the debate, not closing it.

Gregor McLennan

Dictionaries

Tom Bottomore (ed.), *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985, 587pp, £8.50 pb
I. Frolov (ed.), *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984, 464pp, £7.95 hb

Twenty years ago the production in Britain of so theoretically sophisticated a general guide to Marxism as *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* would have been impossible. Neither the intellectual resources nor an audience sufficiently large to make such a substantial publishing venture practicable (particularly in a paperback edition) existed. Its appearance demonstrates the extent to which Marxism has now become a serious oppositional force within British intellectual culture, and is perhaps the best single indicator of the theoretical advances that have been made, in terms of the general level of debate, on the Left over the last two decades.

It aims to provide 'a succinct guide to the basic con-

cepts of Marxism ... and to the individuals and schools of thought whose work has contributed to forming the body of Marxist ideas since Marx's day'. And it offers over 250 entries by 81 contributors from ten different countries, the majority of whom are based in Britain, with a significant minority from the USA. The contents range from straightforwardly biographical pieces, sometimes as short as 200 words, to extended expositions and analyses of theoretical concepts up to 6,000 or so words in length. The entries on specifically philosophical topics are of a particularly high standard, and the following are especially worth consulting: Bhaskar on contradiction, determinism, dialectics, theory of knowledge, materialism, realism and truth; Edgley on dialectical materialism and philosophy; Meszaros on mediation, negation and totality; and Petrovic on alienation, praxis and reification.

Doubtless everyone will have their own criticisms of particular entries, and complaints of omission, but I found the selection and presentations overall to be remarkably even, without sacrificing definite perspectives for an artificially 'balanced' approach to the diversity of views within the Marxist tradition. The entries on individual figures could certainly be expanded. Such people as Della Volpe, Colletti and even Togliatti, on the one hand, and Garaudy, Lefebvre and Poulantzas, on the other, are omitted, without there being general entries on French or Italian Marxism within which they could be dealt with. But presumably restrictions on the overall length of the book prohibit a more comprehensive approach.

While *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* is a general guide to Marxism with a strong philosophical component, the Soviet *Dictionary of Philosophy* is a reference book of general philosophical terms and historical figures that also contains brief accounts of basic Marxist concepts and some interpretations of general sociological ideas. So, for example, fascism, fetishism and feudalism are intermingled with falsification, fatalism, feedback and Feuerbach, while imperialism pops up between immediate knowledge and implication, and generalisation follows on from general crisis of capitalism. The entries are shorter than those in *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, which is more of an encyclopedia, and display the customary ideological uniformity of Soviet textbooks. But most of the accounts of more technical philosophical terms have an inherent value independent of their interest as indicators of the current state of Soviet philosophy.



In fact, precisely because of its ideological function, *A Dictionary of Philosophy* is not a particularly reliable guide to the current state of Soviet philosophy; at least, not to developments within it. For the differences between it and, say, the textbooks of the 1950s reflect battles won in the 1960s rather than more recently. The rehabilitation of Marx's Hegelian heritage is marked by the acclamation of his 'opposition to agnosticism, his historical approach, his faith in the powers of human reason, and his science of logic, in which he traced the connections of the real world and the most important objective laws governing theoretical and practical activity'. And the approach to the history of philosophy is in general less dogmatic than that displayed in previous similar works. But philosophy itself remains 'the science of the general laws of being', and there is little indication of the way in which this idea has come increas-

ingly, if obliquely, under attack in some more recent Soviet work. (For a sample of some of this work see *Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of Dialectical Materialism*, Moscow, 1977 - especially the pieces by Ilyenkov, Leontiev and Oizerman).

Both of these works, then, should be of interest to Marxists and philosophers, and particularly to those interested in the interface between the two areas. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* in particular is well worth getting hold of.

Peter Osborne

A Telling Silence

Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, London: Macmillan, 1985, 110pp, £25.00 hb

More than any other thinker since Hegel, it is Heidegger who has engaged in an appreciation of the radically historical nature of philosophy. It is only by participating in such an appreciation that a genuine re-thinking of the tradition can take place. This may strike us as a grand irony coming as it does from a thinker who portentously pronounced the end of philosophy and who bequeathed to contemporary philosophy the task of overcoming metaphysics. But, as Robert Bernasconi's sensitive study of Heidegger shows, the experience of the end of philosophy, a preoccupation Heidegger takes over from nineteenth-century German thought as a whole, is wrongly understood if it is taken to mean a release or an escape from the historicity of philosophy; rather, the end is the point of re-entry into it.

This book is preoccupied with the idea of the end of philosophy as it is found in Heidegger's post *Being and Time* essays. Bernasconi's concern is not so much to recount Heidegger's history of Being as to trace the experience that underlies it. For Bernasconi, Heidegger's thinking after *Being and Time* is characterised by the experience of a fundamental transformation in the thinker's relation to language - the language of metaphysics - at the time of the end of philosophy. It is only at the time of that end that the tradition begins to speak properly to us as we hear its silences as much as its statements. We experience a post-metaphysical language, a language that is and yet is not metaphysical. Thus, a fundamental ambiguity lies at the heart of our experience of the end of philosophy.

Of course, Heidegger's thinking here confronts innumerable paradoxes, for how can the non-metaphysical be spoken in a language other than that of metaphysics? A clue is to be found in Bernasconi's enigmatic and provocative phrasing that 'The transformation of language is more a matter of hearing differently than of speaking differently'. He emphasises that it is, above all, the experience of the lack of a word for Being in the modern epoch that discloses the negative-positive ambiguity of post-metaphysical thinking. At the end of philosophy, and only at the end, there takes place a transformation in our concept of truth as we begin to hear what has remained concealed and unacknowledged in the tradition in its quest for certitude. At the end what is disclosed to us is *aletheia* (unconcealment) which 'pervades all thought, persisting through metaphysics, unheard until its end'.

It is clear from Bernasconi's reading that Heidegger is attempting to inaugurate a dramatic change and reversal in our thinking. And yet it is a transformation that is only possible through a continuous dialogue with the tradition - there is no simple 'beyond metaphysics'. The transformation attempted is one from a manipulative to a 'commemorative' thinking, from will-to-power (mastery) to submission or releasement (Heidegger's term is *Gelassenheit*). But this

change, Bernasconi points out, cannot itself be manipulated. The transformation is a fate or destiny which happens to us when we place ourselves in the 'grant of language'. For Heidegger, the experience of the lack of a word for Being is a liberating and positive one since it ushers in what he calls a 'telling silence', silence being the language that transforms our relation to Being. This is the point at which Bernasconi leaves us, somewhat tantalisingly, suspended in mid-air.

It will be apparent that Heidegger's thinking on the end of philosophy and on the historicity of philosophy requires a confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung* - settlement) with Hegel, and it is a confrontation that occupies Bernasconi in the opening and closing chapters of his book. No doubt the issue of Heidegger's relation to Hegel requires a study unto itself, and I found Bernasconi's treatment of the matter disappointingly short and somewhat superficial. His argument never really moves beyond the level of a simple comparison. Whereas for Hegel the history of philosophy represents a continuous, progressive movement (it is dialectical), for Heidegger it is discontinuous, neither a movement of progress nor of decline; for Hegel the end of philosophy is a culmination in the sense of a fulfilment of metaphysics that takes place in his own system, for Heidegger, in contrast, there is no superior or privileged standpoint but rather the end of philosophy signifies not a dialectical completion or a new beginning but another beginning that takes us back to the original beginning. Out of the confrontation of the end and the beginning arises a post-metaphysical language ... a telling silence. (Here Heidegger is undoubtedly influenced by the repetition of the 'moment' in Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return.)

It is difficult to conceive of Heidegger's non-dialectical reading of the history of philosophy in any other way than as an inversion of Hegel's thinking and as resulting in the kind of mysticism or poeticism to which Hegel was so opposed. And yet, according to Bernasconi, these would be mistaken judgements to make of the Heideggerian project. The growing oblivion of Being is not to be understood as a simple inversion of the ascent to the Absolute. Heidegger's thinking does not fall prey to an impotent historical relativism even though it refuses any criteria on which to pass judgement on the various epochs of Being, because at the time of the end everything hitherto concealed in darkness comes to light and there takes place the destiny of a transformation. Heidegger's intention in calling the transformation a destiny is to avoid the subjectivism of post-Cartesian metaphysics. Although Bernasconi openly admits that on the question of the relation between Hegel and Heidegger there is more to be said, I think that there is more at stake than he is prepared either to acknowledge or to concede.

This book displays a remarkable fidelity to Heidegger's project of overcoming metaphysics, a fidelity that enables the author to convey a sense of the tremendous importance of Heidegger's work to the reader. Bernasconi has written a compelling and enlightening piece of work that contributes substantially to enlarging our understanding of such perplexing notions as the end of philosophy and the overcoming of metaphysics, notions that are becoming increasingly debased through widespread use and abuse. However, on a number of important questions concerning Heidegger's project the book itself reveals a telling silence.

Keith Ansell-Pearson

Modernist Master

Martin Jay, *Adorno*, London: Fontana, 1984, 192pp, £2.50 pb

The project of producing a popular introduction to Adorno's thought is, as Martin Jay acknowledges in the introduction to this addition to Fontana's Modern Master series, one fraught with difficulties from the outset. For Adorno's work not only presupposes an extensive knowledge of the Western, and in particular the German, philosophical tradition, in relation to which it acquires its primary philosophical meaning. It is also explicitly designed to resist accommodation to prevailing modes of thought, both within and outside the academy. Indeed, it even goes so far as to theorise the impossibility of the popular reception of its content.

Faced with such intransigent material, Jay has opted for an essentially historical, expository approach. The advantage of this is that it enables something of the richness of Adorno's thought to be conveyed without the kind of extended theoretical analyses that would inevitably be required by any more immanently theoretical approach. It is through the demonstration of such 'richness' that Jay hopes to achieve his main aim: to persuade readers of the value of addressing the original work directly.


The strategy is a sound one. What is more problematic is the methodological self-understanding in terms of which Jay goes on to justify it further. For his rationale for it is not simply pragmatic. It is also theoretical. Such an approach, he suggests, may be adopted in such a way as to be understood as the application of one of Adorno's own favoured methodological procedures to the interpretation of his own work: the presentation of a cultural phenomenon in terms of the 'force-field' or 'constellation' of its elements. In line with this idea, we are invited to view Adorno's thought as the 'shifting nodal point of intersection' of a number of disparate cultural tendencies: Western Marxism, aesthetic modernism, mandarin cultural despair, Jewish self-identification, and finally, and most problematically, the 'anticipatory pull of deconstructionism'. Such a perspective, Jay argues, allows us to remain true to the 'unresolved tensions' in Adorno's work, rather than to 'seek to find some putative coherence underlying them'.

There are three main problems with this approach. One is inherent in its methodological structure. One relates to the way in which Jay adopts it in this instance. And the third concerns its status as an interpretation of Adorno's method for the construction of 'constellations'. The first problem is a familiar one in the history of ideas. It is an inherent tendency towards an arbitrary eclecticism which abandons the search for substantive meaning in favour of an interpretive method that merely lists those sources or influences that can be identified at work in the text in question. The extent to which such a method actually merits the designation 'interpretation' may be, and has been, seriously questioned. Its essentially arbitrary character is demonstrated by the way in which Jay omits psychoanalysis from his list, though acknowledging that it might just as well have been included. This omission, and admission, is fairly startling given the far greater weight that any serious exposition of Adorno's 'constellation' would have to attribute to psychoanalysis, compared for example with Jewish self-identification, in terms of its explanatory value in laying bare the structure of his thought.

The inherent eclecticism of the approach - that is to say, its tendency to read texts as eclectic combinations of pre-existing cultural tendencies - is manifest in the way in which Jay abstractly opposes the idea of the existence of 'unreconciled tensions' within Adorno's work to that of the interpretive search for 'coherence', and privileges the for-

mer to the extent of denigrating the latter. In fact, of course, the unreconciled tensions within a work can only adequately be displayed through the demonstration of its failure to cohere fully. The hypothetical presumption of coherence, at some level, is necessary to the interpretation of even the most self-consciously fragmentary text, and follows inevitably from the individuation of the object of analysis. To deny the search for coherence is, in this sense, simply self-defeating.

The most striking feature of Jay's list of the constitutive elements of Adorno's 'constellation', however, is its inclusion of the 'anticipatory pull of deconstructionism'. Two things must, very briefly, be said about this. The first is that the adoption of such an explicitly teleological approach to the history of ideas is surely no longer acceptable without some extended theoretical defence. The second thing is that the increasingly fashionable assimilation of Adorno's thought to certain tendencies within post-structuralism on the basis of a common appreciation of Nietzsche (and sometimes also on the basis of the attribution of unconscious Heideggerian tendencies to Adorno's work), must be seriously questioned. For to say, as Jay does, that Adorno was not 'as contemptuous' of the search for truth as Nietzsche's contemporary French disciples is to so massively understate the importance of the concept of truth to Adorno's project as a whole as to constitute a serious distortion of both its basic philosophical and political directions.



Finally, with regard to the status of Jay's use of the method of constellation-construction as an interpretation of Adorno's methodology, it can only be said that it is directly opposed to Adorno's procedure of laying bare the social presuppositions of a work via the immanent analysis of its epistemological structure. For Adorno, 'constellations' were to be constructed by immanent analysis, not external attribution. The whole tenor of the idea, which Adorno developed through his critical appropriation of aspects of Walter Benjamin's early work, is opposed to Jay's consistently superficial use of the term.

This said, the bulk of Jay's exposition of Adorno's thought is actually very impressive as an example of the synoptic history of ideas. Following a biographical overview of his life-work, Jay provides an account of Adorno's philosophical, social and psychological, and cultural writings, respectively, which synthesises the results of the fairly extensive recent secondary literature on Adorno, and quotes frequently from the original work. The exposition is well-organised and clear, if unavoidably condensed, and successful to precisely the extent to which the unity of Adorno's project prevails against Jay's efforts to reduce it to a 'tense force-field of unreconciled impulses'. Inevitably, the book is schematic, but within its own terms, and shed of its misleading methodological self-consciousness, it is a useful introductory work. For those in need of a more theoretically substantive, if less bibliographically comprehensive, introduction to Adorno, Gillian Rose's *The Melancholy Science* (1978) remains the best bet.

Peter Osborne

Hegel

Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's political philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, £30 hb, £8.95 pb

Hegel's distinction between the state and civil society is the focal point of this collection of papers hitherto unpublished in English. At least nine of the papers deal in some way with the relationship between Marx and Hegel, thus raising the question of a Marxist critique of Hegel. Other topics include Hegel's reflections on Greek society and the relevance of Hegelian social theory to the problems of advanced industrial societies. While several papers consist of critical expositions of Hegel's philosophy and are worthy of serious attention in their own right, others pose a more fundamental question which makes this collection particularly important: namely, can Hegel's conceptual apparatus be applied to the problems which beset advanced capitalism?

It might be objected that since Hegel wrote at a time when capitalism scarcely existed he can hardly be expected to provide a solution to its problems. Yet if Hegel has nothing to say on these matters a revival of his political and social philosophy is futile. Hegel would be the first to condemn the raising of ghosts from the past merely to satisfy our curiosity. Fortunately several contributors to this volume directly relate Hegel's philosophy to contemporary problems. Raymond Plant sees an anticipation of the contemporary phenomenon known as 'legitimation crisis' in the tensions within the conceptual framework of Hegel's civil society. Antony Walton sees Hegel's theory of civil society as having a relevance to some of the problems posed by the contemporary expansion of state activity and its consequent threat to political freedom. And, despite the conservative interpretations of the Philosophy of Right, an important aspect of Hegel's philosophy was his commitment to reform, as Michael Petry demonstrates in his analysis of Hegel's critique of the English Reform Bill.

The importance of Hegel to the contemporary world is also stressed by the editor, Z. A. Pelczynski, who, in an introductory essay, points out that Hegel's political philosophy was 'the result of a search for community in the modern world' (p. 13). This involved a systematic and philosophical grasp of the place of the contemporary European in the modern world and a recognition of certain tendencies straining at the fabric of civilization. Quite obviously Hegel failed to complete such a task, but that he made us aware of the problems encountered in such an endeavour makes his work worthy of serious attention today.

Among the papers which stand out for their clarity and radical interpretation of Hegel are Merold Westphal's 'Hegel's Radical Idealism: family and state', and J. Bernstein's 'From Self-Consciousness to Community'. Bernstein also formulates a timely rejection of the now outworn materialist-idealist dichotomy in his account of the Master-Servant dialectic. Whereas the materialist argues that Hegel's account of self-consciousness 'fails because it relies upon the idealistic concept of man as a disinterested knower and agent', in Bernstein's anthropological reading, 'Hegelian selves are embodied selves whose central relation to the world is practical' (p. 39).

The orthodox Marxist critique of the Hegelian state comes under heavy criticism in Ilting's comparison of the original 'Philosophy of Right Lectures of 1818-19' with the Philosophy of Right which was published in 1820. What began, says Ilting, as a radical work outlining a state of the citizens, became an authoritarian treatise, a state of office holders. The two works reveal a transition from a programme for a citizens' republic to an apology for an author-

itarian state. According to Ilting, Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in 1843 misses the point of Hegel's original intentions. Thus Marx 'reproaches Hegel with mistakes which the latter simply has not made; and he overlooks deficiencies which it would have been decidedly in his interest to criticise' (p. 104). Whereas Hegel makes civil rights the foundation of all duties to the state (and on his own terms deserves censure whenever he departs from this principle), Marx's criticism (which according to Ilting is misled by his eagerness to verify Feuerbach's thesis concerning Hegel's confusion between subject and predicate) fastens on the alleged 'pantheistic mysticism' of the Philosophy of Right. Applying his criticism primarily to the metaphysical tone of Hegel's style, Marx actually overlooked the fact that Hegel failed to realise his own objective; to provide an account of the state as the 'end product' of the activity of its citizens.

Hopefully, Marxists will respond to some of the accounts of the relationship between Hegelianism and Marxism in this book. This collection of papers is certainly capable of stimulating a fruitful debate. What is more, the book as a whole is free from much of the unnecessary and misleading jargon that has too often been employed in Hegelian scholarship. This is undoubtedly essential reading for anyone who wants seriously to confront contemporary Hegelianism.

David Lamb

Habermas

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. one, reason and the rationalisation of society, translated by Thomas McCarthy, London: Heinemann, 1984, xlii + 465pp

In The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas attempts his most ambitious statement to date on the 'paradigm shift' he has been seeking to develop within social theory. In developing this new perspective, he builds on his previous work and surveys a wide range of material including analytical philosophy, sociological theory and Western Marxism. The book as a whole tries, amongst other things, to develop a metatheoretical perspective in which importance is given to both agency and structure in social explanation. Hence, he attempts to bring together action-theoretic and systems-theoretic perspectives. This project is largely accomplished in volume two. Volume one is concerned to establish the rationality problematic as central to social theory and to expand the concept of communicative action. In Habermas's view the concept of rationality is logically related to that of social action. As the subtitle suggests, Habermas seeks to establish a connection between 'rationality ... understood to be a disposition of speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behaviour for which there are good reasons or grounds' (p. 22), and the evolution of society as a process of rationalisation.

Habermas takes up Weber's understanding of the development of modern capitalist society but argues that Weber's analysis, concentrating on teleological action and its institutional embodiment, is one-sided. However, he does take seriously the idea of the emergence, in history, of changing structures of consciousness. Habermas also argues, in the latter part of the book, that Weber's one-sided analysis is not overcome by the Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental reason; this critique essentially follows the same path and is, accordingly, forced to arrive at pessimistic conclusions regarding the relationship between rationality and emancipation in its analysis of the enlightenment project and capitalist society.

Habermas attempts to preserve the link between rationality and emancipation by following 'a path which leads

through the inner logics of the different complexes of rationality and through processes of societal rationalisation divided up according to universal aspects of validity, and which suggests a unity of rationality beneath the husk of everyday practice that has been simultaneously rationalised and reified' (p. 382). This path leads him to the analysis of speech and action in which he develops a typology of interaction mediated through language, which relates formal-pragmatic features of speech with types of social action in order to uncover and separate the complexes of rationality which are tied to specific psychological and social structures. Out of this exceedingly complex analysis emerges the concept of communicative action in which all aspects of the rationality of speech and action are brought together; communicative action displays a 'rational internal structure' and the potential for a rational social praxis:

If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially co-ordinated activities of its members and that its co-ordination has to be established through communication - and in certain spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement - then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action.
(p. 397)

The demand of reason is thus seen to contain a potential for human beings to 'harmonise their individual plans of action with one another' (p. 294); this demand expresses itself in the act of communication - as a presupposition for its very possibility. Through the critical engagement with Weber's work in chapter two this analysis is linked to the idea of the rationalisation of society, of psychological and social structures.

Although Habermas advocates the universality of communicative rationality he does not want to accept the 'guarantees' of the Western philosophical tradition. Consequently, he rejects the philosophy of consciousness or transcendental philosophy and urges a shift to the 'pragmatics of language'. However, despite Habermas's statements to the contrary, it is difficult to see how the notion of communicative rationality is different from a transcendental presupposition in the Kantian sense. Habermas clearly recognises that in claiming the universality of reason without such guarantees he is taking on a sizeable burden of proof.

The problem of connecting communicative reason with material, historically changing structures arises in an acute form with regard to one of the most interesting claims in the book; namely, that the 'potential for critique (is) built into communicative action' (p. 121). According to Habermas, the structures which make communicative action possible also make possible the 'reflective self-control' (p. 121) of the process of social reproduction by providing 'the critical means to penetrate a given context, to burst it open from within and to transcend it' (p. 120). Again, the connection between such a process of critical self-reflection and the material transformation of society needs to be spelled out in a much clearer way than Habermas has managed to do so far. The ideas and arguments in this book are presented in a 'programmatic' fashion, making it very difficult to find clear answers to the many questions and problems the analyses raise.


The complexity and difficulty of the book aside, it has to be said that in its scope and vision it is a truly monumental achievement. It is only to be hoped that the second volume is translated soon and that the book as a whole is widely discussed. It is surely a milestone of recent social theory and a fascinating store of insights and stimulation for anyone working in the field.

Ralph Bannell

Gramsci

J. Hoffman, The Gramscian Challenge: coercion and consent in Marxist political theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 230pp, £17.50 hb

Rather than being a specific analysis of Gramsci's ideas, this text is more of a critical review of the way in which the coercion/consent problem has been theorised in Marxism. Hoffman begins with a general tour of the current 'crisis of Marxism'. He sees the coercion/consent duality as a major theme of the writers of 'Western Marxism' but believes that the obituaries on classical Marxism have been published too soon, and that the political response to this crisis, Eurocommunism, is an emperor without clothes. For Hoffman the problem of coercion and consent requires a 'Marxist' answer.



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In seeking his answer he quickly reviews the classical texts of Marx and Engels on politics and the state. Here he argues for an interpretation which sees the state as having both coercive and consensual aspects, and which is not the mere instrument of the bourgeoisie. This is the strongest chapter, although Hoffman tends to overplay the uniformity and continuity of Marx's and Engels's work on the state. On this interpretation the Marxist theory of the state was developed in the 1840s and then merely elaborated rather than modified and changed in the light of further theoretical breakthroughs.

Hoffman then moves on to what is intended as the critical core of the book, the chapter on Gramsci. This focuses the innovations of Gramsci's theory in relation to the concept of hegemony. These include its extension to encompass all forms of class rule, but Hoffman claims that this is logically implied in the earlier work of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The second major innovation is that Gramsci analysed the intellectual and cultural element of hegemony, but again this is dismissed as being already present in Lenin. To support these claims he has to sustain a view of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci (or rather those features of Gramsci he likes), on the question of hegemony where they all use essentially the same concept. Thus, he argues that hegemony is 'implied' in the classics in the view of consent as the idealised form of the state masking its coercive essence, and the view of the proletariat as a 'universal' class in revolutionary situ-

ations, and as therefore hegemonic.

By analytically separating civil society (the moment of hegemony and consent) from the state (the moment of coercion), Gramsci is seen by Hoffman as organically separating coercion from consent rather than treating them as a dialectical unity. It is here that Gramsci is depicted by Hoffman going right off the tracks. But in so doing, Hoffman's scholarship is often lazy and at times distorts Gramsci's formulations. Gramsci is nowhere quoted at length, nor are the quotes placed in their context. Instead, isolated words and phrases are interspersed in Hoffman's sentences. Most crucially the qualified ways in which Gramsci uses the word 'hegemony' and such associated concepts as 'spontaneity', 'domination', 'intellectual and moral leadership' (as signified by Gramsci's constant use of quotation marks around these words) are blatantly ignored by Hoffman. Similar misrepresentations are also found in relation to Gramsci's discussion of the organisation of political parties.

Hoffman goes on to give us the 'correct line' on coercion and consent. He tells us that consent is the dialectical negation of coercion, the idealised form of the state that masks its coercive essence. Consent emerges from and reacts back upon relations of coercion such that all apparently consensual situations really have a determining coercive essence. People are coerced into consenting, but like slaves have to consent for coercion to be effective. This seems a rather one-sided dialectical unity and an abuse of the term itself. Consent seems to be a mere epiphenomenon of coercive social relations, and the incantation of some mysterious 'dialectic' is constantly used to cover up incoherence and inconsistencies.

Paul Bagguley

Pierce

Christopher Hookway, *Peirce*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, 310pp, £25 hb

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is, so to speak, a semi-neglected philosopher who is periodically rediscovered. Such rediscoveries are usually accompanied by excitement at both the range of his work and the extent to which he can be seen as anticipating later developments. Peirce worked on logic, mathematics, scientific method, semiotics, metaphysics and cosmology, to give but a short list; he originated pragmatism and later objected that William James had both 'kidnapped' and misunderstood this doctrine. His work on logic is an important contribution to twentieth-century logic, with the usual surprising anticipation of ideas associated with later philosophers. His account of scientific method has been described by A. J. Ayer in his *Origins of Pragmatism* (1968) as Popper's philosophy of science in all essentials, *avant la lettre*. So much for the originality of the lonely Viennese, beaten to the draw by an idiosyncratic New Englander. With his work on signs, Peirce took the 'linguistic turn' long before other philosophers. Indeed, Derrida sees Peirce as an early deconstructionist: 'Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign' (quoted in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, 1982).

Hookway, in this volume in the series 'The Arguments of the Philosophers', provides a careful and comprehensive study of Peirce's philosophical work, based on the extensive and still unpublished manuscripts as well as on the published writings. His interpretation is meant to counter the claim which sees Peirce as a displaced philosopher, born too soon for his work to be appreciated by most of his contemporar-

ies. This view rests on editing Peirce's writings for the anticipations and excising much of the framework within which Peirce consciously developed his ideas. Hookway develops Rorty's argument that Peirce was a traditional philosopher. As other writers have done, he draws attention to Peirce's uses of scholastic philosophy as a reference point and stresses the extent to which Peirce was a Kantian. Peirce is compared with Jeremy Bentham, a comparison which Ayer has also made: both men wrote on an astonishingly wide range of topics and both invented numerous neologisms to express their ideas; and with both, some of their neologisms have become established and some now look awkward and obscure. It is, Hookway argues, the religious and metaphysical framework that Peirce developed as an integral and inextricable part of his wide-ranging philosophy that makes him the traditional philosopher that many of his advocates recognised. Hookway's interpretation is thus directed against the carefree mining of the corpus of Peirce's writings for the limpid passages that leap off the page to us with their modernity. There is indeed a great deal to be learned from Peirce in this way, but this is not the same as speaking of Peirce's philosophy.

Cynthia Hay

Legitimation Crisis

William Connolly (ed.), *Legitimacy and the State*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, £19.50 hb, £6.95 pb

It is rare for a selection of essays from different authors to form anything like a genuine unity. William Connolly has achieved overall coherence by bravely sticking to his chosen theme, searching widely for the essays that engage in debate upon it, and by providing linking elements in both the introduction and a separate essay on 'The Dilemma of Legitimacy'. The whole effect is a stimulating and rewarding collection that would challenge both first year undergraduates and teachers of politics, philosophy and sociology.

The linking theme is the relationship between legitimacy and modernity. The story that emerges is one of the ever increasing problem of modern political rulers in fabricating and maintaining political order through the imposition of a vocabulary and practice of legitimation. The historical story ends with the debate over the phenomenon that Habermas has neatly labelled 'Legitimation Crisis', an essay in which Connolly, taking the side of Habermas, rejects the Nietzschean challenge of Michel Foucault. The book is a kind of political companion to Alister MacIntyre's brilliant text on the moral crisis of modernity, *After Virtue* (1981).

My comments will be concentrated upon this final theme as the earlier extracts by Marx, Weber, Sheldon Wolin, Seymour Lipset and John Schaar are well known to students of legitimation. Collectively the above set out three distinctive accounts of, and approaches to, the problem already sketched out in Connolly's concise historical and analytic introduction. Wolin's contribution elaborates Weber's thesis of rationalisation, namely that legitimisation in modern states is predominantly a product of bureaucratic manipulation, of replacing charisma and traditional beliefs by rational legal rules, condoned because they are efficient and expedient. But as Wolin is not widely known to sociological theorists, this commentary may prove to be a popular aperitif for the more appetising meals available elsewhere.

But Weber and Marx's demystifications of traditional forms of legitimation, Lipset's re-legitimising balm of pluralist democracy and Schaar's critique only set up the debate begun by Habermas. His argument of 1973 was that states in advanced capitalist societies were in a double bind over

legitimacy. Compelled on the one side to instrumentally provide welfare in societies dominated by materialist ethics and consumerist culture and practices, modern governments have found that they have bought off economic and social crisis only at the price of first a political and now a crisis of legitimation. The latter is two sided, the new welfare societies have produced a motivational crisis among workers and citizens, a theme picked up in current right-wing party politics; while the increased need and economic costs of meeting citizen demands has created the new economic, political and ideological crisis currently experienced in Western, and increasingly the world, economic systems.

Yet it is the liberational side of Habermas's work that Connolly chooses to stress and which finds its culmination in the last essay by Paul Ricoeur, 'The Political Paradox'. Habermas has come to hold a position on the role of philosophy closer than that of any other modern sociological theorist to that of the classical Western political philosophers. Philosophy is not only critical, the art of the negative, but is also constructive, the later being premised on the potential for philosophy to engender rational thought through increased communicative competence. It is this potential that allows Connolly to defend Habermas from the relentless insistence by Foucault that modern states and the collectively and individually powerful can find a never-ending supply of legitimating discourses and practices. Foucault's insistence that in modernity knowledge itself, and scientific, philosophical and sociological knowledge in particular, are new and more powerful sources of legitimacy, providing justifications for surveillance, discipline and control, is undermined if philosophic knowledge can have this positive, independent and liberating role. But Connolly also sees that philosophy's purchase on the truth is often only made possible through 'slack in the order' of everyday social control (p. 244).

The unity of theme, the concentration on the legitimation problem of modernity and the defence of the 'critical legitimists' (p. 240) all make this collection one of considerable importance. But the suggestiveness implicit in this book, that in Habermas we have the first real possibility for a reunification of political philosophy and social theory around some notions of critical and rational thought and discourse, allows us to call this a significant contribution to modern thought. It is only a pity that Connolly did not explore this possibility further, for after reading the extract from 'Legitimation Crisis' on the right questions to ask of an ideology of legitimation, the reader is left crying out for a reference, for instance to Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (pp. 12-13).

John R. Gibbins

Forms of Oppression

Arthur Brittan and Mary Maynard, *Sexism, Racism and Oppression*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 223pp, £18.95 hb, £5.95 pb

This book seeks to confront some of the problems surrounding explanations of sexism and racism. It conceives the latter as not only adding quantitatively to oppression, but also qualitatively changing the nature of that oppression. The task of the book is to attempt to provide a more adequate explanation of sexism and racism than those currently on offer. The authors reject biological, cultural, psychological and class explanations as either reductionist or essentialist. By relating oppression to underlying causes, such explanations refuse to take actual oppression seriously, as the appropriate questions tend to become related to those

causes. That, at least, is the authors' claim, and their work attempts to overcome this shortcoming.

However, a curious tension remains in the book. Brittan and Maynard reject explanations of why sexism and racism occur on the grounds that they are not able to describe how they occur. While why and how may be necessary for a full understanding of oppression, they nonetheless remain separate questions. To reject explanations for not being able to show how oppression occurs is disingenuous. However, it does provide the authors with a convenient device for entering into an examination of prominent theories of how oppression is reproduced. Nevertheless, this does little to advance our understanding of why sexism and racism occur.

The authors reject established explanations as subsuming the complex reality of oppression under a relatively simple solution. However, when they come to posit their own explanation, this problem is reproduced. For Brittan and Maynard, the cause of sexism and racism is a masculine ideology of objectification. This arises from the male subjugation of nature, from which women become seen as objects and oppressed, which, in turn, makes the oppression of other races possible. Oppression results from the process of objectification related to the male subjugation of nature.

This seems an inadequate explanation, since it gives rise to more questions than it answers. Even if it were possible to establish the subjugation of nature as a male role (which the authors fail to do), it would still be necessary to explain why this initial division of labour takes place. We also need to know why women are associated with nature in the process of objectification, if the 'rape of nature' is to be used to explain the oppression of women. The authors' argument actually assumes the sexism it is seeking to explain. Further, if there is a masculine ideology of objectification, what precisely are the grounds for the oppression of other races? Might it not be more likely that there would be co-operation between men of different races in the oppression of women, rather than of one race by another? What of class oppression? Is this meant to be a later component resulting from the male subjugation of nature? Surely not.

It is certainly feasible that conceiving others as objects does make their oppression easier. But as an explanation of sexism and racism, based on a very vague notion of the male subjugation of nature, it is less than satisfactory. An adequate confrontation of the issues surrounding the theory and practice of oppression still needs to be achieved. Collapsing the why and how into a masculine ideology of objectification moves further from the answers rather than closer to them: to this extent, this book promises much but delivers little.

Richard Edwards

The Body in Question

David Michael Lewin, *The Body's Recollection of Being: phenomenological psychology and the deconstruction of nihilism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, 390pp, £29.95 hb, £9.95 pb

This book, in many ways bold and daring, in other ways overblown and pretentious, is best read as a contribution to a Heideggerian post-metaphysical thinking. Although it draws on an amazing variety of religious, poetic, and philosophical sources, it is Heidegger's work that provides the backbone to the author's efforts to instigate a radical project of thinking and experiencing what remains perhaps the central 'unthought' of the Western philosophical tradition - the body. However, the author finds Heidegger's reflections on the body deficient and wanting. He is thus compelled to supplement his attempt to enlarge the scope of Heidegger's

fundamental ontology with the writings of Merleau-Ponty.

The author's aims are to seek 'a new body of understanding' and a primordial, authentic, and non-reified experience of the body. This would free the body from the dualistic violence of the Cartesian tradition, from Newtonian reductionism and physiological biologism, and restore it to the plenitude of social and communal life. Lewin is concerned with an individual and collective response to the political nihilism of modern Western societies and with relating his radical phenomenology of the body to an ideological and cultural critique.

The 'originality' of the book lies solely in its promise: it contains no more than that - a preparatory and tentative laying of the ground. Criticisms of the book have largely concerned its presentation. It takes the form of a series of meditations and lucubrations rather than a cogent and cohesive argument. Several chapters are preceded by as many as twenty quotations, and together with its largely unexplicated phenomenological jargon, this makes for some laborious reading. However, if one is prepared to invest some time and patience in this book, it can be rewarding.

Keith Ansell-Pearson

Scott Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, London: Duckworth, 1985, 195pp, £18.00 hb, £7.95 pb

This robust assertion of essentialism in general, and Marx's essentialism in particular, is welcome. Essentialism is unfashionable in orthodox circles, and even among Marxists. Yet Meikle argues that not only are Marx's conception of science, his basic categories, and forms of explanation, essentialist, but that the sort of essentialism held by Marx is invulnerable to the familiar forms of attack made upon essentialism, and that, 'far from being a weakness in Marx's thought, essentialism is its greatest strength and the powerhouse of his explanatory theories'. Marx's political economy employs the categories of law, form, and necessity, and these arise from his training in essentialist metaphysics. What Meikle gives us, then, is an Aristotelian reading of Marx. As he allows, a full account of Marx's essentialism and its connections with Aristotle and Hegel would be a major task. He restricts himself to pointing towards the right spirit in which to read Marx.

The first chapter sets up the basic framework, employing as the antithesis to essentialism the metaphysics of atomism. Aristotle realised that no account of things is possible without admitting the category of form (or essence), because what things are cannot possibly be explained in terms of their constituent matter (atoms) since that can change while the entity retains its nature and identity over time. Grasping the essence of a thing enables its law of development to be articulated. This law is necessary. Indeed, changes that are necessary can be distinguished from those that are accidental only when the essence is known. Meikle hastens to add that the development is necessary, not in being inevitable (accident can frustrate it), but as being the realisation of potentials inherent in the form itself. He adds provocatively that Marx's conception of law is teleological 'and all the better for it'.

The following five chapters deploy this apparatus in the interpretation of Marx's theory of history and political economy. One of the most interesting sections is on the vexed question of the 'logical' and the 'historical' derivation of the categories of Capital. Meikle argues that the discussion has missed the point entirely. What we find in Marx is a dialectical development of an essence. This is a matter of ontology. 'A process of essential development, though it may be intellectually presented logically or illogically, is not itself "logical"; it is ontological, that is, it has to do with the

realm of being, and with the observed form of existence of the things that are there.' According to Meikle this is also how to make sense of Engels's claim that the dialectical method 'is indeed nothing other than the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of disturbing accidental occurrences'.

The final chapter, 'Atomism and Essentialism', is not about Marx but attempts to explicate further the philosophical standpoint of the book. The book is very readable, albeit somewhat repetitious. Meikle's exasperation with the enemy makes the tone rather polemical - but none the worse for that.

C. J. Arthur

Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative: Volume I*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984, xxi + 274pp, £26.25 hb

The idea behind Ricoeur's two-volume work *Time and Narrative* is that narratives answer to the ineluctably temporal character of all human experience, and conversely that 'time becomes human time to the extent that it is organised after the manner of a narrative'. In the first volume, published in French in 1983 and promptly and expertly translated here, Ricoeur presents an introductory treatment of 'narrative and temporality' and a detailed examination of the theory and practice of historiography. The second volume, not yet available either in French or in English, will contain a discussion of fiction and some concluding reflections on archives, memory and the experience of time. The scope of the knowledge, sympathy, imagination and inventiveness displayed in *Time and Narrative* is marvellous. The book deserves many grateful readers.

Ricoeur has been the outstanding exponent of hermeneutics in France for more than thirty years. His procedure is to present digests of conflicting interpretations and to produce a synthesis which makes sense of each of them but transcends them all - like a brilliant chairperson, letting every member have a say, and formulating a composite resolution with which everyone is benignly satisfied. Those who like intellectual issues to be provocatively stated and aggressively fought over may find Ricoeur's conciliatoriness soporific. But no one could deny the superb skill with which, in the first part of this volume, he balances the utter unintelligibility of the procession of experience from the future, through the present, to the past (as witnessed by Augustine), against the propensity (codified by Aristotle) to constitute life in the form of plots.

His discussion of history is not quite so satisfying. Ricoeur leads us through a debate between the idea that history deals in general laws and the idea that it confines itself to particular anecdotes, and ends up with a not wholly convincing compromise proposal called 'singular causal imputation'. Taking Fernand Braudel's *Méditerranée* as his paradigm of historiography, he demonstrates that even historians who consider themselves to have discarded 'narrative history' still construct 'quasi-plots' and 'quasi-characters', and so never break their ties to narration. But this does not justify the extension of the 'quasi-narrativist' conclusion to a generalised entity which Ricoeur sometimes refers to, with rather desperate italics, as 'history'. It would certainly be interesting to measure Ricoeur's analysis against histories less exalted than Braudel's - like those which are present in popular memory, or in TV programmes, or in books like *Little Arthur's History of England* or Trotsky's *Russian Revolution*. And I cannot help wondering whether such a widening of hermeneutic attention would disrupt the tranquil ultimate agreements which preside over the world-according-to-Ricoeur.

Jonathan Rée

David S. Landes, Revolution in Time: clocks and the making of the modern world, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1985, 544pp, £7.95 pb

David Landes is a writer with an extraordinary ability to relate technological development to the complexities of human history. In his latest book he applies his skills to the subject of time-measurement. Time emerges as a quantity called down from the heavens; in Derek Price's words, 'a fallen angel from the world of astronomy'. Having been captured, it can be displayed in public clocks, which are used to demonstrate and consolidate secular power. The coming of personal watches suggests a shift, as Landes points out, from 'time obedience' to 'time discipline', with individuals relying on their own sources of time to regulate and synchronise their activities. Clocks and watches are then fundamental sources of order in modern society; but they are more than this. They are products of craftsmanship and organised manufacture, tools of exploration and scientific discovery, objects of human fashion and desire.

These are the themes of Landes's book, which is divided into three parts. In the first, early developments in horological technology are related to the understanding of time in different cultures. Landes compares medieval China, monasteries in the European Middle Ages, the business communities of early capitalism, and the factory populations of the Industrial Revolution. In each case, technical change is connected with cultural demand for time-measurement. The second part details the technical improvements which have steadily increased the accuracy of clocks and watches in post-medieval Europe. The dominant theme here is the perfection of a marine chronometer for measuring longitude. Because the requirements for accuracy here were laid down in advance, the story is one of progress towards the specified ideal; an intrinsically less interesting story, it seems to me, than that of conceptual and cultural change presented in part one.

In part three, Landes widens his scope again, drawing back from the details of mechanisms to consider the economic history of clock- and watch-making. The emphasis is again on social and cultural factors, in their impact on economic development and change. The history of clock manufacture raises important issues concerning the social relations of production, and its links with entrepreneurship, marketing and craftsmanship. Landes's exposition also demonstrates the craftsmanship of the historian at its best. He teases out connections and points up implications, crossing between technical, cultural and social levels with ease, in a prose which is lucid and sparkling with illustrative anecdotes. This is an intelligent and elegant book.

Jan Golinski

George MacDonald Ross, Leibniz, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, 121pp, £1.95 pb

On seeing this book with its somewhat ambiguous title, the reader naturally wonders which Leibniz this is about: for there are at least three, whose relationship, if any, is lost in the mists of time and scholarship. There is the Leibniz who is a Great Philosopher, who lived somewhere between Descartes and Hume and whose rumoured ideas are so peculiar (monads??) as to confirm everyone's prejudices about philosophers. There is the Leibniz who was a younger contemporary of Newton, who spent his time squabbling neurotically about an arcane priority dispute of higher mathematics. There is the Leibniz who always bobs up in the first chapter of books on the history of computers, a young lad-on-the-make hawking his invention of a calculating machine round the scientific circles of Paris and London in the 1670s.

The great revelation of Ross's Leibniz is that, contrary

to previous impressions, these are all one and the same person. A person, furthermore, who was not multiply-schizophrenic but whose diverse activities, ideas and achievements all spring from the same source and relate coherently. That the shores of scholarship are littered with so many bits of driftwood labelled 'Leibniz' is the result of our own confusion and blinkered gaze, not Leibniz's.

There are many ways of contributing to scholarship. One is to come across, and then bring to light, recondite details of the past that no one knew before; another, equally valuable and often rather more widely useful, is to draw together such details and present them in a fresh framework so convincing that even flotsam-gatherers on hitherto disparate shores must find their perspectives broadened and deepened. This is such a work of scholarship. A gem of a book, then, well worth £1.95 of anyone's money.

John Fauvel

T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller (trans.), Hegel's Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, £17.50 hb

Hegel gave many lecture courses which were turned into posthumously published books by his students. His History of Philosophy is one such. The text under review is a translation by Knox (prepared for publication by Miller) of the Introduction to those lectures. Until 1940 the only version available was that of 1836 edited by Michelet from Hegel's own notes and student notes (translated by Haldane in 1892). In 1940 Hoffmeister published a new text embodying lecture notes taken by Hegel's pupils in 1823-4, 1825-6, and 1827-8. It is this which forms the basis of the present English translation. It was also used by Lauer for the translation in his Hegel's Idea of Philosophy (New York, 1971); but Knox has translated considerably more of the Hoffmeister edition than Lauer. He omits only obvious repetitions.

Knox supplies a readable text with useful explanatory footnotes. As he admits, it is difficult to find English equivalents for Hegel's terminology. A notable case in point is 'Dasein'. I am not happy with Knox's choice of 'Existence' for this. The Logic shows Hegel distinguishes 'Existenz' from 'Dasein'. But cavils aside, this book is welcome because it is a useful way for new readers to get into Hegel, and to become familiar with some of his ideas in a less forbidding context than that provided by the textbooks published by Hegel himself, such as the Logic.

In the course of this Introduction Hegel defends the notion of taking the history of philosophy seriously. Probably he was the first to do so. He deploys a dialectical argument to subvert the consideration that every philosophy is eventually refuted. Philosophy itself endures, he argues, for what is refuted is only the claim of one principle to be final and absolute. It is shown to be one-sided. But the new principle is equally one-sided. All philosophies are therefore part of one philosophy. The latest philosophy contains in itself the principles of all the previous philosophies. Their principles are to be integrated as aspects of one idea. A history of philosophy must deploy its material so as to exhibit the idea of philosophy as a concrete unity of these aspects.

The problem arises: is the system now complete, or must history inexorably subsume in its onward march Hegel's own principle? If the latter, what sort of refutation is appropriate, an Hegelian one? ... or something else?

C. J. Arthur