REVIEWS

THE TRIAL OF I. F. STONE

Isidor Feinstein Stone, *The Trial of Socrates*, London, Cape, 1988, xi + 282pp, £12.95 hb, ISBN 0224 02591-0

Near the end of his life I. F. Stone turned away from the hidden history of US politics to look at an older story, the trial of Socrates. Always a defender of democracy and freedom of speech, he could not understand how free and democratic Athens could have executed this aging philosopher. Digging beneath the 'official history' presented by Plato, he aims to give a more accurate picture of Socrates and reconstruct the case for the prosecution, so we can understand how he appeared to his fellow citizens.

His investigations took him into ancient Greek literature, history and philosophy. His method was to concentrate on the primary sources, and he taught himself ancient Greek to overcome the obstacles inevitably introduced by translators. While he admires Socrates' personal courage and defends his right to speak his mind, Stone has none of the traditional reverence for him as a person and completely rejects his ideas.

Stone's conclusion is that Socrates was disliked by the people of Athens because of his philosophy. He claims that there were three important philosophical disagreements between Socrates and his fellow citizens. Probably the chief difference was Socrates' anti-democratic political philosophy. In his view, the real complaint against Socrates was that he subverted (politically) the youth by turning them against the Athenian democracy.

The second difference arose from Socrates's beliefs about virtue and knowledge. Protagoras argued that all citizens can offer advice about political decisions because they all have a share in virtue. He assumes that virtue is necessary to take part in political life but sees virtue as a disposition to behave correctly. For Socrates someone has virtue not because they behave correctly or have good character but because they have knowledge, and knowledge is knowledge of absolutely correct definitions. Since most people could not provide such definitions, they had no knowledge and were unfit to play a role in the political affairs of the Athenian city-state.

The third difference between Socrates and his fellow citizens was that he preached withdrawal from the political life of the city-state. Politics is inevitably dirty and leads to the contamination of the soul. The only way to keep one's moral integrity is to be apolitical. Stone argues that most Athenians would have seen participation in political life as a duty, and cites a law enacted by Solon that people who do not take sides during an important political struggle should be deprived of their citizenship.

According to Stone, Socrates was tried and convicted for exercising his freedom of speech. Socrates' constant criticism was tolerated after the anti-democratic coups of 411 and 404 BC, but the unsuccessful coup of 401 BC made the Athenians more nervous and soon thereafter Socrates was put on trial. Stone believes that in the light of political events after 411 BC the trial of Socrates is understandable, but that it was still unjust, and against the spirit if not the letter of the Athenian tradition of free speech. He argues that Socrates went out of his way to antagonize the jury, did not really try to defend himself, rejected the possibility of escape or a lighter penalty, and so brought his punishment on his own head. He admits, however, that Socrates could not have consistently argued that his prosecution was a violation of the right to free speech because he did not himself accept this as a right.

In some ways the structure of the book is disjointed, but most of the digressions are interesting and related to the general theme, so this is not a serious drawback for the reader. In Chapters 2 and 3 Stone gives a political analysis of parts of the *Iliad*, and in Chapters 9 and 10 he takes a look at Socrates in the eyes of the comic poets. As might be expected, he discusses some passage or other in most of Plato's dialogues. In the Epilogue he rejects the traditional view that other philosophers (Anaxagoras, Diagoras, and Protagoras) were also persecuted in Athens. Stone argues that this claim is an invention of Plutarch and other later Roman writers.

In an extensive and valuable review in the *New York Review of Books*, M. F. Burnyeat claims that one of Stone's great achievements is to give a 'vivid and detailed portrayal of Athenian political experience' in the period leading up to the trial of Socrates. While Stone has much to say about the political background of Socrates' life, I believe that another of Stone's achievements is to explain the political impact of Socrates' philosophy on contemporary Athenian society.

For example, he argues that Socrates' political philosophy was not only anti-democratic, but that it was anti-oligarchic as well. The main political issue of the day was the extent of citizenship. Democrats wanted more people with less wealth to be citizens while the oligarchs wanted fewer people with more wealth. Both sides assumed that all citizens were equal, whether there were few of them or many, and understood that being a citizen carried with it the right to take part in political life.

By contrast, Socrates rejected the traditional conception of the *polis* and 'saw the human community not as a self-governing body of citizens with equal rights but as a herd that required a shepherd or king'. Nobody was a citizen, all were

subjects. Socrates introduced a totally new conception of the state, and was outside of the normal political debates of the day. He believed that people were subjects of a state, not citizens in a state.

Stone also draws attention to the political implications of Socrates' account of knowledge. As we have seen, Socrates argues against democracy because it puts political power in the hands of people who have no knowledge, and Stone's view is that Plato rejects it for essentially the same reason. This analysis of the Socratic/Platonic argument against democracy is quite different from some recent discussions, for example that found in *Plato* by R. M. Hare. When he discusses Plato's political theory, Hare chooses to focus on the assumption that values are objective. His view is that Plato's argument 'is more secure than it looks at first sight' and cannot be rejected without rejecting widely held views on the objectivity of values. Throughout his discussion, however, Hare assumes (with Socrates and Plato) that 'only a certain section of the population are rational and informed', and that



'only some, not all, people are qualified to pronounce on questions of value'. Hare wants to avoid Plato's authoritarian conclusions without giving up Plato's assessment of the intellectual capacities of the majority of the population.

Stone rejects this assumption about people's intellectual abilities. He argues against the approach to knowledge used to justify the claim that most people do not have any. Since knowledge does not entail the requirement to produce absolute definitions, it does not follow that the citizens of Athens have no knowledge because they cannot produce them. Stone realizes that Plato's authoritarian conclusions do not follow from the objectivity of values *without* the assumption that most of the population have no knowledge. Hare gives us one way to avoid Plato's argument while Stone gives us another.

Burnyeat and others who have reviewed Stone's book insist that Stone has little patience with the 'inconclusive meanderings' of philosophy, but I think this is a misunderstanding of his position. Stone is not critical of philosophy in general, only a certain type of philosophy, the type practised by Socrates and Plato. Socrates was the first to see philosophy as the search for definitions, but Stone believes the search for such things is a wild goose chase (Chapter 6) and he approves of Hobbes because of his opposition to the Socratic approach to philosophy. To reject the search for absolute definitions is to part company with Socrates, but it does not mean parting company with all philosophy.

As I mentioned above, Stone is quite critical of Plato's approach to knowledge. He points to a passage in the *Theaetetus* in which Socrates leads Theaetetus to conclude that 'he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art' (p. 72). Stone's reply to this is that the shoemaker does in fact know something. He knows how to make shoes because he can make a pair to suit his customer's requirements. In effect his objection is that the shoemaker knows something because he can *do something successfully*. Many would not accept this as a refutation of Plato's theory of knowledge. They would introduce the distinction between knowing how and knowing that and argue that Plato is wrong here because cobblery is an instance of knowing how to do something. In this case, if one can make shoes then one has knowledge of cobblery, but the Platonic position can still be maintained for knowing that something is true.

This is not the end of the argument, however. If the distinction is rejected, and all knowledge seen as related to action, Stone's argument would stand. His rejection of Plato's theory of knowledge fits in well with the outlook of those who would argue that knowledge is a guide to action and that its correctness is proved by practice. Stone's rejection of Plato is not a rejection of all philosophy, but itself can be seen as assuming a positive position about the nature of knowledge.

Central to Stone's account of the trial of Socrates is his claim that his political philosophy was anti-democratic. Such a position is by no means original, and can be found in the book *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory* (1978) by E. M. and N. Woods. Some writers argue that Stone comes to the wrong conclusion about Socrates because he confuses the real Socrates with Plato's Socrates in the dialogues, but the evidence Stone presents is from Xenophon, not Plato. In fact some of his evidence is the same as W. K. C. Guthrie's in *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. III. Citing passages from the *Memorabilia*, Guthrie attributes to Socrates an argument against the lot and a condemnation of the popular election of officials. In his *Political Theory of Plato and Aristotle* Ernest Barker also comes to the same conclusion about Socrates that Stone does, arguing that 'the anti-democratic trend of his teaching is obvious; and it proves the Athenian democracy not to have been altogether mistaken in its dislike of Socrates'.

However, not all scholars agree with Stone. An extended criticism of Stone's position has been made by Gregory Vlastos in the journal *Political Theory*. He concedes that Socrates appeared anti-democratic to his fellow citizens but argues that he in fact prefers Athens' democratic constitution to all other existing political systems, including Sparta. Vlastos reconstructs the political philosophy of Xenophon's Socrates, shows that it is quite different from the moral/political views of Socrates in the early dialogues, and argues that the views of Plato's Socrates were (roughly) democratic. He then tries to give some reasons for thinking that Plato's Socrates is more historically accurate than Xenophon's.

It seems to me that without fully realizing it Stone has uncovered a long-standing dispute among specialists. Burnet and Heinrich Maier, as well as Barker and Guthrie, line up with Stone, while Vlastos and Julia Annas argue the other side. Stone may not be a professional classics scholar, but his conclusions about Socrates are not wild or fanciful.

Many commentators wish to argue that Stone's account of Socrates is too political, but to me this is one of its strong points. Stone is looking for the political implications of Socrates' views, while his critics claim that Socrates was *just* a philosopher and nothing else. For example in his review for *Commentary* Donald Kagan insists that Socrates was a philosopher, not a politician, and he was martyred on behalf of

the freedom to seek the truth by inquiry. However, Stone does not argue that Socrates was a politician: he tries to show that Socrates' philosophy had political implications, and these can be seen by looking at their relation to other ideas current at the time. In the *Times Literary Supplement* Jasper Griffin writes that he cannot believe that Socrates was as political as Stone makes out. He thinks Socrates was a danger not because of his attitude to democracy but because he questioned traditional moral values. Still Stone argues that the traditional values supported the democracy, so questioning the traditional values undermined it; his point is that Socrates' moral views had political implications.

Vlastos has the most sophisticated reply to Stone. He argues that Socrates has a unique moral end, perfection of the soul. This moral end has political implications, because it destroys the oligarchic distinction between the necessary people (*banausoi*), who were inferior and should be excluded from citizenship, and the worthwhile people (*kaloi kagathoi*), who should not. From this he concludes that Socrates' philosophy was democratic.

Vlastos may well be right that Socrates rejected the oligarchic distinction between the necessary people and the worthwhile people, but one of Stone's points is that Socrates rejected *both* the democratic and the oligarchic conception of the *polis*. He replaces the distinction between necessary and worthwhile people with another one, that between rulers and their subjects. If Socrates did reject the distinction Vlastos draws our attention to, that fact alone may not allow us to conclude his views were democratic.

Even a quick reading of Stone's book makes it clear that it is not a textbook in philosophy or ancient Greek history. Still it has qualities many academic books lack. It is readable, lively, passionate, and interesting. Above all, it is written by someone with real political insight in an area where political issues are frequently ignored or buried. I would recommend it to anyone with the slightest interest in ancient Greek philosophy. It may not be the last word on Socrates, but it is certainly a good start.

Ken Sievers

MOVEMENTS OF THOUGHT

Gerhard Funke, *Phenomenology: Metaphysics or Method?*, trans. David Parent, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1988, xv + 264pp, £26.55 hb, ISBN 0-8214-0719-8

History has dealt unkindly with the reputation of the acknowledged creator of the 'phenomenological movement'. Edmund Husserl died in 1938, aged 79, but the fiftieth anniversary of his death passed unnoticed. Some analytic philosophers have praised him, faintly, for his commitment to making philosophy into a 'rigorous science'; they have treated his idea of 'intuition of essences' as a brave attempt – highly commendable in a 'continental philosopher' – to replicate G. E. Moore's quest for 'simple, indefinable, unanalysable objects of thought'. Others, noticing his programme of 'bracketing off' the natural belief in the actual existence of the world, have regarded him as a born-again subjective idealist, who obstinately refused to acknowledge the real world and the achievements of modern science. It has been comfortably presumed that his attempts to explore the structures of the 'transcendental ego' were just a throwback to wishful pre-scientific superstitions.

Nor has Husserl benefitted from the popularity of those who followed him into phenomenology a generation or two later. Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty were not unwilling to be seen as having progressed beyond Husserl's old-fangled 'rationalism'. They replaced his 'transcendental' phenomenology with 'existential' and 'descriptive' varieties which promised to deal with real human beings, situated in the living world of language, emotion, the body, sexuality, poetry, politics and history. Evidently, only the dullest scholastic could want to return to a pallid Husserlian transcendental ego after that.

From this point of view, the best thing about Husserl was that at the end of his career, when he wrote *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, he became slightly less stiff and boring, and even tried to catch up with interesting questions about human history and the 'life-world'. Still, he was pictured as a bewildered old man, lingering on the platform unaware that the train had left the station long ago. And the waves of condescension which have since engulfed the 'Existential Phenomenologists' in their turn have not – or not yet – led to a review of their own judgements of Husserl.

Gerhard Funke of the University of Mainz might be classified as a Husserlian loyalist, and *Phenomenology: Metaphysics or Method?* is an excellent English version of a rich and programmatic work which, though it appeared in German in 1966, is not significantly out of date. In it, Funke attempts to dismantle the prejudicial frameworks through which Husserl is customarily approached, so as to reveal a range of strenuous reflections on history, subjectivity, truth and scientificity which have few rivals in the entire archive of Western philosophy.

Funke believes that phenomenology is not just one amongst several optional styles of philosophy. It is, rather, a distillation of the practices of rigorous thinking as such. Phenomenology focuses on the intentional bonds, or 'transcen-



dental connections', between subjective 'performances' and the various kinds of objects to which they are directed. It must sedulously resist every temptation to fashion a 'universal image of the world', for to do so would be to relapse from careful phenomenology into dogmatic metaphysics, the ruin of philosophical thought. Phenomenology aims to be a science, but it differs from all other sciences in that its results can never be recorded and stored up for future use; its only goal is 'to dissolve familiar contexts' – including complacent scientism. Phenomenology is essentially disquieting; it is not a system, but a process: 'the interminable process of the disillusionment of favoured absolutised expectations'. Phenomenology is 'consciousness of phenomena in the form of the abolition of matter-of-courseness (*Selbstverständlichkeit*),.

But if this is so then perhaps, as Funke argues, phenomenology did not stand in need of the 'historicisation' to which (as we have been repeatedly told) it was subjected by Husserl's revisionary successors. Husserlian phenomenology was always rigorously historical all the way through. For it was, or rather is, always new; and its future operations can never be anticipated. 'The phenomena treated in philosophy,' says Funke, 'are in an eminent way finitely historical phe-

nomena.' They are the occasions when 'anything whatever that was previously taken for granted *loses its matter-of-course character*'. Hence, Funke argues, the investigations of historicity and the 'life-world' in Husserl's last works are not a break with classical phenomenology; they are, on the contrary, a consistent elaboration of its recognition that 'thinking must be topical and cannot draw its examples from utopia'.

Funke also turns the tables on the idea of a 'phenomenological movement' which is supposed to have gone beyond the aridities of Husserlian 'methodology' into the lush land of 'ontology' and 'metaphysics'. His main target is, of course, Heidegger, whom he interprets (very heavy-handedly, no doubt) as attempting to construct a new, extra-historical absolute in the form of the 'existential structures of *Dasein*'. This is the dogmatic ground, according to Funke, from which Heidegger projected his career as a phenomenologist beyond Husserl's gravitational influence. Unfortunately, Heidegger failed to note that his 'existential structures' could be apprehended only in correlation with indelibly rooted, finite, historical acts of consciousness. It is as if Heidegger and his followers were trying to 'fall out of the correlation and discover something eternal ... which suddenly (one knows not how or why) no longer remains bound to the context of understanding and its powers'.

So in effect, according to Funke, Heidegger was seduced by the debilitating attractions of Rousseauism. Historicity, which Husserl had recognised as the origin of philosophical thought, was domesticated and converted into 'a strictly foreground phenomenon'. Thus Heidegger neglected 'the most important outcome' of Husserl's thought: the unflinching acknowledgment 'that truth cannot be discovered by any 'return to the mothers' of whatever kind, but that it always emerges now, today, here, when farewell is said to the things reason takes for granted'.

Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are often compared on the basis of their common concern with how people try to make sense of their world, as distinct from how that world might be in itself, from no particular point of view. But there is an institutional similarity in addition to this theoretical one: both psychoanalysis and phenomenology present themselves as 'movements', each tracing its origin to a series of works written in German by a founding father, over a period stretching from 1900 to the beginning of the Second World War; and each movement was savaged by Hitlerism and scattered forlornly round the world as a result. More than any other would-be scientific enterprises (including Marxism), phenomenology and psychoanalysis reproduce themselves by retelling tales of their past, repairing and translating the canonical texts, rearranging their pantheon of household Gods, and offering new interpretations of the spirit of their tradition in order to present their own revisions as proper developments of it. Funke's book is not, however, an attempt to return 'the phenomenological movement' to Husserlian fundamentals. It is, rather, an attack on the very idea of such loyalties and 'movements' in philosophy; especially, it is an attack on the idea of 'The Phenomenological Movement', as memorialised in Herbert Spiegelberg's monumental book of that title, which first appeared in 1959 and was substantially revised for a new edition in 1982. Contrary to Spiegelberg (and, by implication, to later commentators who have told tales about the logical progress from phenomenology, through structuralism, to deconstruction) Funke denies that fundamental thinking such as Husserl's has an objective location in a shelf of alternative kinds of philosophy between which we philosophical consumers may make our choice.

It is a profound thought. In 1938, Husserl himself wrote: 'All I claim is the right to speak according to my best lights – primarily to myself and correspondingly to others – as one who has lived through a philosophical existence in all its seriousness.' If a philosophical existence such as Husserl's has some claim on our attention, it is perhaps not as part of some general 'movement', but as a collection of finite, unique, and idiosyncratic acts of resistance to the soothing generalisations of orthodox intellectual history.

Jonathan Rée

ANNA F.

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Anna Freud: A Biography*, New York, Summit Books, 1988, 527pp, $24.95, ISBN 0-671-61696-X

Anna Freud was always reluctant to become the subject of a biography. Approached by the German author Uwe Peters, she agreed to answer factual questions, but no more. When Peters' biography appeared in 1979, she supplied its hapless author with a list of errors he had made, criticised him for 'not knowing enough' and opined that the whole enterprise had been unfortunate. She also made it clear that she hoped that no English edition would appear until after her death; her wish was granted, and *A Life Dedicated to Children* did not appear until 1985. She further confided to Muriel Gardiner that she had every intention of allowing the past to die with her. Here, she is very much her father's daughter. Freud is known to have destroyed personal papers, and looked forward to leading the biographers astray. His Antigone may have had doubts about biographers, but the past was carefully preserved, with every letter filed, as though in the hope that a faithful biographer would appear.

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl cannot be criticised for not knowing enough and her fidelity is beyond reproach. Her biography was written at the invitation of Anna Freud's literary executor, and she was granted access to a mass of unpublished papers and letters spanning a period of almost seventy years. The result is the authorized biography, and the most complete account we are likely to read. As well as providing an intimate account of an exceptional life, it also has a vital contribution to make to the general history of psychoanalysis, covering the heroic period, the diaspora of two wars and post-war reconstruction and consolidation, though this is also the period when the direct link with the founding fathers is at last broken. Young-Bruehl traces a history of institutional struggle and of personal rivalries and loyalties with admirable clarity.

Born in 1895, Anna was the youngest of the Freud children and in her own view the twin of psychoanalysis, competing with it for her father's attention. She certainly had a legitimate claim to being the daughter of psychoanalysis itself. She sat listening in on the Wednesday meetings at the age of 14, went into analysis with her father at 23, and became a training analyst at 30. Her role in the history of psychoanalysis is the stuff of legends. Sometimes seen as the 'vestal virgin' – the phrase is Marie Bonaparte's – sometimes courted as the princess whose hand in marriage would provide the keys to Freud's kingdom (the young Ernest Jones emerges in a particularly bad light here), she was of course the pioneer of child analysis, displaying constant devotion to a specialty which has always been given second-class status. Child analysis without Anna Freud is almost inconceivable. In this domain, her great rival was Melanie Klein and their differing views, explored and explained with great lucidity by the author, still provide the major clinical and theoretical orientations here.

Sometimes seen as a remote figure preoccupied with her identification with Freud, Miss Freud, as she was habitually known, proves to have been a woman with a remarkable gift for friendship, usually with women (Lou Andreas-Salomé, Marie Bonaparte, and above all Dorothy Burlingham, her tireless associate at the Hampstead Clinic), but also with older male analysts like Aichhorn. The strictly orthodox guardian of the paternal heritage also proves capable of entering into the imaginary world of children with remarkable empathy, and could quite justifiably claim that, although celibate, she had 'many, many children'. Even her social and psychoanalytic conservatism appears to have been less rigid than might be supposed: although she continued to regard homosexuality as something to be cured, she was, later in life, able to accept that homosexuals could be accepted for training analyses. It is a measure of psychoanalytic conservatism that one is so struck by this unexpected concession.

Despite the fascination of Young-Bruehl's narrative and the sophistication of her portrait of Anna F., certain doubts must arise as to her methodology and mobilization of analytic theory as an explanatory schema. The temptation is obviously difficult to avoid, if only in that Anna Freud had little or no life outside psychoanalysis; being granted membership of the Committee was, for instance, 'a very beautiful birthday present'. But it can slide into a glib mythologization, as in the claim that the departure of the sons (Adler, Stekel, Jung, Rank, Reich) left the daughters (Freud and Klein) free to fight over the father. Analysis allows the young Anna to transmute



fantasy activity into the social activity of writing. A study of sublimation is in itself an act of sublimation, and Anna pays the price by becoming an ascetic. Her later concentration on the Oedipal period and apparent lack of interest in, say, female psychology and sexuality, are held to be a reflection of an 'unresolved father complex'. In purely psychical-biographical terms, this is not unconvincing, but the claim raises some important epistemological and theoretical questions. If theoretical innovation in psychoanalysis is purely a matter of personal insight and self-analysis, its history becomes a chronicle of exceptional individuals. Ultimately, this exposes the whole of psychoanalysis to the objection that it is no more than the cumulative expression of the neuroses and unanalyzed resistance of its practitioners.

The psychoanalytic history of psychoanalysis is often

written in terms of a bizarre family romance, and such histories almost inevitably involve loyalties on the part of the author. Young-Bruehl is no exception; Klein's 'depressive position' is deemed 'quite un-Freudian', presumably because Anna Freud did not accept the notion. Righteous psychoanalysis is, then, defined in terms of absolute loyalty to father and daughter. One begins to wonder just whose family romance is at stake here. One is also sometimes reminded of those Marxist histories of Marxism which are constructed so as to justify the correctness of a contemporary line. This can lead to a rather odd picture of the development of psychoanalysis as a whole; Lacan is conspicuous by his absence, largely, one suspects, because Anna Freud 'took a dislike to him' in 1936, the year of the mirror phase paper. More significantly, the rather dubious manoeuvrings of Anna's friend and ally Bonaparte, and the role she played in the schism within French psychoanalysis, are passed over in silence. Whilst Lacan is obviously of no great importance to the biographer of Anna Freud, Bonaparte is not a minor figure in this narrative, and it would appear that loyalty to her and Anna Freud outweighs broader historical considerations.

Methodological doubts aside, this is also a most moving account of a life which was not without its tragedies. In some ways, it is the personal detail that stays with the reader. Four of Anna's aunts died in the concentration camps. They had been left behind in Vienna in the naive belief that four elderly women with no interest in psychoanalysis would not be harmed. Anna Freud's comment is chillingly laconic and to the point: 'The Nazis wanted their appartments.' After Burlingham's death, Anna consoles herself by wearing Dorothy's sweaters, stroking a last memento of a friend she had never been seen to touch. The last, haunting image comes from 1982, the year of Anna Freud's death: a shrunken old lady sits by the pond on Hampstead Heath wrapped in her father's winter coat, which she had carefully preserved since his death in 1939. It is a difficult image to forget.

David Macey

NATURAL RIGHTS

Tom Regan, *Animal Rights*, London, Routledge, 1988, xv + 400pp, £7.95 pb, ISBN 0-415-00760-7

Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, trans. and edited by David Rothenberg, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, xiii + 212pp, £25 hb, ISBN 0-521-34406-9

Just about everyone is concerned about the environment nowadays, but different people are concerned about different bits of it. Tom Regan first published his book in 1984 in an attempt to give the struggle for animal rights a secure philosophical basis. Many have agreed that he manages to do so, but at the cost of reducing the number of animals to whom we can ascribe rights to a minimum. His basic strategy is to use the kinds of arguments which have been advanced to secure rights for humans, regardless of colour, religion etc., and to extend them to the realm of animals. The strategy depends on showing how some animals are sufficiently like human beings to make it inconsistent to argue for human rights and yet to disallow the same rights for animals. Clearly only some kinds of animals are even remotely like human beings, and so his strategy will, *prima facie*, condemn large swathes of the animal kingdom to rightlessness. The animals which are rescued are those which have 'perception, memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness, intention [and] a sense of the future', and Regan remarks that 'these are the leading attributes of the mental life of normal mammalian animals aged one or more'. The possession of rights is thus restricted principally to mammals, and while this might satisfy the professional philosopher it is of limited use to the wider animal rights movement, and of even less value to those who (in these environmentally-conscious days) want to develop an ethic for the environment as a whole. In an aside on environmental ethics Regan remarks that the challenges of producing a rights-based environmental ethic have not been successfully confronted. He argues that the difficulties are formidable because of the problem of 'reconciling the individualistic nature of moral rights with the more holistic view of nature emphasized by many of the leading environmental thinkers'. This is true, but he compounds the problem by making it a requirement of rights-bearers that they have something like the mental life of human beings. In effect his monumental work shows us that traditional rights discourse can only be applied to a small proportion of the non-human world, and this is where the Norwegian Arne Naess comes in.

In 1972 Naess gave a lecture in Bucharest in which he drew a distinction between 'shallow' and 'deep' ecology, with the former amounting to a concern for the environment for the sake of human beings, and the latter being a concern for the environment (very widely understood) for its own sake. He held then, and holds now, that only a deep ecological perspective will provide for a sustainable life for human



beings on the planet, because shallow ecology merely reproduces the sin (not too strong a word) which has got us into the mess in the first place: that of regarding the environment as having value only in so far as it is of use to us as human beings. In the deep ecological camp this has led to much spilling of ink in the attempt to develop exactly that which Regan says is so problematic – an ethic for the environment, including not just non-mammalian animals, but trees, rivers and stones as well. Some deep ecologists have tried to extend the traditional rights discourse used by Regan into this new territory and have come up against the problems he outlines, such as that of demonstrating the intrinsic value of the non-human environment. Others, and Naess is among them, have substantially abandoned this strategy in favour of what might be called a 'change of consciousness' approach. This involves demanding that people experience the world in a different way, so that the question of how much interference in it is legitimate is asked at a lower level of intensity, as it were. The Australian philosopher, Warwick Fox, who is such an ardent exponent of this strategy that he disqualifies intrinsic value theorists from the deep ecological camp altogether, puts it this way: 'When asked why he does not plough the ground, the Nez Pearce Indian Smohalla does not reply with a closely-reasoned explanation as to why the ground has intrinsic value but rather with a rhetorical question expressive of a deep identification with the earth: "Shall I take a knife and tear my mother's breast?"'. In essence the 'change of consciousness' deep ecologists want us all to begin thinking like Smohalla. As Naess himself writes: 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world.... If deep ecology is deep it must relate to our fundamental beliefs, not just to ethics. Ethics follow from how we experience the world.' Naess seeks to develop a 'new ontology' which owes much to Spinoza and which 'posits humanity as inseparable from nature'. If we could internalize this, then our dealings with the non-human natural world would necessarily be more benign. There is some standard philosophical discourse here, but as Naess says, getting to grips with this new ontology is primarily an intuitive affair, like having a series of 'a-ha!



experiences'. The problem with this is that the kinds of experiences which Naess has had, and which have left him living in a hut on a mountain in Norway developing his Ecosophy, are not available to many of us – a week in a hut on Norway's highest mountain at the age of 15 with a wizened violin player, or ski-ing at night under a full moon at -20 degrees centigrade. Less flippantly, what experiences are necessary for conversion? An answer might turn on a prior question, which few deep ecologists have confronted: if ethics do follow from how we experience the world, then what makes us experience the world in such and such a way? This might be more a political question than a philosophical one, and I do not think that deep ecology will make its mark as fully as it might until it becomes as much a social philosophy as it is already a metaphysical one. Naess's book provides the most up-to-date full-length version of the deep ecological project in its 'change of consciousness' guise and Cambridge University Press is to be commended for having made it available over here. Together with Regan's *Animal Rights* it bears out Naess's belief that 'the ecopolitical frontier is immensely long' – the frontier is so long, in fact, that there is now room for fratricidal skirmishes over tactics and objectives behind it.

Andy Dobson

PLATO'S FORMS

Charles L. Griswold (ed.), *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings*, London and New York, Routledge, 1988, 321pp, £25 hb, £11.95 pb, ISBN 0-415-00186-2 hb, 0-415-00187-0 pb.

Plato and Kant together are often taken to stand for that rational ideal of philosophy which has been so thoroughly demolished or deconstructed in recent years. But the world of Platonic scholarship has also read Gadamer, not to mention Rorty and Derrida. This collection of essays is an attempt at rereading Plato in the light of modern concerns.

The first part of the book is a series of linked essays; the second is a series of 'dialogues' on recent important books about Plato's philosophy. Each part is sub-divided into a section of 'Readings' and a section of 'Writings'. Each of these sections begins with pieces that address particular texts and moves towards more general issues of wider scope. Each piece (with two qualified exceptions) was written specially for this volume. The editor and contributors have worked together well to carry through so careful and detailed a plan.

It is generally accepted that the distinctive feature of Plato's writing is its dialogue form. One question is why Plato wrote *dialogues*; the other is why Plato *wrote* dialogues. Because he wrote in dialogue form, Plato never speaks, so we do not really know what answers he gave to any question. We can draw conclusions about what he thought important, and about the terms in which he thought; but that is all. This formal point is reinforced by the way in which themes change and develop in his writing. The dialogues are consistent, in their way, but there are no complete, systematic or finished theories.

The claim that Plato wrote dialogues is more complicated than it might seem. The platonic letters are not in dialogue form. But most of these are recognized as forgeries (if that term, with its very specific legal and ideological meanings, can be applied to the Ancient World). But one of them, the Seventh, is often accepted as genuine, and Robert Brumbaugh's 'Digression and Dialogue: The *Seventh Letter* and Plato's Literary Form', relates philosophical and literary questions to these 'purely factual' matters.



Another qualification is that some of Plato's dialogues, especially the later ones, are more like disguised treatises than real conversations or debates. Several essays are germane to this point. For example, Kenneth Sayre's 'Plato's Dialogues in the light of the *Seventh Letter*' argues that Plato's aim in the dialogues is to kindle illumination in the reader, rather than to set out truths as does a treatise.

Many of the essays discuss Plato's own criticisms of writing as a medium. The real dialogue, for Plato, is not the one written in the text; it involves the living soul of the student. Jurgen Mittelstrass's 'On Socratic Dialogue' is one of several essays which discuss the idea that the dialogues are essentially concerned with *showing* something, rather than *saying* it. This missionary call to the life of philosophy is carefully examined. Charles Griswold's own contribution 'Plato's Metaphilosophy: Why Plato Wrote Dialogues' compares Plato to Kant and Hegel, showing Hegel's great concern with those who cannot respond to an appeal to reason because they are not (yet) philosophers.

Philosophy for Plato was the effort of a human being to become like a god. This religious dimension to his thought is difficult for modern philosophy to face up to. Jean François Mattei's 'The Theatre of Myth in Plato' does discuss the myths and take them seriously. But he discusses them as part of Plato's technique, rather than his philosophy. This dimension reappears in the second part when John Moline debates the place of the theory of recollection as described in Kenneth Sayre's *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved.*

There is also a question about how we should read the dialogues. In 'Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play' Rosemary Desjardins suggests that interpretation was one of Plato's central concerns and in 'On Interpreting Plato', Alan Bowen discusses Tigerstedt's history of platonic interpretation. Issues of interpretative method also appear in the second part. The question how far a requirement of consistency between the dialogues should guide interpretation appears more than once. It is part of Clifford Orwin's discussion of Richard Kraut's *Socrates and the State*, and also bears on David Roochnik's assessment of Terence Irwin's thesis in *Plato's Moral Theory* about the 'craft analogy' and his resolution of the well-known puzzle that in the *Protagoras* 'Socrates' appears to accept hedonism.

For the contributors to this book, the natural assumption is that we read the dialogues as Plato himself intended them to be read. So Diskin Clay's 'Reading the *Republic*' analyses the *Republic* in terms of the challenge of the text to the reader and so explains both why Plato wrote that dialogue and how we should read it. Richard McKim's exploration of Plato's handling of the weapons both of logic and psychology in 'Shame and Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*' equally answers both questions. But in the second part, Nicholas White's epistemological response to Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Dialogue and Dialectic* brings this natural assumption into question.

Plato's methods are inextricably bound up with the answers he proffers. Thus the relation between drama and philosophy bears on the question of whether Plato accepted personal and individual immortality in the *Phaedo*, which is debated in the second part by Joachim Dalfen and Kenneth Dorter. The literary, the philosophical and the historical all play a part in Ronald Polansky's assessment of Paul

Woodruff's book on the dubiously authentic *Hippias Major*, in which the question of Plato's development of the theory of Forms is an important issue.

There are many themes and ideas that are pursued throughout the book. But there are important differences between the two parts. In the first, the essays are more closely related and a reasonably clear line of development appears. The new approach to Plato is the starting-point for a fresh exploration of the familiar texts. These essays throw fresh light on the texts and raise many new and interesting questions about them.

In the second part, the critical assessments of each book are replied to by the author. All sides seem to accept that the relation between the literary or dramatic aspects of the texts and the philosophy is important, but there is less agreement about what can be learnt from it. The collection of books is rather disparate and no issue is pursued very far. What are billed as dialogues are too much like salvoes from defended positions.

The book as a whole makes little attempt to address directly the views of Plato which are a standard reference-point in the texts of modern philosophy. Nonetheless, some consensus emerges; Plato is an acutely self-conscious and careful philosopher; his texts do not give final answers, but have a wider aim; his writing is meant as an exploration or a stage on a journey. Indeed, there is a danger of forgetting that Plato remains inescapably platonic in his belief that there is a terminus to our discoveries, though whether that is an end to philosophy is less clear.

Many of the contributors write as if their work were a break with the recent past. But those who represent orthodox scholarship do not accept that the new approach involves any drastic change of method. It turns out that, for the most part, specialist discussion of Plato can adjust to modern philosophy without radical revisions. Perhaps the scholars have missed the point; or perhaps modern philosophy is less revolutionary than we thought.

Claude Pehrson



MORAL DIMENSIONS

Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics*, New York, Free Press, 1988, 257pp., $24.95.

Etzioni's book is a substantial critique of neo-classical economics, written with a sharp eye to its influence in Reagan's America. Etzioni is a leading American social scientist, and he sets out in this work to show that the individualist rationalism of neo-classical economics is only one among many co-existing modes of human action, rather than the fundamental building block of human society. Etzioni's work is the latest in a long tradition of major sociological critiques of economic individualism, which one can trace through Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and indeed Etzioni's own earlier work on the sociology of complex organisations. It was there that he first outlined a scheme of concepts of coercive, utilitarian and normative motivation and compliance that remains basic to his current argument with rational individualism.

The first part of the book distinguishes between utilitarian motives based on pleasure-seeking, and altruistic or morally-based motives. Etzioni sets out a case for 'deontological social science', incorporating ideas of moral obligation and bondedness, and cites a variety of published evidence for the large role of such motivations in social life.

The second part is a critique of rationalistic explanations of social and economic behaviour, emphasising the role of normative-affective factors. He argues that rationalistic models typically exaggerate the rational capacities of actors, underestimate the effort demanded by rational processes (in search or transaction costs, e.g.), and ignore the degree to which actors rely not on instrumental calculation but on shared or internalised moral rules in making everyday decisions.

Part 3 ('Beyond Radical Individualism: The Role of Community and Power') provides the most substantial sociological argument of the book. Etzioni argues that rationality depends more on supportive social structures than on individuals conceived as free of social constraints. Rationality and individuality are emergent properties of historical societies and cultures, not an innate human condition. Rational decision-making is often enhanced rather than diminished by organised collectivities. This is because organisations can filter out the irrational impulses of their members, gather and retain more relevant information than individuals in isolation, and institute productive divisions of labour and attention. Anyone who has been helped to think by a good seminar will understand what Etzioni means. Even competition – a state of 'contained conflict' – depends, he says, on social structure and a framework of rules for its sustained viability. In practice, Etzioni demonstrates, competition between equals is a somewhat rare phenomenon in capitalism since political power is widely used by collective economic actors to enforce their advantages (via regulatory, tariff, or tax policies for example) in so-called free markets.

Etzioni argues for forms of understanding which take account of multiple dimensions of action, in contrast to the one-dimensional, deductive simplicities of economic theory. He stresses that he is not against markets or rational individualism, but wishes to see these as one option to be balanced against others in a more inclusive framework.

This book provides a heavyweight counter-attack to the current hegemony of the neo-liberals, stressing the social and altruistic principles almost absent from neo-classical models. It argues for an alternative mode of explanation – the 'I-we paradigm' or 'socio-economics' – not for specific prescrip-

tions or programmes, though it tends to support ethically-grounded limits to private economic power. Like the functionalist sociological critique of economic individualism of the post-war years, it provides implicit support to ideas of morally-principled interventionism, more than welcome at this time.

The Moral Dimension is a substantial work, though it has some of the drawbacks as well as the strengths of a work of academic synthesis. Critics of neo-classical economics who work from inside the tradition – like Hirschman or Sen on whose work Etzioni draws – are able to use the precision of the theoretical tools of economics against its dominant grain, where multi-disciplinary criticism finds it harder to achieve such elegance. Etzioni understands that one-dimensional analytical models are seductive (if misleading) to social scientists, because of their apparent power to solve problems by deductive reasoning alone – this has been the intellectual appeal of the neo-classical paradigm applied to each and every social phenomenon. But it is one thing to point out this



error, and another to establish in its place a more inclusive and multi-dimensional method of explanation. Etzioni succeeds in setting out his new paradigm in rigorous terms, but unfortunately he does not here set out the problem-solving programme that will be needed if the paradigm is to gain ground. The idea of a synthetic new paradigm which could supplant the neo-classical supremacy may not be entirely consistent with the looser multi-disciplinary pragmatism of the field of policy research, in which Etzioni holds an important position.

As Albert Hirschman has pointed out, individualist and collectivist ideas each have their temporary phases of dominance. The time is now certainly ripe for a resurgence of more social modes of thinking. To this project, Etzioni's book should be essential reading, whether for sociologists, for dissidents among the economists, or for philosophers interested to see what happens when one tries to build morality into a model of economic life.

Michael Rustin

INSIDE YOUR SKIN

Didier Anzieu, *The Skin Ego: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Self*, trans. Chris Turner, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1989, 246pp, £25 hb, ISBN 0-300-03747-3

Didier Anzieu, Vice-President of the Psychoanalytic Association of France and an Emeritus professor of clinical psychology, is probably best known for his huge *Freud's Self-Analysis*, which appeared in translation in 1986. The present volume draws on original research, and attempts to make a new contribution to the psychoanalytic understanding of the self in both clinical and theoretical terms.

For Anzieu, the skin is a basic datum and the most vital of the sense organs, providing the essential bodily support for a psychical function which transposes its workings on to the mental plane. The skin ego can be defined as a mental image which the child uses in order to represent itself as an ego containing psychical contents. It provides both a narcissistic envelope and a guaranteed and continuous sense of well-being, and is in that sense the heir to the holding environment described by Winnicott. Whilst acting as a shield against stimulation, the skin ego also supplies a basis for individuation (the me/non-me distinction). It provides a surface which can link up various kinds of sensation, support sexual excitation, allow the libidinal recharging of the psychical mechanism, and register sense impressions. Many of the most important insights made in post-Freudian psychoanalysis are mobilized in Anzieu's exploration of the construction of the self: Klein's internalization (somewhat oddly rendered as 'interiorization' by the otherwise accurate and readable translation), Winnicott's holding, Bion's dialectic between container and content, Kohut's view that the self is formed by a process of mirroring and fusion, Bettelheim's work on symbolic wounds and even Bowlby's attachment drive. This does not lead to eclecticism but signals, rather, a real ability to make critical and non-dogmatic use of whole sectors of the psychoanalytic tradition. Strangely, there is little mention of Lacan, even though Anzieu did participate in the early seminars. Winnicott's version of the mirror stage (in which the mother's face provides the child with its first mirror) is privileged over Lacan's version, and the latter's claim that the ego is structured like a Möbius strip is held to be applicable only to borderline cases. This may be an expression of the new openness which characterizes so much post-Lacanian psychoanalytic writing in France. If so, it augurs well for the future.

One of the text's most attractive features is its ability to deal with body in physical terms. Smell, touch, sound, and pain all become objects of investigation. Speech and hearing are related back to their physiological supports – and to the affective dimension that implies – rather than to abstract mathemes and topologies. Anzieu's reading of the myth of Marsyas, the satyr flayed by the god Apollo, is an eloquent demonstration of how important the body (and physical pain) should be to psychoanalysis.

Although the notion of a skin ego is novel, Anzieu succeeds in grounding it in Freud's veiled comments on internal differentiation and containment in the 1895 'Project for a Scientific Psychology', in the thesis, advanced in 'The Ego and the Id', that the ego is both an 'envelope' and a projection of a surface, and on the 'inscription' themes of the notes on the 'mystic writing pad'. His loyalty to the Freudian tradition is beyond question, especially in his discussion of the prohibi-

tion on touching in the analytic session. On the other hand, Anzieu is highly critical of the 'endless quasi-talmudic commentaries' which characterized so much of the return to Freud, and appeals to the alternative tradition of relying upon the creative imagination to renew, and if necessary, challenge the classic tradition. He accepts that his skin ego is basically a metaphor, and that it requires further conceptualization. But, even as it stands, it is a powerful and impressive metaphor.

In grounding his metaphor so firmly in Freud, Anzieu does, perhaps, raise one unresolved problem. The title refers to a skin ego; the subtitle (which does not appear in the French edition) to an approach to the self. The French term *moi* tends to be broader than the English *ego*, and often has definitely philosophical connotations. In other words, it easily lends itself to the claim that psychoanalysis contains within it an entire philosophy of human subjectivity. Even Freud himself is not always clear as to the precise meaning of 'ego': is it an internal agency of the personality, or is it synonymous with the personality as such? Fertile as it may be, the skin-ego metaphor does not dispel this ambiguity.

One of the *Skin Ego*'s most appealing characteristics is the author's ability to draw on a vast range of source and illustrative material, from case histories, ethology, literature, mythology, the gospels.... Reading Anzieu, one has a refreshing and exciting confirmation that psychoanalysis is still a creative mode of thought and practice and not merely a compulsive repetition-reproduction of Freud or a dogmatic defence of existing concepts. He has the skill and the courage to engage in a fruitful dialogue with a wide range of discourses, from dermatology to Thom's catastrophe theory, without lapsing into eclecticism or speculative banalities. The text can at times be highly technical and rather dense, but it makes for exciting and stimulating reading.

David Macey

MONEY, MONEY, MONEY

Constantine George Caffentzis, *Clipped Coins, Abused Words, & Civil Government: John Locke's Philosophy of Money*, New York, Autonomedia, 1989, 246pp., $26.95 hb, $10.95 pb.

One of the more grisly sights of the late seventeenth century, the era of peace, freedom and toleration ushered in by the Glorious Revolution, was the behaviour of Isaac Newton as Warden of the Mint. The retiring Cambridge scholar, prised from his solitary study to serve a grateful nation in an amiable sinecure, became an avenging fury. Coiners and clippers innocently pursuing their age-old occupations did not know what had hit them, as the new Warden assembled a network of agents and informers, ferreted out their misdeeds and delivered them pitilessly to the gallows.

Recent biographers have amply rehearsed the factors in Newton's psyche that led to his relentless pursuit of the wrong-doing and punishment of others. But how did an offence that seems to us barely more reprehensible than forging a TV licence come to assume such monstrous and unforgiveable proportions? What does this tell us about the stability and beliefs of a society in which clipping or falsifying the coinage

is treasonable activity? Caffentzis's book supplies a fascinating and plausible account which makes good sense of the depth of offence committed by coiners and clippers, seen in the light of the views of John Locke.

The coinage was certainly in a bad way by the 1690s. Clipping had reduced coins to just over half of their legal weight, and nearly a fifth of the coins in circulation were counterfeits. The state of the currency threatened the stability of the Whig settlement. But what to do about it? Treasury Secretary William Lowndes argued that the effective devaluation of the currency be accepted, and coins be reminted to the same face value, but containing appropriately less silver. Locke was appalled by this proposal; in *Some considerations of the consequences of lowering the interest and raising the value of money* and *Further considerations concerning raising the value of money* he argued that this would be to validate criminal acts and hence would undermine civil government. Clipping is, furthermore, a philosophical or an epistemological crime, for it robs people of knowledge and introduces an ever-deepening obscurity into our ideas. And the integrity of the contract inherent in coinage is essential to the continued existence of the state: money is, for Locke, the generating cause of the social contract; to undermine the regulation of money is literally to degenerate the state. Thus, much hung on retaining the value of the coinage, even at the expense of creating short-term economic ills.

Caffentzis pursues Locke's views vigorously through *Two Treatises on Government* and *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, as well as dropping valuable hints about cultural interconnections of philosophy, science and money. For example, he notes more pointedly than others have done that aspects of the world-views of Locke and Newton, characterised in part by determinism, the gold standard and the belief that words signify ideas, travelled together before disintegrating together in the first half of this century. So this book is, besides a detailed treatment of some views of Locke (at times remarkably detailed: readers should not miss the cogent discussion of Locke's views on the importance of regular defecation), a fascinating contribution to cultural history. In its conception as a philosophical history of money, it complements the discussion of paper money in Brian Rotman's *Signifying Nothing* (reviewed in RP 49), and shares a similar admirable trans-disciplinary perspective. The writing of this book was done while the author was at the University of Calabar in Nigeria, which must be a good place for empathising with Locke's concerns, whilst keeping the right distanced perception of them.

John Fauvel

THE RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVITY

Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences*, London, M.I.T. Press, 1988, 190pp, £17.95 hb, ISBN 0-262-15034-4

In 1902, towards the end of one of the most celebrated illnesses in intellectual history, Max Weber sent his wife a letter from Florence, in which he wrote: 'I have just finished Rickert ... he is *very good*.' Anyone who has confronted Rickert's ponderous and convoluted works will read this either as a sign of complete recovery or as the ultimate symptom. But they will conclude, too, that the duty of any contemporary commentator is (a) to tell us why Rickert is significant and hence worth reading, and (b) to do so by making him accessible to an audience which extends beyond the rather narrow circle of 'Weber Research'. Unfortunately, Guy Oakes's new book does neither.

Ostensibly, its central concern is what Oakes calls 'the fundamental issue of Weber's methodology', namely the problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences. For Weber all scientific inquiry depends upon the overcoming of the alleged irrationality of the real. The manner in which this irrationality is overcome is the manner in which an object domain is constituted. 'Nature' is reality related to laws, 'culture' is reality related to values. Oakes thinks that because Weber insisted that value conflict was inevitable and that 'the light that illuminates the great cultural problems shifts', his work is haunted by the absence of objective criteria of value-relevance. Moreover, he claims that Weber always evades this problem, and for a solution he refers the reader to Rickert.

This is Oakes's justification for devoting two thirds of the book to a quite separate discussion of Rickert's account of the nature of historical knowledge and of value-relevance. This culminates in the assertion that, ultimately, Rickert acknowledges that he requires objectively valid criteria of historical selectivity but fails to provide any. Choice between value-relevances remains dependent upon the evaluative standpoint of the historian. Therefore Rickert is no help in solving Weber's problem.

The difficulty here is that for Weber, the problem of objectivity as Oakes states it didn't exist. Oakes fails to note that Rickert's attempted solution of the problem of objectivity was a response to Nietzsche's perspectivism, stated famously in *The Genealogy of Morals*: 'the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", be.' Weber understood the objectivity of social science – and many other things – in a Nietzschean sense. The historian's point of view does not undermine objectivity, it contributes to it. Oakes's account, however, treats objectivity as a philosophical 'problem' confronting each individual historian on each occasion of inquiry, when for Weber it is the concrete achievement of a scientific community. Weber's essay, 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', which marked his assumption of the editorship of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, is, among other things, a policy statement whose central tenet is that 'a peculiar characteristic' of the journal is that 'political antagonists can meet in it to carry on scientific work'. Those who cannot face this type of work are 'free not to participate'.

The 'objectivity problem' really serves Oakes as a pretext



for a display of his knowledge of Rickert. The discussion is highly competent, but Weber is mentioned only five times in 104 pages. It is also written in a turgid and repetitive style which appears to be modelled on Rickert. The profusion of 'Considers', 'Supposes' and 'Thus's' at the beginning of sentences reminds one of the overlong introductions to his translations of the works of Weber, Rickert, and Simmel. Even for those who 'consider' neo-Kantianism the most exciting period in the history of German philosophy, this book will be a literary disappointment. And the more general philosophical reader in search of plain intellectual pleasure had better look elsewhere.

Charlie Turner

NEW VALUES

David Detmer, *Freedom As A Value. A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre*, La Salle, Illinois, Open court, 1988, v + 262pp, £12.95 pb, ISBN 8126 9083 4.

The aim of this study is twofold: firstly, to provide a critical exposition of Sartre's work in terms of an ethical theory, and secondly, to explain and defend the central thesis running through Sartre's writings – that freedom is the highest value. The book succeeds in bringing together in a lucid manner the different and conflicting strands of Sartre's ethical thought (namely his subjectivism and his objectivism) and providing a coherent picture of Sartre's ethics. Detmer defends Sartre's philosophy of freedom against a number of frequently made criticisms – that it does not recognise the limitations to the achievement of autonomous and creative action, that his later thought is inconsistent with his earlier existentialist position, and that there is a fundamental incompatibility between Sartre's existentialism and his Marxism. Concerning the latter, Detmer suggests that Sartre's turn to Marxism is not adequately or appropriately construed in terms of a 'radical conversion'; rather, the adoption of a Marxist perspective represents a continuation of the major concerns of his early philosophy of freedom. Dialectical materialism provided Sartre with a much-needed realism in recognising the material constraints placed on human praxis and a recognition that freedom is not so much an ontological and individualistic value as a practical and social one. The emphasis in Sartre's work shifts from a preoccupation with 'desire' and the *invention* of values to a concern with 'need' and the recognition and *discovery* of values. In other words, an ethic of play is only possible in the context of the satisfaction of human needs. The implications of Sartre's adoption of such a viewpoint for understanding the shift in his politics is clear. Sartre's thought shifted from placing responsibility for creative action on individual conversion to placing it on an act of social revolution. I found this emphasis on the continuity of Sartre's ethical concerns particularly refreshing. His argument that the myth of Sartre's radical conversion rests on the incorrect assumption that *Being and Nothingness* is intended as a complete description of an inescapable human condition, rather than as an incomplete description of those features of the human condition in need of radical alteration, is a pertinent one.

The weaknesses of this study stem from the lack of any discussion of Sartre's philosophy of freedom in the context of some of the debates in moral and political theory that have taken place in recent years. I would argue that Sartre was one of the most important thinkers in the twentieth century to have accepted Nietzsche's challenge that we revalue the fundamental values of humanity and, out of a dialectical appropriation, create new ones. Yet nowhere in this study is the precursor of Sartre's philosophy of freedom (understood as a philosophy of values) mentioned. Both Kantian constructivism (Rawls) and Nietzschean creativism (Foucault) are crucial to current debates in moral and political theory, and a study of this kind could have made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of how Sartre's thinking on ethics fits into these debates (e.g. MacIntyre's critique of the vacuity of our modern emotivist moral culture, including Sartrean heroism). It would also have been interesting to know where Detmer thinks Sartre's Marxism, his recognition of the priority of need over desire, differs markedly from Rawls's philosophical defence of some form of welfare liberal democracy as the best way of achieving a community in which the satisfaction of human needs and the space for creative human activity exist side by side. If it had taken these issues into account, this study would constitute an even more valuable contribution to our understanding of Sartre.

Keith Ansell-Pearson

NEW TERRITORIES

Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, London, Routledge, 1989, xiii + 196pp, £8.95 pb, ISBN 0 415 024439.

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are unusual in their long-standing collaboration and for the originality and contention of their work. This is essentially a book about their interaction, but both are prominent in their own right. Guattari, working in the Lacanian tradition of psychoanalysis, has been associated with Laing and Cooper and is perhaps a little more well known than Deleuze, whose Nietzschean poststructuralism has constrained his popular appeal. But neither of these writers has received the attention he deserves, and Bogue's text is the first full length exposition of their work in English. It considers their joint works, *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* in accessible detail, and discusses a number of Deleuze's major works, including *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. Bogue does not pretend to be exhaustive: this is a study of texts chosen for their ability to reveal the overall direction and meaning of their authors' ideas, and Bogue succeeds in presenting a unified body of thought whilst at the same time maintaining the diversity and breadth of Deleuze and Guattari's concerns, which extend between Marxism, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and aesthetics.

Bogue is careful not to overemphasise Deleuze's role in the partnership, pointing out that Guattari's engagement with debates over political organisation and the nature of group collaborations, particularly as they surfaced in 1968, was vital to the development of *Anti-Oedipus*. Guattari's attempts to realign Freudianism and Marxism, bringing some notion of desire to Marx and placing Freud's unconscious in a social context, were as important to this and their other texts as Deleuze's philosophical publications. The Nietzschean philosophy of becoming which dominates their thought emerges in Bogue's clear exposition of the philosophical context in which Deleuze and Guattari write, a project facilitated by

their explicit critical relation not only to Nietzsche but also Kant, Hegel, and Freud. The relation of their work to that of Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida is discussed in equally accessible terms.

Many recent French philosophers have been well served by the Anglo-American interest in poststructuralism and postmodernism: Foucault and Baudrillard, for example, have been made relatively accessible by numerous publications and commentaries which have promoted them at the expense of others in their genre. This has often meant that they are given responsibility for many of the ideas which Deleuze or Guattari might be better placed to defend. This is particularly true of the issues surrounding the dissolution of the subject, to which the Deleuzian 'desiring machine' and 'body without organs' bring a colour and intensity lacking in Foucault's work; Bogue's work goes some way to redress this balance.

One of the most interesting aspects of this book is its concern with literary criticism. This is approached through a study of the relevance of Deleuze and Guattari to the concerns of contemporary literary theory as well as studies of their readings of Proust, Kafka, and Sacher-Masoch. Although this emphasis precludes an equal concentration on the issues of political theory and criticism, Bogue succeeds in emphasising the literary debate whilst at the same time presenting a general overview and careful introduction to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Bogue is clearly sympathetic to his subjects, and this is not a critical text; there is little discussion of, for example, the problems of foundation and meaning which underlie all poststructuralist writing. But debates about Deleuze, Guattari, and the genre in which they write will undoubtedly be encouraged and informed by this text, whose publication fills a gap that was becoming increasingly obvious with the development of interest in the implications of poststructuralist writing for literary, cultural, and social critique.

Sadie Plant

NOTES AND THEORIES

Maurice A. Finocchiaro, *Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, xi + 313pp, £30 hb, ISBN 0 521 36096 X.

There is a great deal of current interest in the work of Antonio Gramsci. His writings on hegemony are assuming an increasing importance for debates about the future of Marxist analysis and revolutionary politics, and his life of political activity continues to inspire. This interest is nevertheless accompanied by a good deal of confusion and disagreement: every area of the left reads a different Gramsci and draws different conclusions from his work. Some of these difficulties are due to the discontinuity of the writing in the *Prison Notebooks*, and the appearance of the first critical edition of the text in 1975 provided an unprecedented opportunity for their detailed study. Finocchiaro considers the *Prison Notebooks* invaluable to the understanding of Marxism, and his book is the scholarly product of careful thought and polished writing. It presents a detailed exposition, criticism, and evaluation of the *Prison Notebooks* and those thinkers – Croce, Hegel, Bukharin, and Machiavelli – whose influence is paramount throughout them.

Finocchiaro seeks to understand a world view which, in his subject's own words, 'has never been systematically expounded by its founder". Submerging himself in the notes, references, and allusions of the *Prison Notebooks*, Finocchiaro surfaces with a fascinating and authoritative interpretation of the dialectical nature of Gramsci's writing. This is primarily a work of hermeneutics, in its broadest sense; concerned with the elucidation of Gramsci's own concepts and meanings. Finocchiaro continually reports on the methods and intentions with which he develops a dialectical textual analysis and studies Gramsci's own participation in this project. Finocchiaro alternates chapters analysing the *Prison Notebooks* with expositions of its influences, and the book is carefully paced to allow gradual involvement with the complexities of its textual studies.

The text moves between defence, criticism, and what Finocchiaro optimistically describes as neutral evaluation of Gramsci's work. One of the major concerns which emerges in this process lies with the discrepancies between a writer's practice and theory: the gaps between what writers do and what they say they are doing. For this reason the 'self-image' adopted by all those considered in the text is emphasised. The self-images of Croce, seeing his work as anti-Marxist, and

Bukharin, perceiving himself as a positivist, are measured against their actual procedures, and Finocchiaro applies this critical method to Gramsci's Marxism. He shows, for example, how Gramsci's characterisation of a Marxist hegemony in terms of the broad philosophical legitimacy of a religion is influenced by Croce's definition of religion as an ethical world view. Similarly, he reveals the influence of Bukharin's positivism on the *Prison Notebooks*, and uses such illustrations to subject Gramsci's dialectical method to the same scrutiny. Finocchiaro argues for a distinction between Gramsci's theoretical perception of dialectic as the historical process of synthesis and antithesis, and its practice in his work, where it appears as an apolitical means to objectivity and a way of discerning underlying patterns and structures of thought.

This is a book about dialectical thought which aims to use its own dialectical procedures to transcend the divorce between theory and practice it discerns in Gramsci. Finocchiaro claims that the text is both for and against its main concerns, including Marxism, science, politics, dialectic and, of course, Gramsci's development of these areas, and this is largely legitimate. Although the book sometimes appears to promote Gramsci's influences at his expense, this may well be due to the unusually high quality of Finocchiaro's investigation into the foundations of his subject's work. His respect for Gramsci and the *Prison Notebooks* is clear, and the text is an accomplished addition to the literature.

Sadie Plant

BIOSOPHY

S. A. Barnett, *Biology and Freedom: An essay on the implications of human ethology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 376pp, £32.50 hb, ISBN 0 521 35316 5.

Barnett brings a welcome perspective to the debates over the acceptability of ethology and its derivatives. He is a scientist who fully recognizes and incorporates the prescriptive nature of scientific inquiry into his analysis. He is particularly concerned about the verdict most biological accounts of human nature reach: that we are inherently violent, selfish and greedy. Barnett argues that these conclusions are simply moral judgments passed on humanity rather than the results of a proper scientific method. Armed with these assumptions, he proceeds to debunk such characterizations of human nature, tracing their development from ancient pessimism, exemplified in Plato, to Nietzsche and the modern tradition. All these accounts, he contends, advocate an essentially static conception of humanity, in which people are naturally an antagonistic group, bound by an unchangeable destiny of competitiveness.

Modern biology has built upon this misanthropy and seeks to find scientific proofs for previously held philosophic positions. Barnett divides the general themes from the theory of evolution and behavioural accounts into four portraits of humanity. First, *Homo pugnax*, a concept built on the idea that animals are in a constant state of strife and humans as evolutionary beings should also be inherently violent. This notion of aggression as an explanation of various actions has become increasingly popular, especially among sociobiologists. The second, *Homo egoisticus*, is based on the idea of natural selection: we compete for survival, so are therefore selfish and competitive. The final two portraits are an alternative to these views of humanity as instinct bound evolutionary puppets: *Homo pavlovi*, a mechanistic account of behaviour, and *Homo operans*, the rewarding of certain actions in an attempt to engineer behaviour. Barnett sees these four portraits as modern science's endeavour to explain human nature and he takes issue with their conclusions, regarding them as detrimental and pessimistic judgments upon humanity.



In order to question these assumptions, Barnett evaluates the general methodology used by biology in its quest for an explanation of human nature, questioning the applicability of such theories to our species. He provides a clear case against the use of animal analogies, the particular favourites of sociobiologists. The theory of natural selection is also criticized in its application to humans. Natural selection is neutral in relation to human values, making it difficult to tell specifically what characteristic would make a person more likely to survive in a complex human society. He points out that natural selection is tautologous in a similar way to the proofs of mathematics, which are based on axioms, a set of logical relations not derived from any observation of the external world. In this way, Barnett says, biologists formulate assumptions or propose axioms; compute the consequences of these assumptions; and then tell us what humans do, or should do. This is an unwarranted leap, as it can lead to the justification of almost any type of behaviour the theorist wishes to promote. The legitimation of capitalism by claiming it as the natural outcome of people's essentially selfish and competitive nature is a well known example of such a leap.

On the whole Barnett provides an interesting critique of ethology, giving many elucidating examples and illustrations, that expand the case against biological determinism. Unfortunately, he often does not push his analysis to its logical conclusion; for instance, he criticizes evolutionary theory on the ground of its tautologous nature, while leaving its inherent notion of species progression towards some more 'efficient' state untouched. He incorporates such a notion of progress in his final argument against the pessimism of biology, by elaborating on the growth of freedom and the achievements of humanity in the area of human rights. The achievements cited are the elimination of slavery and the recession of racial prejudice – very questionable assumptions. Despite this, it is encouraging to see scientists concerning themselves overtly with issues traditionally seen as the domain of the moral sciences.

Lucy Frith

TRAGIC SENSE

Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society*, with a new introduction by Steve J. Heims, London, Free Association, 1989, xxx + 199pp, £10.95 pb, ISBN 1 85343 075 7 (first published 1950; 1954).

This republication of a work which first appeared in 1950 is to be welcomed, not least because it presents an important chapter in the history of contemporary science from the standpoint of one of its protagonists. Wiener originally trained as a mathematician, and was one of the pioneers of cybernetics – a term he coined. The present book is a reworking of his earlier *Cybernetics* (1948) in a form more accessible to the non-specialist.

Wiener begins by indicating how, in the shift from a deterministic to a probabilistic paradigm in the natural sciences, questions of communication and control come to occupy a key position; and it is these questions which define the research field of cybernetics. Control and communication are classed together in the definition of cybernetics because both seek to establish 'enclaves of order' against nature's tendency

to degrade the organised and destroy the meaningful – the tendency for entropy to increase. Wiener's thesis is that all forms of organisation – biological, technological and social – can be understood in terms of the messages and communication facilities which belong to them. Moreover, the existence of these dynamic systems enables us to assert the existence of progress. He does not suggest, though, that social evolution can be understood in the same relatively unproblematic way as the evolution of complexity in life forms or machines. Cybernetics is immanently critical of merely technological progress: an increase in the volume of messages transmitted does not automatically mean a gain in communication – on the contrary, the more probable the message, the less information it gives. The mass media and the 'culture industry' would be good illustrations of communication at an advanced stage of entropy. Information can increase organisation only to the extent that it generates *new meaning*. With this necessary reference to semantics, cybernetics itself, then, seems to invoke irreducibly human dimensions of communication. At any rate, Wiener pre-empts the stronger claims sometimes made for AI – that it not only simulates (aspects of) human intelligence, but is (potentially) indistinguishable from it – for a fairly straightforward and traditional reason: humans are not machines. The idea of purpose in nature has been disposed of by the probabilistic turn in science, but this has not undermined the persistence of that peculiarity, referred to by terms like 'consciousness', 'intentionality' and 'subjectivity',

which sustains the belief that humans *can* have purpose. So whilst machines develop formidable capacities for learning, what they learn is 'know-how', and what they are incapable of is that more important quality which Wiener calls 'know-what' – 'not only how to accomplish our purposes, but what our purposes are to be'.

Wiener further stresses that the determination of purposes is not only subjective, but *inter* subjective; and his political commitment to their free democratic thematisation is supported by cybernetics which shows that it is as unfeasible as it is undesirable for information to be stored and concentrated in few hands. Incidentally, he also has some powerful things to say about the futility of governments' obsessions with secrecy, and about some not unconnected defects in the institutional structure of scientific research.

The book has worn remarkably well. Wiener not only foresaw the potential applications of cybernetics, but also retained an awareness of those problems which information technology is *not* likely to solve, and, indeed, others which it creates. Machines cannot rise to the level of humans, but humans can be brought down to the level of machines: 'What is used as an element in a machine, is in fact an element in the machine.' This explains the (perhaps not altogether felicitous) title of the book, whose content is otherwise better described by its subtitle: for it was originally conceived as a protest against the *in*human use of human beings. Wiener's underlying message is that we throw responsibility onto the computer at our peril. Against the view that every problem can be solved by manipulation, Wiener insists on a sense of human limitedness, indeed, a tragic sense.

Tim Hayward

FABIAN FACTS

Ben Pimlott (ed), The Fabian Series (London, Unwin Hyman, 1989):
Austin Mitchell, *Competitive Socialism*, 107pp, £4.99 pb, ISBN 0 04 440431.
Oonagh McDonald, *Own Your Own: Social Ownership Examined*, 83pp, £4.95 pb, ISBN 0 09 182383 8.
David Clapham, *Goodbye Council Housing?*, 77pp, £4.95 pb, ISBN 0 09 175807 6.
Clive Ponting, *Whitehall: Changing the Old Guard*, 76pp, £4.99 pb, ISBN 0 04 440433 6.
Vivien Stern, *Imprisoned By Our Prisons: What Needs To Be Done*, 101pp, £4.95 pb, ISBN 0 09 175812 2.

Rethinking Labour's past as the basis for socialist advance in the 1990s is not an unusual project on the left these days. The need to recapture a radical agenda by 'leapfrogging Thatcherism' is another sensible proposition. To aim to land on the *terra firma* of Swedish Social Democracy is another matter altogether; accepting this aim, one must wonder whether the policy proposals contained in this series have the strength to take them there. For, considered collectively, their proposals have not the legs to get far beyond the Labour Party policy review, let alone to the social-democratic New Jerusalem.

The point is not the reformist tenor of these pamphlets – this is after all a Fabian series – but their failure to explore the possibility of democratic *socialist* reform at all. The Labour Party's alleged confusion of the ends of socialism with a specific set of means, most notably nationalization, is the stock in trade of all 'market socialisms', and Mitchell's *Competitive Socialism* is no exception. It contains much on competition, but little that is meaningfully socialist. For Mitchell, socialism's aim is to make capitalism run more efficiently, but he is unconvincing as to how to do this. His economic policy centres on a massive and sustained sterling devaluation, and seems destined to create inflation rather than reflation, in the absence of a coherent supply-side strategy. Moreover, his refusal to consider such a devaluation as part of a negotiated entry into the EMS undermines both the sustainability of such a devaluation, and any possibility of democratic

socialist cooperation across the European Community. But what is most disturbing is Mitchell's proposals for avoiding sterling crisis prior to a Labour victory by 'keeping mum' on the central plank of Labour's economic policy. This isn't 'democratically socialist', or even competitive.

Fabian concern with planning and public control rather than public ownership is continued in both Clapham's *Goodbye Council Housing* and McDonald's *Social Ownership Examined.* If modern Fabianism finds Labour's statist past unsavoury, the new dish is 'social ownership', for both industry and housing. McDonald and Clapham are aware of the need for choice, and their recipe for social ownership comes in many different flavours: Employee Share Ownership Schemes (ESOPS), Cooperatives, Swedish-style wage-earner funds and Trade Union owned enterprises are served up by McDonald, and various forms of cooperative and housing association developments by Clapham. Both argue that such forms allow more scope for workers and tenants to be involved in the management of the industries in which they work, and the homes in which they live. But with both authors management is confined within the limits of the market. The potential for a long-term 'system transformational' perspective, which formed part of, for instance, the Swedish Labour Organisation's original plan for wage-earner funds, is not discussed.

Goodbye Council Housing concludes by arguing that releasing local authorities from the day-to-day management of housing will allow them to concentrate on long-term strategic planning. This theme is transferred to the national level in Ponting's *Whitehall: Changing the Old Guard.* He argues that the policy-making functions of the civil service need to be divorced from the day-to-day execution of policy proposals. Whilst the establishment of the new executive agencies is castigated by Ponting as an extension of the government's privatisation programme, the White Paper proposals for Whitehall reform do not seem to be far away from his own.

By far the best book in this series is Vivien Stern's *Imprisoned By Our Prisons.* Stern provides an informed and damning indictment of the state of British prisons. She argues for reduction of custodial sentences through a number of alternatives, whilst presenting a convincing case for treating criminality as an integral part of social policy, and not merely as a penal problem. The prerequisite for this is a major change in the way society views crime. Whilst Stern certainly recognises this cultural problem, her calls to widen 'public debate' do not confront the problem of Britain's 'moral majority' and its attitude to criminality.

Concern with increased public debate and involvement is displayed by all the authors in this series – a definite advance on Fabianism's old technocratic image. Yet the terrain on which that debate takes place is confined to Thatcher's agenda. Ten Tory years may well have 'cleared the decks' for a major rethink on the left, but with increasing public concern over the environment and the future of Europe, the possibility that the conservatives may well have cleared the decks of a sinking ship escapes them. The vision is a reflated, efficient capitalist economy, getting government out of day-to-day management of industry and extending consumer choice in the market place, whilst creating better overall co-ordination of government policy. It is too restricted a vision for radical parliamentary socialism. It seems designed to swell the ranks of the Greens with disaffected Labour supporters seeking an alternative agenda, rather than providing the groundwork for a new Jerusalem.

Nigel Ambrose

PAST THE POST

Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989, xvi + 195pp, £29.95 hb, £9.95 pb, ISBN 0-7190 (hb) 0 7190 1925 7 (pb).

Lisa Appignanesi (editor), *Postmodernism: ICA Documents*, London, Free Association Books, 1989, 230pp, £9.95 pb, ISBN 1-85343-078-1.

Both these books are mainly conversations with the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard. The ICA volume is a reprint of a glossy in-house pamphlet which has been widely available since 1986. It contains the transcript of public discussions with Jacques Derrida at the ICA in Autumn 1985, but most of the volume is taken up with papers from a two-day conference on postmodernity and the postmodern held in May 1985. The 'star' of the May event was Lyotard and the text is punctuated by his pithy (or occasionally banal) responses to the participants' efforts to move the debates about postmodernism up a gear. The contributions generally achieve just that. Lyotard's own short paper on defining the postmodern, as well as the pieces by Michael Norman and Angela McRobbie, justify bringing this formative stage of these debates within postmodernism to a much wider audience. The debates have shifted considerably since 1985 (it is noticeable, for instance, that 'art' is the constant referent here) but this should rapidly become a standard reference work.

Lyotard's *The Differend* however is perplexing and infuriating. The form of the book is that of conversations with itself, or the A (the first reader, as the bizarre Reading Dossier at the beginning informs us – in other words Lyotard himself).



Sometimes fascinating, sometimes unfathomable, this latest translation of Lyotard's work lies somewhere between the upbeat interviews in *Just Gaming* and the overrated *The Postmodern Condition.* The 264 entries (or paragraphs) here represent random thoughts fired from the barrel of a gun, notes for a postmodern dictionary. If it all leaves A a little breathless, he can always rewind to the Preface which (tongue in cheek?) predicts that 'in the next century there will be no more books. It takes too long to read, when success comes from gaining time'.

Steve Redhead

GOLD INTO DROSS

Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, xii + 327pp, £30 hb, £10.95 pb, ISBN 0 521 37026 4 hb, 0 521 37923 7 pb.

To paraphrase the song: why can't Hegel be more like Kant? That is the constant refrain of this book. Despite all appearances, Hegel's project is interpreted as an essentially Kantian one, centred on the 'problem of knowledge'. According to Pippin, Hegel is trying to answer the sceptic and give a deductive justification of knowledge in idealist terms. After an initial discussion of Kant and Schelling, Pippin attempts to sustain this account through a detailed consideration, first of the opening sections of the *Phenomenology* (viz. 'Introduction', 'Consciousness' and 'Self Consciousness'), then of some key categories of the *Logic*. The selection of passages for detailed commentary seems rather limited and arbitrary. Apart from that, however, Pippin does what he does well enough. But why do it? Why try to force Hegel into such an alien and uncongenial mould? It is almost as though Pippin had discovered the opposite of the philosopher's stone. He turns gold into dross. Hegel – the philosopher who attempted to transcend the absolutist metaphysics of the eighteenth century, who introduced the social and historical dimension into Western philosophy – is transmuted into a fumbling and obscure Kantian, constantly needing to be rescued from glaring errors and elementary confusions. Moreover, the whole discussion takes place in the sort of scholastic void which German philosophy all too often encourages, with no attempt to relate it to current philosophical ideas or controversies.

Sean Sayers

Adopting a currently fashionable approach, Paul Owen Johnson's *The Critique of Thought: A Re-examination of Hegel's Science of Logic* (Aldershot, Avebury, 1988, xi + 276pp, £27.50 hb, ISBN 0 566 05765 4) offers a reading of Hegel's *Science of Logic* which is based on the premise that Hegel is primarily a critical philosopher engaged in a dialectical analysis of our categories, rather than a 'metaphysician of the old school'. Johnson provides a painstaking commentary on the *Logic* from this perspective, trying to show in detail how Hegel's categorial revolution was meant to come about. Although he does not altogether avoid sinking beneath the weight of Hegel's terminology and architectonic, and although he writes almost exclusively within the British tradition of Hegel-reception, this book will be a useful text for all those who like their Hegel in close-up.

In *Marxism and Phenomenology* (London, Croom Helm, 1986, 201pp, £27.50 hb, ISBN 0 7099 40556) Shirley Pike argues for some sort of synthesis of Marxism and Phenomenology, and explores the common ground between the genres with particular reference to the work of Hegel, Marx, and Husserl. Notions of science and ideology, subjectivity and consciousness, history, intentionality, and totality are considered in relation to Kant, Lukács, Kojève, Sartre, and Althusser; the work of Heidegger, Foucault, and Merleau-Ponty is also considered. Paci's claims to present a phenomenological Marxism which reconciles Husserlian idealism with Marxist materialism, and the possibility of a dialectical form of phenomenology, are assessed. The Husserlian *Lebenswelt* is offered as the potential ground for a renewed appreciation of the objectivity of Marxism, and Pike explores the possibilities of a phenomenological understanding of the experience of the totality common to both Marx and Husserl. The differences and similarities between these thinkers' approaches to such notions are developed in the context of an appreciation of their philosophical backgrounds and the treatments each of them make of science and philosophy, and both are seen responding to the positivism of scientism and identifying a crisis in the relationship between science and philosophy. The book's understanding of Marxism as a social science is achieved to the detriment of any concern with notions of class and historical struggle. Nevertheless, Pike's interest in the epistemological and methodological interfaces between the genres she addresses means that the text provides an excellent framework for the discussion of a number of contentious and problematic issues. She is astute in her identification of the crisis of the legitimation of political theory and social science, and the text is to be welcomed as an exploratory examination of fascinating and often neglected problems.