Liberal democratic ideology under strain

Allende's Chile and 'The Economist'

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In political, philosophical and ideological struggle, the words are also weapons and explosives or tranquillizers and poisons.

Louis Althusser[1]

This paper[2] explores some of the ways in which the ideological discourse associated with liberal democratic theory masks our cognitive access to social reality, and isolates for special consideration one form that that discourse takes (the so-called technocratic ideology). It also discusses the way that material conditions underpin an ideological system of thought. It arose as a direct response to the brutality recently unleashed in Chile by the military junta which ousted Allende's government, and the material which will be analysed relates to events which occurred in that narrow slice of Chilean history occupied by the Allende regime.

The election by bourgeois democratic procedures of a Marxist president, who formed a government comprised predominantly of Socialist and Communists, posed acute problems for the proponents of liberal democratic theory once that government began to implement socialist policies. These problems were generated in part by the assumptions which that theory makes regarding the relationship between the political and the economic spheres of society. Crudely put, liberal democratic theory insists that parliamentary democracy guarantees that power lies in the hands of the 'people' who 'govern' through their elected representatives, but also demands that state interference in the economy be consistent with the aims of capital, thereby imposing a limit to popular control of the area most crucial to the overall well-being of the population. It justifies this exclusion on the grounds that the maintenance of the capitalist system is in the 'general interest' anyway, so that the limits posed to the domain of popular control precisely serve to block, rather than to encourage, the emergence of narrow, sectional interests. On this view, the health of the body politic as a whole demands that a wedge be driven between the economic and political realms of society. What then is to be its response when a democratically elected parliamentary party which supposedly represents the will of the people, strikes at the very basis of the capitalist system - private ownership of the means of production? At one extreme it can claim that the interests of capital must predominate as being in the genuine 'general interest', thereby clearly exposing the limits it places on the 'sovereignty of parliament' or, at the other extreme, it can cling to the latter, even if it involves accepting the dismantling of the capitalist economic base, and the concession that that base is not necessarily consistent with the general interest. Either way the theory stands to lose, being forced to pose questions about precisely who *does* govern and control the functioning of a liberal democratic system, and whose interests are served thereby. Rather than face up to these dilemmas, however, the ideological discourse we shall analyse below develops mechanisms for alleviating the intellectual tensions born of inconsistencies as an alternative to exposing the roots of which they are a symptom.

Most of the raw material for this discussion is provided by reports which appeared in the *Economist* between 1970 and 1973. Ever alert to the changing balance of forces in Chile, this newspaper always carefully considered the interaction between the economic and the political within the framework of liberal democratic theory. Aligning itself uncompromisingly with the interests of capital, which it takes to be the general interest, its reports provide a valuable insight into how ideological discourse can 'tranquillize and poison' a confused mind, providing rationalisations when pressures other than those of reason gain the upper hand.

In what follows, the *Economist*'s treatment of three specific events in Chile are discussed in some detail: the mid-term elections in 1973, the departure of certain key technicians in the copper industry soon after Allende's election late in 1970, and the attempts made by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) to subvert that election. The first example thus considers reports dealing predominantly with a political event, the second concerns reports of an event in the economic sphere. In the third, which was prompted by the publication of a series of ITT's internal memoranda by Jack Anderson of the *Washington Post* in March 1972, the political and the economic clearly confront each other. There is, however, a more significant difference between this third case and the other two, for here it is the organisations and institutions of capitalist society, and not of Allende's Chile, that are under scrutiny. This demanded a completely different kind of analysis from the *Economist*. For whereas in the first two cases the desirability of the liberal wedge between the political and the economic could be taken for granted, and was used to discredit Allende's socialist program, in the case of ITT the existence of the wedge had to be argued for, i.e. it had to be shown precisely how the (alleged) gap between the political and the economic levels in capitalist society was maintained. As we shall see, to do this the *Economist* structured its analysis of the ITT affair using a technocratic ideology which itself rests on a conception of reason from which liberalism draws its strength.

In each case considered preliminary steps are taken towards unravelling the conditions which make the adherence to an ideological scheme of thought possible: in other words, an attempt is made to explain how it is that such schemes can persist in the face of facts so obviously at variance with them. Although no attempt is made to develop a systematic theory of the tenacity of ideological discourse, in the analysis I have kept Marx and Engels' discussion in *The German Ideology*, and Mepham's[3] and Althusser's[4] treatment of ideology constantly in mind. To anyone familiar with them, the influence of a book[5] and a recent paper[5] by Edgley will be manifest.

The political struggle

As in several other Latin American countries, a marked trend to the 'left' occurred in Chilean politics in the 1960s. The precise form which this trend took was determined by the prevailing balance of forces in each social formation; in Chile the politicisation and mobilisation of the masses during this period resulted in a majority vote at the polls for Salvador Allende in the Presidential election held on 4 September 1970. Allende was the leader of the Popular Unity (PU) coalition of Socialist, Communist and Radical parties which was committed to the expropriation of foreign and private capital and to an effective program of land redistribution within the overall framework of socialist policies.

Allende's majority was a narrow one, and reflected the disillusionment which both the 'left' and the 'right' felt with the reformist policies of his predecessor, Christian Democratic President Frei. Allende gained 36.3% of the votes, just beating Alessandri of the right-wing Nationalist party, who gained 35% of the votes, but well ahead of Tomic, the Christian Democratic (CD) candidate who gained only 27.8% of the votes. Furthermore, Allende's coalition of parties was in a minority in the 200-seat Congress, and this meant that his ratification as President was not assured. To gain the necessary majority in Congress the support of about 25 CD candidates was required. Despite intense efforts to swing the CD behind Alessandri, or to provoke military intervention, both to be discussed in more detail below, Tomic carried the party with him behind Allende, who was nominated President by an overwhelming majority of Congress on 25 October, and inaugurated on 3 November 1970.

The precise details of what happened in Chile during the next two years are not relevant here. Let it suffice to say that in the edition of 24 February 1973 (p14), the *Economist* claimed that the state controlled 80% of industrial production, and that three quarters of the cultivated land had been brought into the reformed sector. As pointed out above, the penetration of the state into this level of the economic fabric of society puts acute pressure on the assumptions of liberal democratic ideology, and if they are not to be questioned, mechanisms for dissipating this pressure must be evolved. The ones we shall explore in this section represent attempts made by the *Economist* to save the theory by accepting the sovereignty of parliament, only to deny that the measures which Congress approved while Allende was in power could be in accord with the will of the people.

Of course the crudest way of doing this is to point out that the party in power does not command a majority of the votes cast in the election. Thus in the article referred to above the *Economist*, discussing the forthcoming mid-term elections in Chile, emphasised that a 'majority vote for the opposition parties would show those who still remain to be convinced that Dr Allende's regime is not the people's government that it claims to be'. And again, after the election, in which the PU coalition gained 43.3% of the vote, an increase of 7.1% over the figure for the 1970 election, it remarked that 'Sunday's election in Chile underlined the basic fact about his [Allende's] government: a clear majority of Chileans are opposed to it.' (10 March 1973, p18)

This kind of criticism, unless directed against the adequacy of the electoral process as such as a mechanism for expressing the will of the majority, simply cannot stand up to scrutiny. Heath formed a government in Britain in 1970 although the Conservatives won only 46% of the popular vote, and even more obviously, Wilson was asked to form a government in 1974 although his party not only won a mere 37% of the popular vote; it actually polled fewer votes than the Conservatives did. Nixon's 'mandate' from the 'silent majority' to govern, given in 'a landslide victory of historic dimensions' in the US Presidential elections in 1972, although representing 61% of the popular vote, in fact represented only 32% of the eligible electorate, almost half of whom simply did not bother to go to the polls.

Perhaps it was the subterranean pressures exerted by considerations like these that led the *Economist* to present a different set of arguments to show that Chile's elected government was not a 'people's government'. Here is a quote from the issue of 10 March 1973 (p32), in which one such argument is presented:

> *The advances made by the marxist parties can give the misleading impression that they gained more ground than they actually did, since the real comparison is with the last parliamentary election in 1969, before Dr Allende came to power. By comparison with the latest nationwide elections - the municipal poll of 1971 - the Popular Unity vote actually dropped by about 6 per cent. Even so, the Communists gained one more deputy and two more senators and the Socialists jumped from 14 to 27 deputies and from three to five senators. The government coalition as a whole now has 63 deputies and 19 senators (against 57 and 16 before); the opposition alliance has 87 and 30 compared with 93 and 32 before'.*

This is utter gibberish. Having claimed that the real comparison is with a parliamentary election held in 1969, the *Economist* goes on to compare the results of the mid-term Congressional elections in March 1973 with those of the municipal poll held in 1971! Be that as it may, these comparisons have the effect of making the reader move mentally from the idea that the results are misleading, to the idea that Allende's popularity has actually dropped, and on to the crucial accusation that 'even so' the PU coalition has increased its number of seats in both houses. This accusation is consistent with the campaign waged from the very beginning of PU rule to the effect that once in power Allende's government would institute a one-party system. One of the *Economist*'s articles on 12 September 1970 (p40), written immediately after Allende's success at the polls, was headed 'But can they vote him out again?', and in another (p19) it claimed that Allende's promise of elections in 1976 did not inspire confidence since he had hinted at legal and constitutional changes, and would probably sink his scruples and introduce a one-party state. After all, it pointed out in the pre-election article of 24 February 1973 (p14), Allende's 'Socialist party have been telling their followers not to worry about the results of what they claim to be merely a "routine democratic exercise" - one more move in a game whose rules they never really believed in'. It is hard to know what elections are if not a 'routine democratic exercise', or why a party which fears a reversal at the polls should not try to dispel its supporters' fears. And if Thorpe says that the present British electoral system is a 'travesty of democracy' is he not expressing disgust with the rules of the game as presently constituted, nor permitted to try to change those rules with the power at his disposal? However, the *Economist* 's purpose here is clearly not to provide a balanced analysis of the political manoeuvering of the Allende government which, for example, would have exposed the fact that many aspects of its program had the support of sections of the Christian Democrats who are lumped with the 'opposition alliance'. Remarks such as these rather serve to prepare the ground for justifying the removal by non-electoral procedures of the Allende government.

That this in fact is the case is apparent from the changes in formulation of allegations of electoral malpractices which were used to detract from Allende's success in the mid-term elections. On 10 March 1973 (p18) the *Economist* wrote that 'There have been accusations of fraud, and several bags of stolen ballot papers have already been found. The process of cross-checking makes it unlikely that systematic fraud could have accounted for more than 1% of the government's vote, but if it happened *on anything like that scale* the fact will *soon be known*.' [my emphases]. By 18 August (p34) suitable facts were ferreted out as the campaign to smash Allende's government gained momentum; it was reported that the Law Faculty at the Catholic University had found that 'up to 200,000 [about 5%] pro-government votes may have been fictitious. Even if these charges prove exaggerated, the government has a case to answer and the evidence tabled so far does not encourage optimism about its democratic intentions'. This concession to its previous claim that malpractices of the order of 1% would be readily detected evaporated as the *Economist* desperately tried to justify the brutality of the

military coup which it supported. In an article written partially to discredit the 'campaign of organised hostility in the west' against the junta (13 October 1973, p43) it claimed that the voting lists needed to be cleaned up since they had been 'padded out with false names before the legislative elections in March. Dr Allende's defenders rarely mention the fact that this may have accounted for as much as 5% of the votes that his supporters received on that occasion'.

As a postscript to this sorry affair, here is a quote from an article in the *Times Higher Education Supplement* of 9 November 1973, written by a number of Chilean academics and professional men who fled the country. It suggests that the facts concerning allegations of fraud were indeed soon known, although the *Economist* did not report them, and they would have enabled it to maintain internal consistency in its own articles. The authors speak of a report

> *prepared by the Faculty of Law in the Catholic University in May, just after the Allende regime had increased its percentage of votes from 36 per cent to 44 per cent. The lawyers concluded that the ballot had been falsified. This was proved two weeks later to have no basis. The principal author of this report, Jaime Guzmán, has now been asked by the junta to rewrite the Chilean Constitution.*

What these examples show is that, rather than admit that parliament is sovereign only as long as it does not threaten the interests of capital, thereby putting its liberal democratic ideology under strain, the *Economist* attempted to discredit that institution's legitimacy during the latter part of the Allende regime by implying that it was not truly representative of the will of the Chilean people. To do this it not only resorted to crude and mystifying arguments to support its contention; it actually went as far as to redescribe events in ways which were inconsistent with its earlier descriptions. Its uncritical use of these devices to distort events in Chile can, in the first instance, be explained in terms of its bias. This bias springs from too close an identification with the interests of capital, and makes it possible for the *Economist* to resort spontaneously to these devices, which protect its liberal democratic ideology from assault. Although implicit much of the time, this bias emerges into full view as the need predominates to protect those interests against a 'campaign of organised hostility', sweeping away any vestiges of impartiality and swamping the pressures exerted by reason. Its presence makes the *Economist*'s (sincere) claim to be 'an independent newspaper' which helps one to 'find out what's going on' sound rather hollow; its progressive elimination, along with that of ideological thought, requires nothing less than the removal of the economic base on which class society is founded and the ongoing democratisation of the ensuing politico-economic system.

The copper industry

Copper accounts for 80% of Chile's foreign exchange. Until the 1960s the industry was almost wholly controlled by Anaconda and Kennecott, two United States based companies. Norman Girvan[7] has remarked that 'the Chilean mines proved highly profitable to both companies over the bulk of the life of these operations. From 1915 through 1968 (excluding Kennecott after 1964) the companies earned a total of $2,011 million in net profits and depreciation from Chile, of which $738 million only was used for reinvestment'. To ensure some measure of Chilean control over these companies, Allende's predecessor, President Frei, initiated steps to nationalise the mines. The deals which he negotiated with Anaconda and Kennecott involved the immediate takeover by the State of a 51% share of the industry, with compensation guaranteed, to be followed by the gradual, phased transfer of full ownership to the Chilean government.

Once the PU coalition came into power, a bill was presented to Congress which proposed the immediate expropriation of the companies concerned. This was passed unanimously on 11 July 1971. A long and bitter struggle[8] ensued between the companies and Allende's government over the issue of adequate compensation, which culminated with Kennecott gaining a court order in Paris demanding that 1¼ million tons of copper bound for Le Havre to be seized. The dispute has apparently now been settled. On 15 December 1973 (p102) the *Economist* reported that the company had a good chance of getting $300m in compensation from the Chilean junta.

The specific issue which I wish to use to expose the *Economist*'s ideological discourse concerns the way in which it reported on the loss of skilled and senior personnel in the copper industry which occurred during the first six months after Allende came to power. On 20 March 1971 (p87), discussing difficulties at Chile's second biggest copper mine El Teniente, it said that 'The smelting furnaces broke down after a *walk-out* by 300 mine managers opposed to President Allende's policies'. A report two months later made it clear that this was no ordinary walk-out. On 22 May 1971 (p48) the *Economist* pointed out that Chile's economic strategist, Vuskovic, 'will still have to work out how to replace the copper technicians who have been *streaming abroad* since the PU coalition took office last November'. On 19 June 1971 (p85) the *Economist* wrote of the '*withdrawal* of *American* technicians', thus identifying them as having links with the United States, and beginning to shift the responsibility for their departure off their own shoulders, and by the end of the year (25 December 1971, p78) it remarked that a new copper company in Iran was to 'be manned partly by up to 200 western copper men, many recruited among Anaconda's copper technicians *laid off* by the nationalised mines in Chile'. By early 1972, as the opposition's attempts to limit the scope of state intervention in the economy were constantly thwarted, the *Economist* lost all semblance of impartiality. On 11 March 1972 (p25), in an article purporting to explain the alleged drop in production from the expropriated mines during the first nine months of 1971 it claimed that 'Systematically government agents have worked *to expel* managers and technicians regarded as politically "unreliable". The result has been the loss of scores of trained men with many years of experience'. On 14 October 1972 (p50) it bemoaned the 'administrative chaos' which occurred with 'trained managers were *pushed out* in favour of "politically reliable" supervisors' during the first six months of 1971, and three months before the military coup the newspaper became quite hysterical. Production in the mines it said on 23 June 1973 (p88) 'has fallen steadily since the American management was *kicked out*.' [My emphases throughout this paragraph]

Here then we have travelled all the way from a walk-out by management and other senior personnel to them being kicked out. If we are to explain this somersault, given the wedge which liberal democratic theory drives between the political and the economic, we must first ask what kinds of reasons, consistent with the framework of that ideology, highly skilled and qualified personnel could have for 'walking out' of a production process. One kind of reason which is excluded is that they were politically motivated; as a result the PU coalition's attempts to replace them with 'politically reliable' men is construed as being unreasonable. What is implied, however, is that their reasons for doing so were purely technical ones, which in turn suggests that the American managers 'walked out' because (unspecified) perturbations to the smooth and efficient running of the industry were proving intolerable. That granted, we see that what is merely insinuated in the early reports becomes progressively more explicit in the later ones. The use of the term 'kicked out' by the *Economist* indicates that it was precisely state interference in the copper industry which (allegedly) led to losses in production, and

which made the lives of key personnel committed to efficiency unbearable. Thus the precise nature of the perturbation hinted at in the earlier reports is identified.

Obviously this entire edifice rests on the claim that production losses occurred in the Chilean copper industry which could be attributed to the expulsion of skilled and managerial personnel. There is strong evidence to suggest that this is not the case. The issues of the United Nations' *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* of April and November 1972 show that the monthly average amount of copper ore and refined copper produced in Chile between January and September 1971 was roughly the same as the monthly average for the previous year. In fact there was a massive increase in September 1971 as mines abandoned by the American companies as unprofitable were reopened by the government. Admittedly production may have fallen short of estimates based on earlier plans for expansion, but that is an entirely different matter. There were undoubtedly difficulties in the Chilean copper industry while Allende was in power, and political activity in the mines was probably one factor which contributed to them. But it is only one aspect of a complex situation, in which for example the depressed copper prices which persisted until early in 1973 and Kennecott's ability to block purchases of the metal also played an important part.

The transformations in the descriptions and re-descriptions of the single event we are considering here reveals the tremendous flexibility of ideological discourse as opposed to the rigour of scientific discourse. Precisely why a sequence showing this particular trend was used can be explained, again only in the first instance, by attributing it to bias. In the early days of the Allende regime, when the precise form its intervention in the economy would take had not yet crystallised, pressures springing from the need to defend the interests of capital were counterbalanced by those arising from an acceptance of the legitimacy of parliamentary democratic procedures, which were relatively deeply embedded in Chilean history. But as the PU coalition extended its socialist policies over more and more sectors of the economy, the former pressures intensified, and the latter were deflected by 'showing' that Allende's coalition of parties was simply using parliament as a means to further its own sectional interest, and was not a 'people's government'. Its alleged willingness to disrupt the copper industry to serve its political objectives revealed that it was prepared to sacrifice the lifeblood of the nation on the altar of marxist ideology. With nothing to check the passion to defend the interests of capital the *Economist*'s bias burst to the surface; that it was always there is most clearly shown by the newspaper's willingness to discredit the political process, without ever asking whether the capitalist economic base is, in fact, consistent with the general interest.

The case of ITT

In the earlier brief survey of the events surrounding the election of Allende on 4 September 1970, it was pointed out that the support of the Christian Democrats was essential if he was to be ratified as president, taking over from President Frei, on 25 October. This time delay provided Allende's opponents with an opportunity to thwart his bid for the presidency, and they pinned their hopes on creating the conditions which would make this possible. The so-called 'Alessandri formula' was promoted. This rested on one of two lines of attack. Either Frei was to persuade his followers to back Alessandri rather than Allende on 25 October, in which event the former would be elected president, or the military were to be persuaded to intervene, deposing Frei (who was apparently not averse to a military coup) and then calling for new elections. If Frei was successful, Alessandri would immediately resign the presidency, Frei would again be eligible for re-election for a further 6 years, and it was felt certain that in a straight Frei-Allende fight the former would easily win. If the military intervened, Alessandri would again not participate in the new elections; the problem here though was that Chile was almost unique among Latin American countries in its record of military non-intervention, and only a very serious threat to the country's stability could provoke them to act.

It was realised by Alessandri's camp that the alignment of the Christian Democrats behind the right, or military intervention, depended on the threat that economic chaos and possibly bloodshed would ensue if Allende were victorious. This was the atmosphere which they tried to creat during the key 50 days between the elections and the nomination of Allende, and the Anderson papers provide a valuable insight into the co-operaiton which they received from several United States based organisations. The ones discussed below cover the period from 14 September to 18 November 1970[9]. It is necessary to analyse these in some detail before discussing the *Economist*'s part in them.

It is clear from the Anderson papers that Allende's enemies in the United States realised that outsiders like themselves would have to work through the existing Chilean political system to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, they realised that in 1970 any American action had to be taken in the light of growing anti-US sentiment in Chile. They knew that if their involvement was too blatant, the Chilean people would swing decisively against the right, and unite solidly behind Allende on an anti-imperialist platform. If this happened, the deep split in the electorate would temporarily recede into the background, and the spaces in which the opposition could move to overthrow Allende would contract accordingly. This probably explains why Berrellez, an ITT employee based in Buenos Aires emphasised that 'Every care should be exercised to insure that we are not - repeat not - identified openly with any anti-Allende move.' (43) He also spelt out the conditions which would have to be met if the 'Alessandri formula' was to work: 'Chances of thwarting Allende's assumption of power now are pegged mainly to an economic collapse which is being encouraged by some sectors in the business and political community and by President Frei himself... Undercover efforts are being made to bring about the bankruptcy of one or two major savings and loan associations. This is expected to trigger a run on the banks and the closure of some factories resulting in more unemployment.' (42) It was hoped that the economic chaos would convince the Christian Democrats that the business community had no faith in Allende's policies, so that they would side with Alessandri, or that 'massive unemployment and unrest might produce enough violence to force the military to move.' (43) Yet they were not optimistic about the latter. Berrellez and a colleague, Hendrix, reported that 'The marxists will not be provoked. "You can spit in their face in the street" Matte [Alessandri's brother-in-law] said, "and they'll say thank you." This means that the far left is aware of and taking every precaution to neutralize provocation.' (32)

In what follows I will discuss separately the role played by the State Department, the CIA and ITT in this deliberate attempt to provoke unemployment and violence in the name of defending freedom and democracy.

The State Department

The State Department's agent in Chile was Korry, the US Ambassador in Santiago. His 'gutsy final effort to block Allende, so unusual in our diplomats' (105) was praised by Berrellez. Yet it is clear that he acted more or less independently of State for much of the time, taking a far harder line that Assistant Secretary Meyer or his deputy Crimmons would have liked. Long before receiving

any official authorisation Korry had been putting pressure on Frei to unite the party behind him and against Allende. Admittedly about 10 days after the September election 'Korry finally received a message from State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible - short of a Dominican Republic-type action - to keep Allende from taking power.' (29) Nevertheless it was only with difficulty that Korry persuaded Washington to reduce by as much as possible the $30m of aid already in the pipeline for Chile, and to block existing letters of credit. ITT official Neal reported that 'This "cut-off" will be denied by State, who will say, as it has in the past "there has been no shut down of aid to Chile; the program is under review."'(57)

The CIA

The political and economic initiatives taken by the CIA were of a rather different kind. On 9 October Merriam, the ITT president in Washington, informed McCone, a former CIA director, and then an ITT Board member, that the CIA had continued to make approaches 'to select members of the Armed Forces in an attempt to have them lead some sort of uprising - no success to date.'(52) A week later Hendrix reported that, at about that time, Washington had in fact discouraged Roberto Viaux, a Brigadier General in the Chilean army, from staging a coup. It was felt that he did not have sufficient support for such a move, and that if it failed it would be counter-productive. 'As part of the persuasion to delay,' Hendrix added, 'Viaux was given oral assurances that he would receive material assistance and support from the US and others for a later manouver.'(60)

On the economic front CIA Director Broe approached ITT Vice-President Gerrity late in September, 'looking for additional help aimed at producing economic collapse.'(40) He presented a 5-point plan to Gerrity involving the application of pressure by both financial institutions like banks, savings and loan companies, and businesses like ITT. It was suggested that the latter 'should drag their feet in sending money, in making deliveries, in shipping spare parts, etc,' and 'should withdraw all technical help and should not promise any technical assistance in the future. Companies in a position to do so should close their doors.'(40)

ITT

Probably the most sensational aspects of ITT's involvement in Chile was its offer to Broe of the CIA of a million dollars for use in any plan to defeat Allende. Less frequently spoken of is the offer made by Company President Geneen to the State Department's Latin American adviser to Kissinger to 'assist financially in sums up to seven figures' to protect its Chilean interests. As Neal pointed out on this occasion, 'all along we have feared the Allende victory and have been trying unsuccessfully to get other American companies aroused over the fate of their investments, and join us in pre-election efforts.'(28)

It is clear that ITT's senior personnel regarded intervention of this kind to be a logical extension of US policy in Chile as it had developed in the 1960s. Neal, complaining bitterly about the State Department's hesitancy in dealing with the new Chilean situation, analysed figures for US economic assistance to the country during this period and concluded that 'the US realised the danger of Marxism in Chile; so fought it with grants and loans but did not have the extra forethought to follow its intuition by taking a more active part during the pre-election period to assure the defeat of Allende... Why should the US try to be so pious and sanctimonious in September and October 1970,' he added, 'when over the past few years it has been pouring the taxpayers' money into Chile, admittedly to defeat Marxism.'(47) Hendrix echoed these judgements: 'The United States failed even to head off in 1970 that which it so successfully and energetically aided Chileans to avoid in 1964 - the emergence of a Marxist president. Meyer and Crimmons jointly led the effort to make certain that the US this time did nothing with respect to the Chilean election.' (91) Even though these analyses are crude inasmuch as they ignore the changes which had taken place in Chile itself during Frei's presidency, changes which precisely made possible the election of Allende, they are particularly revealing about the aims of the United States AID program, and the actions which ITT's personnel took to be 'normal' practice.

The pre-election difficulties which ITT had had to persuade other US business interests to support in their attempt to block Allende probably accounts for Gerrity's lack of enthusiasm for Broe's plan for economic subversion discussed above, which he thought was unworkable. He noted that there was a growing economic crisis anyway, and also established that Hobbing, another CIA agent, had been told by an Alessandri representative to 'keep cool, don't rock the boat, we are making progress... This is in direct contrast to what Broe recommended.'(45) Nevertheless, apparently to appease Broe, ITT 'made repeated calls to firms such as GM, Ford and banks in California and New York,'(51) but without success. As Merriam reported to McCone, 'Practically no progress had been made in trying to get American business to co-operate in some way so as to bring on economic chaos.'(52) GM and Ford claimed that they had too much inventory on hand in Chile and, despite assurances to the contrary, the Bank of America did not close its doors in Santiago.

These activities by ITT on the home front were complemented by direct action in Chile and elsewhere, much of which reflected its importance as a communications company. Hendrix and Berrellez identified Frei and the Mercurio newspapers, who were outspoken in their condemnation of Allende, and under severe pressure from Allende aides immediately after the election in September, as two crucial supporters in the campaign to stop Allende taking power in November. Korry applied pressure to Frei, telling him 'to put his pants on' (31) and ITT offered financial help to the Alessandri group, as well as pumping advertising into Mercurio. Hendrix and Berrellez also suggested that 'we help with getting some propagandists working again on radio and television', that the Washington office of the United States Information Service (USIS) be approached and asked to distribute Mercurio editorials around Latin America and in Europe, and that ITT's contacts in the key European press be urged to 'get the story of what disaster would fall on Chile if Allende & Co. win this country.'(34) They also proposed that the company assist financially to relocate in Argentina for a month to six weeks the families of certain central figures involved in the fight against Allende.

By the middle of October it was clear to the ITT management that Frei could not carry the Christian Democrats with him, and that a military coup was most unlikely. Assuming that Allende would be inaugurated in November, they drew up a detailed set of recommendations pertaining to US action on Chile. These were to be put to the State Department and to Kissinger in the White House, and demanded the diplomatic and economic isolation of Chile if adequate compensation was not paid for expropriated properties. It was also recommended that US representatives on international banks be told to block the extension of credit to the Allende regime (which did in fact happen). Furthermore in an attempt to discourage 'leftist nationalism' in other countries in Latin America, threats to sever their lines of credit were also proposed. At this time an appropriation of $2.9 billion to the US-government sponsored Inter-American Development Bank was awaiting final ratification by the Senate. Merriam reported that 'we are planning ... to approach

Senators Scott and Mansfield to see if they will just "forget" to take up the bill. We could prepare statements from them which would get a message to the other Latin American countries that Chile's action is affecting them too, albeit indirectly.'(72)

The overall picture which emerges from the Anderson papers is one of three United States based organisations applying pressure at those points at which each thought that it could be most effective to bring about economic chaos, unemployment, violence and bloodshed in Chile. With the possible exception of the State Department, which was committed to a 'low-profile' policy in Latin America, neither ITT, the CIA or Korry had any compunction about generating the conditions in which a military coup would be possible, and bloodshed inevitable so that Allende's bid for the presidency would be thwarted. As far as they were concerned it was essential to stop him before it was too late, for if he succeeded 'Whatever the trappings, there is unlikely ever to be another truly free election in Chile'(84) - truly free, that is, for the US to 'successfully and energetically' intervene to stop the emergence of a Marxist president. 'The repression of the human spirit which the doctrinaire Marxist always imposes'(87) was to be countered by setting in train a series of events in the hope of precipitating violence, which is somehow supposed to expand and enrich the 'human spirit'. Writing to Kissinger, ITT Vice-President Merriam said that 'Our company knows the peoples of the Americas deserve a better way of life and we believe we have a substantial interest in diminishing their problems. The countries themselves are unable to furnish necessary development funds, the US taxpayers cannot, and US private enterprise can provide only that part which a proper climate affords.'(95) And of course, as far as he was concerned, if the 'proper climate' did not prevail it was up to organisations in the United States to create it, and that done to maintain it at all costs by all possible means. 'The peoples of the Americas' deserved nothing less.

The limits set by technocratic ideology

It is clear that activities like those we have just discussed, in which a business concern unambiguously aligned itself with one side rather than another in a policital conflict, and attempted to subvert the democratic political process to serve its own interests can present problems to the adherent of liberal democratic ideology. It does not necessarily produce such problems because, for example, in this case the involvement occurred in a so-called 'under-developed country', which is characterised as one in which there is a low GNP and per capita income, a lack of health and educational facilities, and a high incidence of poverty and misery. To solve these problems a massive injection of foreign capital is (allegedly) required, so that the subversion of political moves which threaten the flow of 'development funds' is readily justified on the grounds that the unimpeded operation of capital is in the 'general interest'. As Merriam put it above, 'The peoples of the Americas deserve a better way of life' toward which ITT could contribute, and it is considerations like these which serve to deflect any pressures generated by a concern for the sovereignty of parliament or for those people who may have been harmed if attempts to provoke violence and bloodshed had succeeded.

However, in the particular case of ITT's involvement in Chile wider issues were at stake which effectively blocked this loophole in the liberal scheme and questioned its most basic assumptions. For the Anderson papers provoked hearings by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the influence which multinational firms had on the course of political events in the countries in which they operated; as the *Economist* put it (1 April 1972, p42), 'It is often said, and is being said of ITT, that the huge assets and omnipresence of the multinational companies give them virtually the status and the power of governments.' Clearely if this allegation was shown to be true, the postulated symbiotic relationship between the political and economic spheres, with power residing in the former, would be placed under severe strain.

In an attempt to come to terms with this threat the *Economist*, in the article referred to above, analysed the Anderson papers within the framework of a technocratic ideology. Its treatment provides a valuable insight into how this ideology, which shares with liberal ideology certain general postulates about the domain of reason and the relationship between reason and action, limits one's thought about the problem under consideration.

Central to the technocratic conception of reason is that the term rational be reserved for the means an agent uses to achieve certain ends; the question of the rationality of the ends themselves does not arise. These are non-rational; they serve to activate one's deliberation about means, which presupposes the intention on the part of the agent to achieve the end, but cannot themselves be the object of deliberation. Of course some ends (e.g. stopping Allende from taking power) are intermediate, means to a further end (i.e. staving off expropriation), and as such their rationality can be debated. But again they are only judged, not as ends, but on their appropriateness as means to achieve that further end, where the most appropriate means is that which achieves the end with the greatest efficiency. 'Know-how' enables one to make this decision; once equipped with it the agent is in a position to select from the means at his disposal that which is most likely to ensure the successful attainment of his objectives with the least possible input of the available resources. As such, it helps him to avoid behaving irrationally, and thereby to control his own destiny. Since it enables those who have acquired it to do things they would not otherwise be able to do, 'know-how' is the source of the power agents have to achieve the goals they set themselves. It is also the prerogative of experts in specialised disciplines, who have had the requisite training and who are equipped with the skills necessary to decide on the most rational course of action in a particular situation.

This pattern of relationships permeates the *Economist*'s discussion of the Anderson Papers. It is realised that ITT could only achieve an economic objective (staving off appropriation) by achieving the intermediate political objective (stopping Allende from taking power). And the crucial question of whether or not the company had the 'status or the power' of a government is construed as the question of whether a business concern staffed by economic experts had personnel with adequate political know-how to achieve this political goal. The criterion for the rationality of the measures which ITT took to thwart Allende's bid for the presidency is the views of the political experts: Korry in Santiago and the State Department in Washington. Measures considered by the company which deviated from those deemed appropriate by these experts are judged to be irrational; that ITT entertained them at all indicates its lack of know-how, and suggests its corresponding inability to influence the course of Chilean political affairs, which lies beyond its control.

Two examples from the report in question will show how the choice of certain words at key points in the description allude to the technocratic ideology which structures it. The first concerns the offer of financial assistance made by ITT President Geneen to Kissinger's White House office, which is described in the following terms: 'Perhaps the weirdest fact to emerge from the ITT Chile papers is that one of the company's men, in a telephone conversation with a Latin-American specialist in the White House, actually offered to help with the the cost of stopping Dr Allende "in sums of up to seven figures". Naturally the offer was not taken up, but the papers show no echo of any

clear sharp Administration voice telling ITT that this is not the way government is conducted.'

The incredulity which this account expresses is without foundation. There was nothing 'weird' about the fact that ITT 'actually' offered money to the State Department. As I pointed out above, the Anderson papers themselves show that the US played an active role in promoting Frei's successful bid for the presidency in 1964, and continued to funnel money into Chile to block the emergence of a Marxist president thereafter, so ITT had good reason to think that it would do so again. An offer to provide $1m to protect interests in Chile which it valued at over $150m was quite reasonable, particularly since a precedent had already been set. This explains why ITT were not rebuked for being prepared to assist financially; on the contrary, Meyer of the State Department 'said he could understand Mr. Geneen's concern and appreciated his offer to assist.'(28) Whether or not Meyer subsequently took up the offer is not clear from the papers; what is clear is that Broe of the CIA told ITT Vice-President Gerrity that 'money was no problem.'(40) There was thus also nothing 'natural' about the offer not being taken up; it was turned down (and, as we saw, subsequently used by ITT for other purposes), because sufficient funds had already been made available, at least to the CIA.

Be that as it may, the *Economist*'s report has created the impression that the ITT personnel came up with a 'weird' and 'unnatural' scheme to block Allende's bid for power. The 'natural' way of conducting government is that embodied in the methods favoured by Latin American experts in the State Department and the White House, who have the requisite know-how to deal with political affairs.

What is only implied in this description of the more sensational aspect of ITT's activities is quite explicit in the account the report gives of the corporation's role in implementing the Alessandri formula to thwart Allende's bid for the presidency. It will be remembered that this required that a climate of economic uncertainty and instability be created which was sufficiently unsettling to swing the allegiance of the Christian Democrats away from Allende or, failing that, to provoke military intervention. It is referred to on two separate, unrelated occasions in the article: 'A scheme was promoted which would have produced new elections but nothing came of it. This was the outcome that Mr. Korry predicted,' and 'Other memoranda in the file suggest that the ITT men buoyed up their fading hopes with thoughts of military intervention and of creating something they called "economic chaos" (a relative term in Chile) which might mysteriously cause Dr. Allende to be excluded, or to fall, from power. They do not contain any evidence that the ambassador or the State Department entertained either of these ideas.'

Both of these quotations suggest that the Alessandri formula was something dreamed up by ITT's employees, and both effectively discredit the political acumen of those personnel, suggesting that they lacked the know-how to pursue their objectives successfully and efficiently. It was presumably because of what the *Economist* called their 'unquenchable spirit' that they persisted with their ill-conceived plans, ignoring the rational advice of their political mentors. After all, Korry had 'predicted' that their scheme would fail; neither he nor the State Department 'entertained' any other possibility. (Although it is clear from the Anderson papers that it is the question of the formula's success that is at issue here, the second quote above is in fact so ambiguous that it might even be taken to mean that the measures proposed were so bizarre that they never even occurred to the political experts.) In the light of this it comes as no surprise to find that the report concludes that ITT, and, if it is at all representative, other multinational firms too do not have 'the appropriate men or the corresponding knowledge' to achieve political ends.

The use of the word 'mysteriously' in the second quotation above is particularly significant. It is not merely that it leads the reader to think that ITT's proposals for stopping Allende were hopelessly inappropriate. It is rather that there was nothing 'mysterious' at all about how economic chaos would do so; in fact, one of the ways in which ITT's men, and others, thought that this would happen is stated in the quotation itself, i.e. by creating a climate which would provoke the military to intervene. A careful reading of the Anderson papers leaves one in no doubt about this, since Barrellez unambiguously ties the two together: 'Chances of thwarting Allende's assumption of power now are pegged mainly to an economic collapse ... massive unemployment and unrest might produce enough violence to force the military to move.'(42-3)

This is a striking example of how ideological discourse structures an analysis, radically distorting the material at its disposal. In this instance the confusion arises in the following way. If the military had intervened, it would thereby have denied Allende the presidency. These are not two events, but one and the same event under two different descriptions. Economic chaos was the means thought most likely to achieve this single objective. Yet in the *Economist*'s report it is seen as a rival to military intervention; the experts are said not to have entertained '*either of* these ideas', which are construed as alternative means to the same end.

It may seem remarkable that the central link in the chain of events leading from economic collapse through unemployment and unrest to military intervention could thus disappear from view. Its absence indicated pressures arising from another source: the liberal democratic wedge between the political and the economic, the influence of which explains how it was possible for the report to regard military intervention and the inducement of economic chaos as separate, rival means to thwart Allende. Their isolation from one another governs the statement that ITT 'thought *of* military intervention and *of creating*' economic chaos, which identifies the economic sphere as the domain of activity of a business concern. This wedge is consolidated by the remark in the report that ITT thought that an economic collapse 'might *mysteriously*' block Allende, which implies both that its personnel's specialised skills do not extend beyond business matters, and that there is an unbridgeable gap between the political and the economic realms. In this respect the use of the term 'mysteriously' serves the same purpose as that served by the term 'naturally' in the first example discussed above; there it was said that White House officials 'naturally' did not

accept ITT's offer of financial assistance for a program to stop Allende because this is 'not the way government is conducted'. By thus dovetailing liberal democratic and technocratic ideologies the report in question so structures its argument that the conclusion it reaches that multinational companies do not have significant political know-how and therefore power, is already contained in the premises from which it is drawn.

As another instance of this dovetailing one can cite the exclusion of any discussion of the contracts between ITT and the CIA from the report in the *Economist* which we are analysing here. This is presumably because, as a clandestine intelligence organisation, the CIA is supposedly not a political organ and the links established with it are accordingly deemed irrelevant to an evaluation of ITT's ability to control political affairs. The inverse of this position is that adopted by many radical critics of American involvement in the third world: an exaggerated emphasis on the role of the CIA as an instrument of subversion to the exclusion of an appraisal of the political leverage contained potentially in 'foreign aid' programmes, for example, which are administered by more 'respectable' organisations. By assuming that injections of foreign capital are politically neutral, so that the only external threat to the sovereignty of the government in a 'less developed' country comes from an underground organisation like the CIA, these 'radical' critics are adopting a position consistent with the assumptions of liberal democratic ideology. They are not rejecting that mode of discourse; they are operating within its framework and contributing to its tenacity.

Another significant absence from the *Economist*'s report is an evaluation of ITT's activities from a moral point of view, i.e. the additional misery which the already oppressed would have faced if the attempts to create unemployment had succeeded in sparking off unrest, violence and bloodshed is nowhere commented upon. This is a consequence of the alleged value free and morally neutral character of technological statements which, identifying rationality with efficiency, relegate considerations about the harm done to others in achieving pursued ends to the 'irrational' and 'subjective', domains which lie beyond the scope of cold, calculating technical reason. That granted, the *Economist*'s conclusion that 'In short, nothing terrible was done' is not one that can be disputed by insisting that, on the contrary, by deliberately trying to create an explosive and unstable situation in Chile ITT did do 'something terrible', and potentially harmful to the oppressed masses in that country. For this is clearly not a moral judgement but one that reflects the tendency to reserve the notion of doing something for actions which achieve some objective, as if trying to achieve a goal is not also something that an agent can be said to do. This of course is a consequence of looking at actions only from the point of view of their efficiency or success in attaining a pursued end; if they fail to do so, not only has the agent done 'nothing terrible', it is sometimes even said that he has done nothing at all.

The systematic exclusion of moral considerations by the discourse that constitutes technocratic ideology and of behaviour which is guided by it, is symptomatic of its manipulative character. Its adherents assimilate the social to the natural universe, treating human beings and the groups and classes which they form as objects only to be reasoned about, and not as members of a rational species which can also be reasoned with. Control over them as individuals or groups is exercised by giving them reasons for pursuing the goal that the technocrat chooses for them. From his vantage point 'deviant' behaviour is either irrational or reveals that the agents have chosen to pursue a different objective which conflicts with the one preferred. These alternatives exact different responses from him. He can either argue that the agents in question are incapable of behaving rationally, and commit them to a mental institution, or he can escalate the pressures on the agents until the reasons which they have for pursuing the goal which has been set for them outweigh the reasons which they have for pursuing a 'dysfunctional' objective of their own choosing. The rational thing for them to do will then be to bow to the will of the technocrat and to pursue the goal which he has set for them. In either case the influence of technocratic ideology and the institutions which embody it gradually permeate society, and existing patterns of dominance are reproduced on an ever-expanding scale.

If this seems unduly exaggerated and pessimistic it is only because the account given here is one-sided. It is important to emphasise that the escalation referred to above rises in response to pressures springing from within the body of society itself and that the limits to which it can be pushed and the success which it achieves will themselves be subject to the prevailing balance of forces. On the other hand it would be a mistake to think that social theories do not insinuate themselves into the very body of society, structuring the social system to fit their patterns of commitments. Consider for example how readily a theorist like Downs[10] slips from a passive to a manipulative postures in his discussion of the meaning of economic rationality, which relies heavily on the technocratic conception of reason:

> *Economic analysis thus consists of two major steps: discovery of the ends a decision-maker is pursuing, and analysis of which means of attaining them are most reasonable, i.e., require the least input of scarce resources. In carrying out the first step, theorists have generally tried to reduce the ends of each economic agent to a single goal, so that one most efficient way to attain it can be found. If multiple goals are allowed, means appropriate to one may block attainment of another; hence no unique course can be charted for a rational decision-maker to follow. To avoid this impasse, theorists posit that firms maximize profits and consumers maximize utility ... Even though we cannot decide whether a decision-maker's ends are rational, we must know what they are before we can decide what behaviour is rational for him.*[11]

On this view an economically rational society is one in which different groups of economic agents pursue a single goal uncompromisingly - the maximization of profits by the producer and the maximization or utility by the consumer. To ensure that limited resources are not used inefficiently, 'we' must not 'allow' other goals to 'block' the attainment of these objectives. If society can be structured in such a way that each economic agent is given reasons sufficiently strong to outweigh all those which might distract him from their pursuit, an 'impasse' can be 'avoided' and a 'unique course can be charted' by 'us' which if followed will guarantee that no irrational waste of resources occurs. Technical reason notwithstanding, we are here clearly not confronted with a value-neutral theory, but one committed to the reproduction on an expanding and all-pervasive scale of the capitalist mode of production, the success of which demands engineered conformity.

The 'we' of whom Downs speaks in the above quotation refers of course to the experts, the faceless theorists who have 'tried to reduce the ends of each economic agent to a single goal'. This elevation of the technocrat to the status of the guardian of rationality is an integral feature of a mode of ideological discourse which assimilates the social to the natural world with the manipulative consequences we have been examining. It arises because the relationship between the expert and the layman in the natural sciences is one which, by definition, excludes the socialisation of most, if not all the former's knowledge beyond the confines of the scientific community of which he or she is a member. If

an astronomer predicts that a comet will appear over Britain in January 1974, the fact that he or she, as an expert, thinks that this is so, is a good reason that a layman can have for thinking that the comet will appear. As a layman, the reasons which the astronomer has for thinking this do not enter into the formation of his beliefs; those reasons are rather subject to criticism from fellow members in the community of astronomers who are sufficiently familiar with the theory on which the prediction was based. The natural scientist reasons about nature and with scientific colleagues, and his or her conclusions constitute the rational grounds for many of the layman's beliefs about the natural world.

If the social world is reduced to the natural one, considerations like these come into play structuring the way in which a theorist like Downs thinks about his object of study. If one is to escape from the constraints imposed by a technocratic ideology it is essential that one concede that when dealing with human societies, the object of study comprises groups of rational interacting human beings, who can both be reasoned about and reasoned with. This implies that the community of social scientists can, potentially at least, be expanded to embrace the members of society themselves, and with this socialisation and democratisation of knowledge the distinction between layman and expert is progressively eroded. Along with it the opinion of the 'expert' loses its sacrosanct character and no longer serves in itself as a rationally adequate ground for the 'layman's beliefs about society.

Considerations like these provide us with some idea of the sense in which an ideology may be said to 'reflect' a material base. For it is now clear that the technocratic mode of thought derives its plausibility from the fact that it is grounded in a social system which is characterised by a rigid division of labour, and by a corresponding fragmentation, specialisation and hierarchisation of knowledge, which is taken to be of the 'natural order' of things. As a consequence of these divisions the utterances of those who wield power are set up as if they were not to be questioned by the masses, who are always confronted by jargon whenever they attempt to penetrate beyond the claims of those in authority. As such the ideology not only 'reflects' a social system, it also legitimates and reinforces it, precisely by posing questions which presuppose its basic divisions rather than undermining them. What is more, as we have seen above, a technocratic ideology also serves as a basis for the reproduction and intensification of these divisions from which it springs to the extent that it is embodied in institutions which so structure society that conflicts between 'multiple goals' are not 'allowed'.

Explanations of this kind do not exclude explanations for the tenacity of ideological discourse which appeal to bias, like those which were presented in the earlier part of this paper. As was suggested there, the occurrence of bias has itself to be explained in terms of a particular kind of social structure, and what we have done here is to unravel some of the characteristics of that structure. What has emerged is that the cleavages which underpin liberal democratic ideology and the related technocratic ideology can be woven into the very framework of a social formation, shackling in the first instance the minds of the intellectuals who reflect on it. Nothing short of a revolution in consciousness is required of them if they are to free themselves from the limits it imposes.

Notes

1 L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, New Left Books, 1971, p21.

2 I am grateful to Roy Edgley and John Mepham for extensive criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.

3 J. Mepham, 'The Theory of Ideology in *Capital*', *Radical Philosophy 2*, Summer 1972, pp12-19.

4 L. Althusser, *ibid.*, pp127-186.

5 R. Edgley, *Reason in Theory and Practice*, Hutchinson, 1969.

6 R. Edgley, 'Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom', to be published in John Mepham (ed.), *Ideology, Social Science, Freedom of Speech*, Harvester Press, 1974.

7 N. Girvan, *Copper in Chile*, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1972, p60.

8 This is discussed in more detail in my 'Copper: The Chilean Experience', of which I have a few copies available.

9 *Subversion in Chile: A case study in U.S. corporate intrigue in the Third World*, Spokesman Books, 1972. Figures in brackets in the text refer to page numbers in this selection from the Anderson papers.

10 A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper and Row, 1957, pp4-5, 6.

Wittgenstein and bourgeois philosophy

KT Fann

Most Marxist philosophers dismiss Wittgenstein as a typical bourgeois philosopher whose philosophy is essentially reactionary. It is strange that these same Marxist philosophers find it perfectly permissible for Marx to learn from the arch idealist-conservative philosopher Hegel but do not permit themselves the benefit of learning from a philosopher of Wittgenstein's stature. Just as Marx had to settle his philosophical accounts with Hegel modern Marxist philosophers must settle their accounts with Wittgenstein.

It is true that the formalism, solipsism, and mysticism of the early Wittgenstein was bourgeois philosophy at its logical extreme. Precisely because of this, Wittgenstein's later attack on his early philosophy constitutes a major attack on bourgeois philosophy in general. The later Wittgenstein was a fighter against bourgeois philosophy from within. His attack on formalism, solipsism and skepticism, his characterization of traditional philosophy as a kind of disease to be cured, his branding of metaphysical statements as nonsense, and his urging his students to quit academic philosophy and do something useful - all this and more can only be regarded as a progressive movement within bourgeois philosophy. Like the proverbial child who called attention to the king's nakedness Wittgenstein called attention to the emptiness of bourgeois philosophy.

Engels remarked somewhere that those who employed the Hegelian method became revolutionaries and those who followed the Hegelian system became reactionaries. Wittgenstein made a significant contribution to the philosophical method which may well prove to be an important contribution to the